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The logicatom is defined, and it is argued that this repre;;eut;; the quantum of knowledge. 
Theory networks encapsulating a set of logicatoms and the dynamic relations between them, are 
defined. It is shown that these structures call emulate cellular automa.toll systems and in particular, 
simulate universal Turing machines. 
The regulating priuciple of natural selection is formalised together with its neces"ary and sufficient 
conditions. It is proven that there exists inverted theory networks (an analogous construct to theory 
I1Nworks) that satisfy all the requirements specified for natural self'ction to regulat.f' t.heir dynamics. 
The applicability of inverted theory networks to modelling thought is analysed. Further, inverted 












This thesis represents a long and arduous journey in my life. Along this journey, many mentors, 
friends and loved ones carried me when I had given up and thrown in the towel. I would thus like 
to take this time to briefly describe this journey and portray the heroines in my story. 
When I was fourteen years old, I distinctly remember sitting at my desk, bouncing a tennis ball on a 
maths book and promising myself that I will one day understand why the ball falls. This promise led 
me to learn and love mathematics and physics, resulting in me studying towards a masters degree 
in cosmology at the University of Cape Town in 1994. My thesis topic at that time entailed the 
analysis of Berry's phase, a phenomenon in quantum physics that is solely explained using geomet-
ric concepts. The idea was to see if all of quantum theory could be rewritten using geometrical 
concepts, with the final objective being to 'geometrise quantum theory' (as opposed to quantising 
general relativity). Needless to say, after two years, I had achieved nothing except frustration and 
confusion. My supervisor then stipulated that I write a review of all research done in this field in 
order to complete my degree. From my perspective, I had failed in my original promise and thus 
threw in the toweL My dream of becoming an academic who works for the sole purpose of discovering 
truth collapsed and I entered the financial markets, selling my mathematical skills to asset manage-
ment companies solely for the accumulation of capital. I had given up searching for the truth and 
tried to replace it with capital, a clearly inferior and, in my opinion, diametrically opposed objective. 
It was at this point that I met my wife, a zoologist who introduced me to the concepts of evolutionary 
biology. She gave me Richard Dawkins book, "The Selfish Gene". On reading it, that little child that 
needed to understand why the tennis ball fell, awoke within me once again. I thought he was dead -
he was actually only sleeping. Dawkins concept of a meme fascinated me and I decided to attempt 
to mathematically formalise them. I restarted a masters degree in pure mathematics focusing on 
logic. On attempting to mathematically formalise memes, I started recognising characteristics in 
my structures that reminded me of the research I had done ten years previously. Here the writings 
of John Wheeler guided me in seeing the similarities between my structure and his hypothesised 
pregeometry. In effect, the last ten years have led me full circle and I believe that I have come some 
way in solving that original thesis topic. 
Every story has its villains, heroes and heroines. They are all fundamental in bringing the saga 












physics and biology what I believed: That the universe was one big brain - that the same regulating 
principle that constructed unalterable beliefs in my brain created the unalterable physical laws that 
we observe - that the mathematical platform used to describe dynamical knowledge in my head 
and that used to describe physical law was one in the same - that physical law itself evolved by 
natural selection - that the reason the ball fell was because general relativity ended up being one 
of the fittest laws that survived. These statements evoked both scorn and laughter and it was at 
this point that my mentors and loved ones came to the fore. Firstly to my wife Nikki, who never 
stopped believing in me, even though I often did. Thank you. Without you, none of this would have 
been possible. Secondly, to my supervisor Ingrid who allowed me the academic freedom to express 
these ideas and helped me sculpt this work into the robust mathematical proofs that constitute this 
thesis. Thank you. Without your input and guidance, (T EA)-l theory would have remained a hand 
waving exercise. 
Cape Town, South Africa 













The three postulates that form the foundation of this thesis are introduced. These motivate the 
problem statement and thesis objective. I conclude with an overview of the remainder of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Bertrand Russell, Richard Dawkins and John Archibald Wheeler provide me with the postulates 
from whence this thesis arises. 
1.1.1 Russell's Logical Atomism 
The primary hypothesis adopted in this thesis is that of logical atomism. Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and Bertrand Russell were the prime exponents of this philosophy. The logical atomism view of 
reality assumes that all knowledge must begin with sensory experience. Genuine information about 
the world must be acquired by a posteriori means, so that nothing can be thought without first being 
sensed. From this beginning, Russell argued that everything else follows by logical analysis. Simple 
facts like 'It is raining' are the atomic facts or 'logical atoms' upon which all human knowledge is 
grounded. In particular, Russell claims in t.he fifth chapter of The Problems of Philosophy (1912): 
"Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents 
with which we are acquainted." This statement forms the founding argument in the formal 
definition of a 'logical atom'. 
1.1.2 Dawkins' Meme 
Richard Dawkins hypothesised the existence of a 'meme' [15, 16]. In order to define a meme, he 












their phenotype [26J. The genotype (nucleic acids) represents the underlying genetic coding while 
the phenotype (proteins) is the expression of the genotype within an environment. Dawkins defined 
the meme as "a unit of information residing in the human brain" [15]. Just as the phenotype of a 
particular gene complex in a species determines a particular trait e.g. blue eyes in human beings, the 
phenotype of a meme complex represents a concept that can be understood, learnt or sensed. This 
can be represented as a collection of words, music or visual images. One can view Dawkins meme 
as equivalent to Russell's logical atom. However, Dawkins' genius carne in observing the regulating 
principle of these entities. Dawkins hypothesised that the dynamic behaviour of memes is governed 
by natural selection. From an intuitive perspective, consider the following example. This thesis 
represents the phenotype of a meme complex existing in the author's brain. By reading it, the reader 
has allowed the meme complex to make a copy of itself in the reader's brain. Thus memes have the 
property of reproduction. Now the reader will understand this thesis in a different way to the 
author (or any other reader for that matter) due to the incoming knowledge interacting with the 
existing knowledge in the reader's head. Thus the meme complex can be said to have mutated as 
a copy was made. Finally, depending on whether the reader thinks this thesis is of any value to the 
scientific community or not, he/she may recommend others to read it, or he/she might forget entirely 
about it. Thus the meme complex exhibits the property of differential fitness i.e. its spread and 
survival depends upon its makeup - in this particular instance, its acceptance within the scientific 
community. This fitness may be quantified by the number of citations in future scientific work. The 
three properties stated in bold are exactly the necessary requirements of natural selection [17, 47]. 
The second hypothesis is encapsulated in the statement: 'Natural selection acts on memes and 
regulates their survival, resulting in the fittest rneme surviving.' 
1.1.3 Wheeler's Pregeometry 
Einstein's theory of general relativity [22] elevated the importance of the underlying spacetime struc-
ture in physics. Prior to the theory, the spacetime continuum was regarded as the arena in which 
the laws of physics act. Einstein's field equations dictated that energy curved spacetime and space-
time in turn prescribed the dynamics of classical energy. In Wheeler's words [55], general relativity 
"dethroned spacetime from a post of preordained perfection high above the battles of matter and 
energy, and marked it as a new dynamic entity participating actively in this combat." What was 
previously perceived as a gravitational force field is now known to be the effects of curved space-
time. Further, physical laws such as the conservation of energy and momentum ended up being a 











the next logical step by asking the question: 'Is the spacetime continuum all there is to physics?' 
In other words, can curved spacetime solely represent all the laws of physics. To answer this ques-
tion, the theory of geometrodynamics was born. Geometrodynamics is the study of the geometry of 
curved empty space and the relative dynamics of subspaces therein, as prescribed by the Einstein 
field <,quations. Misner and Wbeeler [78] went some way to show that da.'lsical physics embodying 
gravitation, electromagnetism, IloIl-quantised charge and non-quantised mass can be represented 
as purely geometrical phenomena. This theory reached its explanatory limit when attempting to 
discuss quantum phenomena. The limitation in the theory was identified in that it was constrained 
to operate in a differentiable manifold. There was no natural way of modelling the dynamics in the 
underlying topology. To overcome this barrier, \Vheeler hypothesised the existence of a 'pregeom-
etry'. Wheeler argued that spacetime itself must be understood in terms of the more fundamental 
structure. The underlying principle of such a structure was to be found in its simplicity. In partic-
ular, Wheeler stated [79]: "All of physics, in my view, will be seen someday to follow the pattern 
of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, of regularity based on chaos, of 'law without law'. 
Specifically, I believe that everything is built higgledy-piggledy on the unpredictable outcomes of 
billions and billions of elementary quantum phenomena, and that the laws and initial conditions 
of physics arise out of this chaos by the action of a regulating principle, the discovery and proper 
formulation of which is the number one task of the coming third era of physics." 
1.2 Problem statement and thesis objective 
These disparate topics are linked in the following way: Russell's logical atom is analogous to Dawkins' 
meme. Russell's postulate describes properties regarding the quanta of thought; Dawkins postulates 
what regulates these quanta. The question as to what this has to do with physics and Wheeler's 
pregeometry, comprising the hypothesised fundamental building blocks of physical law was elegantly 
answered by G.F.R. Ellis in :23]: "Human thoughts can cause real physical effects." If I have the 
intention of picking up a stone and throwing it, the result would be the physical effect of a stone 
hurtling through the air. "At present there is no way to express this interaction in the language of 
physics, even though our causal schemes are manifestly incomplete if this is not taken into account. 
The minimum requirement to do so is to include the relevant variables in the space of variables 
considered. That then makes these variables and their effects a part of physics - or perhaps of 
fundamental physics". Thus Wheeler's pregeometry must comprise the 'variables' that model intent 











hypothesised pregeometry. Further, the regulating principle sought after by Wheeler is none other 
than Darwin's law of natural selection, originally suggested in 1859 as the principle mechanism of 
evolutionary change. 
The above paragraph guided my research program resulting in the question "Can a formal 
paradigm be created in which to model these postulates?". I split this problem state-
ment up into 2 objectives: The construction objective encompasses defining a formal mathematical 
space comprised of entities that represent Dawkins' memes or Russell's logical atoms. Further, 
this objective encapsulates showing that the dynamics of the space is regulated by the principle of 
natural selection. The application analysis objective encompasses investigating if this space can be 
applied to analysing the dynamical properties of knowledge and whether it serves as a candidate 
for modelling pregeometries in physics. Needing to define a space that comprises a set of elements 
representing knowledge, I naturally enter the formal arena of knowledge representation description 
logics. Research within this broad mathematical arena is guided by Russell's claim that "every 
proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are 
acquainted". This is interpreted as saying that 'new' knowledge is made up of 'existing' knowledge 
i.e. all knowledge is comprised of knowledge. I use this to define the basic entity of my space - the 
logicatom. I then proceed to formally construct platforms comprising dynamic sets of these entities 
i.e. theory networks and inverted theory networks. In order to prove that these structures are reg-
ulated by natural selection, I derive the necessary and sufficient requirements for it to be said that 
natural selection regulates the dynamics of a space. The construction objective is met through the 
construction of a particular inverted theory network, whereupon I prove that it is regulated by nat-
ural selection. The application analysis objective is met since it completely guided the construction 
of the space under consideration. Various case studies are given throughout the thesis that show 
the various applications of these structures to multiple fields of study. 
1.3 Layout 
Chapter 2 begins by providing an overview of knowledge representation using modal logic and 
proceeds to motivate the definition of the logicatom. Theory networks. a space comprising these' 
entities, are constructed and formally defined using basic maps in modal logic. I then proceed to 
show how knowledge is actually modelled within theory networks and conclude by showing how these 
structures can simulate the dynamics of cellular automata systems. All work done in this chapter is 











In Chapter 3, the theory of natural selection is formalised resulting in the proofs of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for it to regulate a space. The search for theory networks that are regulated 
by natural selection lead me to an analogous construct, an inverted theory network. The chapter is 
concluded with a proof showing the existence of an inverted theory networks that satisfies all the 
requirements of natural selection. All work done in this chapter is the author's original work. 
In Chapter 4, I argue why inverted theory networks can be used to define a pregeometry, with 
specific emphasis on classical physical observables such as the dimension of space-time. F\lrther, I 
argue how quantum theory could arise within this platform and discuss how this same formalism 
could model the dynamics of knowledge i.e. thought. Work done in this chapter encompasses a 
mathematical reformulation of existing research in physics. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by detailing exactly what has and has not been achieved. Further 
research objectives relevant to this work are stated in a single hypothesis. 
Appendix A contains the mathematics pertaining to all algorithms used in simulation programs 











Constructing Theory Networks 
This chapter introduces theory networks, the formal structure that underpins the foundation of 
all work in this thesis. Section 2.1 reviews basic concepts and notation used in the basic modal 
language. Section 2.2 informally motivates the definitions required in the construction of a theory 
network. Section 2.3 then proceeds to formalise these notions using the language of modal logic. This 
formalisation will result in a set of tools that will be used to reason about these spaces. Section 2.4 
provides varions case studies showing how knowledge is described within theory networks. Section 2.5 
provides case studies showing how theory networks can simulate the dynamics of cellular automata 
systems. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter by summarising all results. 
2.1 Knowledge representation using modal logic 
"Logic is the glue that binds together methods oj reasoning, in all domains." 
D. Gries and F.B. Schneider [33]. 
I review propositional calculus and the basic modal language using definitions and examples from 
Blackburn, de Rijke and Venema's authoritive book on modal logic [7). Refer to [7] for the historical 
background concerning modal logic a..<; well as examples showing how modal logic can be used for 
knowledge representation. 
Definition 2.1.1. The language of classical propositional calculus (PropCal) is built up using 
a countable set of propositional variables <P usually denoted by p, q, r, .... The set Form ( <p) of the 
well-formed formulas (wff) of PropCal are constructed using the rule: 
where p ranges over all propositional variables in <P. This means t.hat a formula is either a proposi-
tional variable, the propositional contradiction, a negated formula, the disjunction of a formula or 












Abbreviations for implication ¢ V!!;, bi-implication 6 <-->1/' (6 <->!1;) 1\ (1/' .;-, ¢) and the 
propositional tautology T ,~L are used throughout the thesis. If the set of propositional variables 
<I>n = {p 1, P:z, ... , Pn} is finite, I denote the language as PropCaln . One introduces the semantics of 
PropCal using valuations. A valuation can be viewed as a mapping to: <I> --; {O, I}, assigning to each 
propositional variable in <I> thr val11eR TRUE( = 1) or FALSE( = 0). This is extended inductively to all 
propositions in Form (ib). The set W of all possible valuations is referred to as the set of possible 
worlds. Any proposition true under all valuations is called a tautology; conversely, any proposition 
false under all valuations is called a contradiction. I denote the set of all valuations that map 1/' to 
is known as the meaning of 1/'. Two propositions ¢ and 1/' 
are said to be logically equivalent ¢ 1/J iff l¢j 
PropCal can be axiomatised as a logic using a particular system. Examples include Gentzen (natural 
deduction systems), Beth (Tableau systems) and Hilbert-style systems [6.1J. In a Hilbert-style system, 
the following inference rules are supplied to the system: 
• Modus ponens: From r/J and ¢ infer 
• Uniform substitution: From <:;;, infer () where () is obtained from 9 by uniformly replacing 
propositional variables in r/J by arbitrary formulae. 
It is then proven that they preserve the valuations. Certain tautologies in the system are chosen 
as axioms e.g. ''''''P <--> p. One then procepds to show that thC's(' axioms are sound in that (,VPlY 
theorem produced from these axioms and the inference rules is a tautology. Completeness is proven 
by showing that every tautology is in fact a theorem. PropCal will be used to describe the logicatom 
I wish to model. However, as will be shown in Section 2.2, a relational structure is, by construction, 
a necessity in the definition of the logicatom. Modal logic provides one with a simple, yet expressive 
language for talking about relational structures. 
Definition 2.1.2. The basic modal language ML(O, ib) is built up using a set of propositional 
variables ib and a unary modal operator 0 ('diamond'). The well-formed formulas 4> E Porm(O, ib) 
of the basic modal language are given by the rule: 
¢ ::= 1) I 1. I 
where P ranges over all propositional variables ib. 
The difference with PropCal is that one can prefix a formula by a diamond. The dual operator 0 
('box') for the diamond is defined by 04> := ....,O,r/J. There are various readings for diamond and 











auto-epistemic logic [56] where the basic modal language is used to reason about knowledge itself. 
In this case D<1J is interpreted as meaning 'the agent knows that ¢'. In provability logic, D¢ is read 
as 'it is provable in some arithmetic theory that ¢'. l\Iore than Olle modality call be used to defiue a 
basic modal language as in the case of the Basic Temporal Language. Here the modalities (F;, (P) 
are interpreted as follows: (F)¢ reads .¢ will be true at some point in the Future', while (P)q) reads 
.¢ was true at some point in the Past'. The list continues and detailed application examples are 
shown in [7]. One int.erprets the basic modal langnage using relational structures. Clarifying the 
notation and terminology used with relational structures, a binary relation R from a set X to a set 
Y is defined as a subsf't of the eartesian prodnet. X x Y. Binary relations are denoted by the symbols 
R. S, T, .... The notation xRy mealls that (x, y) R. In all cases that follow, I consider binary 
relations for the case when X Y. The image set of x under R is denoted by R(x) = {y I xRy}. 
In the interpretation of the basic modal language, the semantics is given by Kripke structures or 
frames. 
Definition 2.1.3. A frame for the basic modal language is a pair F (iV, R) such that 
(i) lY is a non-empty set of possible worlds. 
(ii) R is a binary relation over W. 
This simple relational structure provides a setting in which to define the models of the basic modal 
language. 
Definition 2.1.4. A model for the basic modal language ML(O,if» is a pair ./V! = (F, V)= 
(vv. R V) where V is a valuation mapping each proposition variable p E if> to a set of worlds 
V(p) <: W. Formally V is a IIlap from the propositional variables to the power set of W Le. 
i" : if> ----'; p( W). 
One uses these definitions to interpret the basic modal language in models, as specified by the 
following satisfaction definition. 
Definition 2.1.5. Consider a model .M = (W, R, V) with wEill a world in the model. One 
inductively defines the notion of a formula ¢ being true in M at world w as follows: 
• M, u: 1= p iff ill E V(p) with p E if>. 
• It is not the case that Art, 11) 1= .L 
• .vt. to b -,4> iff it is not the case that .M, to 1= 4>. 
• .M, tv ~'c <b V 1./J iff Jvt,w 1= ¢ or M,w 1= 0. 











The relational structure together with the fact that these notions are intrinsically local, in the sense 
that each formula is evaluated inside a particular world, provide the powerful description language 
required to achieve the construdion objective. Global truth is naturally de filled as nuth in every 
world. 
Definition 2.1.6. A formula ~6 is globally tr1J,e in a model M (W, R. V) if it is satisfied at every 
world W E W in the model J\1 
The following example [7] shows the intuition behind all the definitions thus far: 
Example 2.1.1. Consider the frame F '-~ (Wi) W2, WI, Wj, W,-" R) where wiRwj iff j 
model (F, V) over <1>3 = {p,q,r} has valuation V defined by: 
yep) {W2,W3} 
V(q) W 
V(r) = 0 
The following is true: 
(i) M, WI F OOp 
i + 1. The 
One has ;\1, W3 F p since 1113 Yep). Thus .M, W2 F Op since the image set of 1l'2 is 
R(W2) {w:d. Finally. A1,Wl F OOp since WIRw2 and .M,'U'2 F p as required. 
(ii) M F Oq 
It is true that ViM, Wi F q (q is true at all worlds) by definition of the valuation. 
The above definitions and simple example shows two important aspects of models in the basic modal 
language that further reinforce my view that this is the correct mathematical toolkit in which to 
analyse the thesis objective. Firstly, the example shows that one has a structure in which global 
propositions (e.g. M ~= OIJ in Example 2.1.1 um be vif'wed as a law that specifies the physics 
throughout the universe) and local propositions (e.g. M. WI 1= ODp in Example 2.1.1 can be viewed 
as a belief that determines an individuals actions) could live in harmony with each other. This is 
exactly a property that I would require of any pregeometry, if I am to adopt Whecler's hypothesis 
that pregeometries underly all observables in nature. The observation of someone picking up a stone 
and throwing it has 2 distinct features the person's intent to pick up the stone and throw it and 
the gravitational law that determines the path the stone follows. Secondly, the relation R endows 
the space with a geometric structure, a requirement for any pregeometry. Further, this geometric 
structure is intricately linked to the 'local and global laws' of the model, the geometrodynamical 
view of physics. To motivate this point, I will proceed to show some examples of how globally true 
formulae in a model determine global geometrical aspects of the underlying relational structure. 











Definition 2.1.7. A normal rnodallogic A i::; a set of forlIlula8 that cOlltainf:l the followillg axiom 
schemata: 
Taut All propositional tautologies 
Dual: Op"""" 
K : D(p -t q) Dq) 
and is closed under the inference rules: 
Modus ponens: From cb and q) -t 1/1, inferlJ' 
Uniform substitution: From cb, infer H where (J is obtained from cp by uniformly replacing 
propositional variables in cp by arbitrary formulae. 
Generalisation: From ¢, infer 
Throughout this I will work with the normal modal K. unless I specifically emphasise 
that I am working in standard propositional calculus. Inference within K will be denoted by f- K 
while f- denotes inference in PropCal. Example 2.l.2 shows how the a.xiom schemata of models in a 
normal modal logic specify properties of the relation R of a frame :F (W. R) and thus from another 
perspective, the geometry. For the physicist reading this work, Example 2.1.2 shows the well known 
correspondence proofs [7] linking a property of a relation in a model, to a modal formula that is 
globally true in the model. Intuitively, the example show how the axioms in a model constrain the 
'geometry' of the underlying space. 
Example 2.1.2. Consider a model M (W, R. V). Then Vw E H',11'Rw (i.e. R is reflexive) iff 
\I ¢ E FOl'm( ° , <1» • M F -t cb 
('ho()s(' Hll arhitral'." W E lV. Now assume A1, U' F for some q) E Form(O, <1». Then \Iv It' 
such that u'Rl' 011(' has jvL v F cb. But wRw implying M. W F cb. Thus M. w F Dd> -t rp. Sillce 
this is true for every IJ! E lV, one can deduce ;v1 d> as required. Conversely, assume R is 
not reflexive. Thus 3w E TV such that not wRu.'. To falsify.M F -t cb for some cb E FOl'm(<>, <1», 
collsidl'l' a \'alnHtioll V whert' V(¢) = n" {w}. Then, by definition, .M. w.lt' d>. On the other hand, 
consider v s.t. wRv. This implies w i v. whicb ill turn illlplip,; v E V(¢), allowing one to conclude 
M, U (j). Since v was arbitrary, one has M, 11' F Dd> implying .A-1, w .It' 00 -t ¢ and thus finally 
A1.1t'Do O. 












2.2 Manufacturing consent 
"Saddam Hussein is a threat to America. He's a threat to our friends. He's a man who said he 
wouldn't have weapons of mass destruction, yet he has them. He's a man that not only has weapons 
of mass dest1'Uction, he's used them. JJ - C. W. Bush l 
This section informally guides one towards the formal definition of the logical atom and the structure 
of the space, theory networks, in which it lives. I will proceed by modelling one of my beliefs. This 
will in turn motivate the definitions and behavioural requirements of logicatoms. Suppose I believe 
Chomsky's thesis of 'manufacturing consent ' , an argument stating how the population of the USA 
live in an orwellian world order where capital (equated with power) dictates what the masses must 
know and believe [37]. In order to present this belief to any rational person, I am required to argue 
why I believe this. So here goes. 
Manufacturing Minority with 
Consent Majority Power 
A minority with majority Neo-liberal capitalism 
power use their power focuses the majority 
to predominantly power in the hands 
influence the beliefs of a minority 
of the masses Neo-Liberal 
~ 
Capitalism 
L/ A minority manufacture 
the consent of the 
masses to enforce the 
belief in, and acceptance 
of, neo-liberal capitalism. 
Figure 2.1: The thesis of manufacturing consent 
First of all, I believe that the short term profit objective of nea-liberal capitalism, the dominant 
model adopted by the USA concentrates the majority capital into the hands of a minority (as con-
firmed by a reading of any fortune 500 magazine) . I thus conclude that a minority have the majority 
power (where I use capital to quantify power). The system is stable in the sense that it is self-
perpetuating, since the powerful minority can use their power to manufacture the consent of the 
masses to accepting nea-Iiberal capitalism. This allows them to further their own capital interests 











and tllUti accumulate lllore capital (and tJlUS power by definition). Any altemative structure in soci-
ety that truly questions this model or the powerful minority interests will find themselves in conflict 
with those who have the power to regulate what the masses know and believe through media com-
panies owned by them, and governed by the regulating principle encapsulated in the mantra: 'Our 
short term profit objective rlictates that .... '. The most important aspect of the' above argument is 
not to convince the reader to join anti-globalisation groups (although I personally don't think that's 
a bad idea), but that in trying to explain why I believe in manufacturing consent, I was required 
to introduce other beliefs of mine e.g. that neo--liberal capitalism implies the minority have the 
majority capitaL My beliefs are built up using existing beliefs. Figure 2.1 shows how I construct 
my belief of manufacturing consent using my other beliefs. The header of each rectangle represents 
the names of the various beliefs. The body represents a description in terms of associated beliefs. 
The arrows point to any beliefs that are mentioned in the description. Note that each individual 
rectangle does not represent a belief by itself. However, the combination of the three rectangles 
together with their relationships do. To observe this, start in the manufacturing consent rectangle 
and move counter-clockwise (in the opposite direction of the arrows), reading each description in 
turn. 
The argument that beliefs comprise other beliefs is analogous to Russell's statement: "Every propo-
sition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are ac-
quainted." The natural question arises as to whether there is a set of quantum beliefs that one can 
use to build up my belief in manufacturing consent? I adopt Min.."lky's [54J argument in doubting 
"the fe&<;ibility of representing ordinary knowlerlge effectiwly in the form of many small indepen-
dently true propositions" formally, the propositional variables of a description logic. In other 
words. attempting to define the quantum of belief (hereafter referred to as the logicatom) as having 
the formal representation of propositional variables in some logic will not serve my purposes. Even 
if one constrains the problem to only modelling knowledge ('fact' as opposed to a 'belief'), I argue 
that there can be no fundamental building blocks to 'knowledge' since these building blocks would 
require 'knowledge' to describe them. Consider the statement 'It is mining'. This statement can 
only be constructed once the concept 'water falls from the sky' exists. This in return can only be 
constructed once the concept of 'water' and 'sky' exists .. For 'sky' to exist, I need the concept of 
'the view of space from earth' ... It is my thesis that this process could continue ad infinitum. This 
argument implies that the logicatom, the building block of knowledge and beliefs is constructed 
using other logicatoms i.e. knowledge and beliefs. In other words, I require something analogous 











defilling the logicatolll as an entity that has a particular nallle (e.g. manufacturing consent) and 
believes sometbing about the other logicatoms in its universe (e.g. 'A minority have the power to 
influence the heliefs of the masses'). To formalise this, I proceed as follows: 
Definition 2.2.1. A logicatom {l OWl' Pl'OpCal n is defined as an element of the cross product 
<Pn x Form( <Pn). rf'prf's('uted as an ordered pair (1', ¢) where P E <Pn is a propositional variable and 
0~ E Form(<Pnl is a formula ill PropCaln. 
I refer to the logicatom {l with {l := (p, ¢) a'3 name P and believing (/). Formally, I define the 
two projection operators N : <P x Form ( <P) <P and B : <P x Fa,m( if» --+ Form( if» with 
N(Ji) P representing the name and B(,L) ¢ representing the belief of the logicatom/L In terms 
of notation. {l.v will usually be used to represent logicatoms. P, q, r, ... proposition variables and 
Q, Ib, ... the well formed formulae. 
Now consider a set. of these logicatoms. Intuitively, the belief of a logicatom is a belief about 
the logicatoms in the universe in which it resides. For example, assume logicatom Ji defined by 
{l := (PO,PI 1\ P2) has name Po and believes say that both the logicatoms named Pl and P2 are 
true. This would only make sense if their was only one logicat.om named PI (respectively P2) in its 
respective space, I thus only consider sets U of logie-atom::; OWl' PropCaln that the condition 
v iff N(/l) N(v). I have an entity that lives in a space and believes something 
about the space it lives in, its belief being made up of elements comprising the space. 
Example 2.2.1. A pictorial example of the concepts defined using PropCab is shown in Figure 2.2. 
The names of the logicatoms are shown in the boxes above the ellipses, and their respective beliefs 
in the underlying ellipses. 
Figure 2.2: A logicatom universe over PropCal3 
A logician may at first find it strange that names are atomic beliefs. The previous example of 











me, as the value thereof will become clear in later sections. I now need to consider the structures 
required to model the dynamical behaviour of logicatoms. Intuitively, this will be encapsulated in 
the belief revision of each logicatom. Now the natural mechanism (from a physics perspective) would 
be to allow logicatoms to interact and through their interaction, change their state. This will result 
in a new (and maybe diff('f('nt) logicatom llniYerse. In order for a logicatom to intemct, it needs to 
know of the existence of other logicatoms. This can be represented as a binary relation R on U. Now 
guided by modern theories of physics that are predominantly local in their description of nature, I 
impose a constraint on the binary relation R, in that it must be local. I now constrain the definition 
of a 10gicatoIIl universe to be a pair (U l R) where U comprises a set of uniquely named logicatoms 
on'r PropCaln and R <::: U x U is a local binary relation. Before I proceed to formalise the definition 
of the local relatioll, I present an example showing how such a relation can be defined. 
Example 2.2.2. Given logicatoms p, v E U, define the loeal relation of U to be a binary relation 
R U x U given by 
J.LRv iff f- B(J.L) -> N(v) 
The inference f- is the standard inference of PropCal. This definition says that two logicatoms /-L, v 
are related if and only if the belief of J.L implies the name of v in PropCaln . This relation is dearly 
local since one can determine all the inferences of the propositional variables for any proposition ¢ 
in PropCaln . This relation is shown for the example of logic atoms in Figure 2.3 below. It will be 
referred to as the afjirmed impl'ication r'elation. 
Figure 2.3: A universe comprising related logicatoms 
One can formalise the definition of the local relation of a logicatom universe using the definition of 
a relation generating function. 
Definition 2.2.2. A relation generating funct'ion owr PropCaln is defined as a function 











Given logicatoms 11, v over <1'n and a relation generating [unction R j : Form( <1'n) --> P( <1'n), one can 
define the binary relation by 
11.R1/ iff N(l/) Rr [E(Ii)] 
Relation generating functions capture the essence of the local requirement, since what J1 is related 
to is determined solely by its belief B(,l.) u::;iug a well defiucd fUIlction Hr. 
Definition 2.2.3. A logicatom mdverse over PropCaln is defined as the pair (U, Rf ) where U is a set 
of Tl distinct logic atoms satisfying the unique naming constraint i.e. for every logicatom 11, l/ E U , 
It 1/ iff ""(/1) N(l/), and Rj : Forrn(<1'n) P{<1'n) is a relation generating function that generates 
the binary relation R C U x U capturing local relationships between logicatoms. 
The final requirement for completion of this platform, is 'change'. This is clear since our objective 
will be to show that the way a logicatom universe changes is regulated by natural selection. Once 
again, motivated by physics, I require this change to be local in nature. Now given a logicatom 
p E U in a logicatom universe (U, Rf). consider the image set of p under R, the binary relation 
generated by the relation generating function Rj- One has 
R{tt) {vEU I/iRv} 
{l/ E U I N(v) E RrlB{fl)]} 
The image set R(I1) specifies the 'local' set of iogicatoms that could possibly influence how J1 changes. 
Now the name or the belief of 11 could possibly change. If one was t.o allow the name of /1. to change, 
OIle could in no way guarantee that the new set of logicatoms generated will satisfy the unique naming 
constraint. For the required dynamic behaviour, I will thus only allow the beliefs of logicatoms to 
(possibly) change. This will be encapsulated in a transition rule that maps a logicatom universe 
(U. Hr) to a new logicatom universe (U', Rr) hy dmnging the heliefs of the logieatoIlls in U. The 
new belief of a logic atom will be determined solely by information local to the logicatoID i.e. the 
set mmprising the logicatorn and its related logiratoms. (Note that the local rriterion specified is 
exactly the same as for transition functions of cellular automata :2.) The relation generating map 
will generate a new binary relation R' C (1' x U' from the new set of beliefs. 
~~- ..... -------------











Example 2.2.3. An example of a transition rule T : Form( if» ~ Form ( <p) that upuates the beliefs 
of logicatoms in a universe U is defined as follows: Assume fLRvi for some set {VI, 1/2, ... , Vk} u. 
T specifies that the belief of fL gets 1Ipdatell hy uuifonllh' snhstitllting ('wry O('CUlTPll(,U of N(1/d in 
B(p) with B(l/,) and evaluating the new proposition. This update rule is shown in Figure 2.4 where 
I have used the affirmed implication relation as specified in Example 2.2.2. :'\ote that the transition 
rule updates the beliefs of the logicatoms and consequently, the relations between them, resulting in 
a new logicatom universe U f • 
The logicatom universe U The updated universe U' =- T(U) 
r 
."" 
Figure 2.4: The dynamics of a logicatoms universe 
A space comprising logicatoms Ims heen defined. These logiLatollls 'believe' something ahout the 
universe they live in. This belief determines who they 'see' in their universe. This in turn determines 
how their bdief will chang(l. I thus haW' all t h" tools to definf' a theory nf'twork over PropCaln . 
Definition 2.2.4. A theor~' Iletwork O\'('r PropCal11 comprises a 3-tuple (U, Rj , T) wlwl'P (U, Rj ) 
is a logic atom universe and T ; Form{<Pn) ---> Jibrm(il>n) is a local transition function that maps a 
logicatom's belief to a new belief. The updated belief of the logicatom is determined solely by its 
current belief and its related set of logicatoms' beliefs. 
The 3-tupk allows me to gencrate a series of logicatoll1 uniw'rses (( UIJ, Rj ), (U1 , Rj), (U2 , Rj ), ... ). A 
logicRtolll lluivprsl' (Ui , Rr) is determincd hy the uuiwl'se (Ui - I , R j ) and tIlt' transition rule' T. The 
local binary relation is generated using the relation generating function R j . and call change from 
OIle uuiverse to the next. 
I will conclude this section by intuitively arguing how this simple structure satisfies the behavioural 
characteristics I am after in terms of the construction objective. From a biological perspective, 
consider Dawkins' behavioural analogy of memes (or beliefs) with genes. Now the phenotype of 
the gene determines its morphology and physiological control i.e. its expression within the natural 











relation R generated by the relation gellerating function. The morphology thus specifies its relation 
to other logicatoms. By the analogy with genes this 'phenotype' should be determined by the logi-
catom itself i.e. locally. Section 3.5.2 will expand on this analogy and incorporate all other aspects 
required in the living sciences i.e. procreation, parenthood, transmission and mutation of genes etc. 
From a physkR perRp('ctive, Klinger and Cahill define the entitieR comprising their prcgeometric Rpace 
as "information denoting relationships" flO]. ~Iy definitions and requirements analogously stipulate 
that the' information content of a logicatom specificR its relatiollRhipR with othe'r logicatomR. reinforc-
ing the path I am following to create a structure that can serve to model a pregeometry in physics. 
Finally, from a knowledge modelling perspective, all one can conclude at the current time is that I 
have a structure built up using the language of logic, a platform for modelling knowledge. Towards 
this end, I will delve deeper into modal logic, with the objective of creating an alternative represen-
tation of theory networks and logicatom universes, that will be shown to be very useful for reasoning 
about the content and dynamics of this space. 
2.3 Alternative representations of theory networks 
I introduce this s('ction by stating; the standard definition;;; and theorems [7] that encapsulate thf' 
invariance results used for models in a basic modal language. These definitions and theorems will be 
used to arrive. at an alternative representation for logicatom universes and theory networks_ This 
alternative representation will allow me to extend the current definitions, allowing me to show how 
knowledge is modelled within this platform. 
Definition 2.3.1. Let. M 1 = (WI, Rl , Vd aml M 2 = (W2 , R 2 , V2 ) hl' two models of tilt' basic Jtlodal 
language Itf L ( 0, Ill). 
M2 is a submodel of ./"1 1 if W2 c:;:; WI, R2 RI n (W2 X W:2) (i.l'. R2 is the restriction of Rl to W2) 
and E III , V2 (p) ."" VI (p) n W2 . 
M2 is a gf'fll:mtu/ 8ubmodd of Ail (i.e .. _A/b .A.1d if /Vl2 is a submodel of Ml and the following 
closure condition holds: If wE Wz and WRIV then v E W2 . 
Theorem 2.3.1. Let A'll (Wt,R1, Vd and JVl2 = (H-2 ,R2 , \'2) be two models in the basic 
modal language such that • .vt2 is a generated submodel of M 1- Then for eve1'Y modal formula 











Definition 2.3.2. Let .A,11 (Wl . R]) Vd ilwi j\.'h 
homomorphism f from Ml to M2 written f : Ml 
the following properties: 
(lV".R'2. V2 ) I)" tWt) lllotiallllode/:,;. A 8trong 
}v1 2 is a function between lV[ and ~V! with 
(i) wand f( w) satisfy the same propositional variables; 
(ii) v E WI. wRj'v iff f( w )Rd( v). 
An isomorphism is a bijective strong homomorphism. 
Definition 2.3.3. Let Ml ,,= (~Vll R J , V]) awl :'vI2 (H~2' R2 • V2 ) he t\\'() lllodalulo(kls, A mapping 
f from M 1 to ,\.12 is a bounded morphism if it satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) wand f(w) satisfy the same propositional variables; 
(ii) f is a homomorphism with respect to the relations i.e. if wR11) then f(w)R2f(v); 
(iii) If f(w)R21121 then such that WRVI and f( I'd = V2· 
If there is a surjective bounded morphism from Ml to M 2 , then M2 is a bounded morphic image 
of .M}. 
Definition 2.3.4. Let J'vI 1 = (~~'l,Rl) Vd ami M 2 ,c (~V!,R'2' V'll 1)(' two lllodal lllOdds, A 1l0l1-
empty relation Z <;;;; Wi X W2 is called a modal bisimulation if the following hold: 
(i) If W I Z'I1:2 then WI and W2 satisfy the same propositional variables; 
Oi) IfWtZW2 andwjR11I}, then there exists a 112 E W:: such that W2R2V2 and IJIZV2 (the forth 
condition) ; 
(iii) If W1ZW2 andW2R'2V21 then there exists a v} E n"l such that wjR1Vl and t'tZV2 (the back 
condition). 
Throughout the thesis, I will be working with the notion of uniformly replacing propositional vari-
ables in a formula with other formulae. 
Definition 2.3.5. Consider the basic modal language Form( 0, iP n) over a finite set iPn of n propo-
sitional variables. A substitution is a map ~ . iPn ~ Form( 0, iP n). 
TlIP substitution induCf's t h,' map (.)'; : Form( 0, <I» ~ Form( 0, iP) knO\vn as uniform substitution 
which is recursively defined as follows: 









Given a substitution E, and a formula q;, one can denote the substitution instance ·if' of </J by~) := cl, 











I extend this concept to that of constrained 'unifor'm substitution. 
Definition 2.3.6. Let f. be a substitution map over the basic modal language Forrn( 0, iPn ), and 
let X ~ iP" be a subset of propositional variables. The substitution f. restricted to X, called the 
constrained 'uniform substitution, is denoted by f.lx and is defined by 
Wx) (p) { ~(p) ifpE X otherwise 
Example 2.3.1. Consider the substitution map f" defined by 
f,(p) q 1\ Or 
t,(q) p 
f.( r) q V 0 (p 1\ r) 
Let X = {q, r}, If rP p 1\ q 1\ l' then 
(p 1\ q 1\ if' = (q 1\ Or) 1\ p /I, (q V 0 (p 1\ r)) 
x (pl\qt\i,)~iY =pl\(qVO(pl\r)) 
I will now proceed to show that a logicatom universe (U, Rf ) OVH PropCaln can be uniquely repre-
sPllted by the pair (f., Rf ) where f. : <I>n Forrn(iP n ) is a substitution map as introduced in Definition 
P( <I>n) b a relatioll gelleratiug fuuctioll on'r PropCaln FIR defined in Def-
inition 2.2.2. This representation will enable me to analyse the various sought after characteristics of 
logicatom universes, as described in the thesis objective. In order to give the reader an intuitive feel 
of how I arrive at this alternative definition, I will first represent the logicatom universe of Example 
2.2.2 using a model of the basic modal language. 
Example 2.3.2. Define the model M = (H/.R. V) with W {/11./12,/13} and 




The model M completely determines the names (through the valuation mapping) and relationships 
(equivalent to the modal relationship) of the logic atom universe illustrated in Figure 2.3 of Example 
2.2.2. To complete the specification, I require a method of representing the beliefs of each logicatom. 














By specifying the belief of a logicatom J1 E Was being ~ (N(p,)), the logicatom universe defined ill 
Example 2,2.2 has been completely specified. To summarise, the set n: t.ogether with the valuation 
V determines the number of logicatoms and their corresponding names. The accessibility relation 
R idelltifies the relatiollships hetween the logicatoIlls. and the substitution t, in turn determines the 
belief of each logicatom. Finally note that the proposition 
<;> ( (p /\ .q /\ '1') V (.p /\ q t, '1') V (-.p /\ -.q /\ r)) 
/\ (p /\ Oq) 
/\ (q /\ 01') 
/\ (//\Oq) 
is globally true in M i.e. M cb. 
The above example shows how I represent the information of a logieatom universe using a model of 
the basic modal language to represent the geometry (a co-ordinate system embodied in the name of 
each logicatom and a metric embodied in the relations between the logicatoms) and a substitution 
map W represent the beliefs. I will define G-Models as the class of such models that embody this 
geometric information. I will show that these G-models, together with a substitution map and 
a relation generating function, represent a unique logicatom universe. Further, I will show that 
these G-Models are in fact completely determined by the substitution map and relation generating 
function using the concept of a G-defining proposition. Formally, I define G-l\1odels as: 
Definition 2.3.7. A model Ai (W, R, V) of the basic modal language over a finite set of propo-
sitional variables <1>" is called a G-modd iff the following conditions are satisfied 
(i) \:fp ill", 31/1 E W such that w E ~V(p) and \ill! W, 31' E ill such that w E V(p). 
(ii) For p, q E ill" with p =J. q, one has V(p) n Vi!]) = 0. 
(iii) For p E ill" with 71.. V E V(p) and wE lr, if uRw then uR1/'. 
Intuitiveb', condition (i) of the definition above states that every propositional variable is true in at 
least one world and every world satisfies at least one propositional variable. Condition (ii) states 
that every world satisfies at most one propositional variable. Finally condition (iii) implies that 
two worlds satisfying the same propositional variable, are modally equivalent. (This will hecome 
evident in the proofs that follow). To show how G-models are used in the representation of logicatom 
uuivl:rl:les, I first prove that every G-model over ill" is bisimilar to a unique (up to isomorphism) 
G-model with exactly n worlds. In terms of the notation used, a bisimulation Z between G-models 
.M = (lV, R, V) and M' (lV', R', V') is total iffl:fw E IF. ::lw' E IF' such that wZw'. The range of 
Z is denoted by ran (Z) {Wi E W' I ::lw E W st W Rw' }. The domain of Z denoted by dom( Z) = 











Theorem 2.3.2. Let /0 = (W, R, \I) be a G-model over 1>n. Then there eX'ists a 1Ln'ique bisirn'ilar 
G-rnodel .;\IIG (tVG , RG, \lG) 'With # W G n 
Proof. Since .\11 is a G-model, one has #W ? n. (This is enforced through conditions (i) and (ii) 
ill Definition 2.3.7.) The case #W = n is trivially true. For the case #W > n, define the G-model 
/vic = (tVG, RG 1 \lG) as follows: Let We {\I(p) I P E 1>n}, Define \lG by V G (p) {ll(p)} for ev-
ery p E <Pn. Finally, define RG as follows: Fur ever~' p, q E 1>n' \l(p)RG\l(q) iff.3w E \l(p).3v E \I(q) 
such that wRv, By construction, there are exactly n worlds with <'Hch world satisfyiug a unique 
proposition variablf: in 1>n. All requirements of Definition 2.3.7 arp therefore trivially satisfied. De-
fine the bisimulation Z c n- x WG as follows: Select lL' Hr. Since.VI is a G-model, there exists a 
unique p E 1>n such that w E \l(p). Then wZ\l(p) with lL' E H' and VIp) E l'VG . To show that Z 
is a bisimulation, I llf'ed to prove the thrf'e conditions spf'rifif'd in Df'finition 2.3.4. For reqlliremf'nt 
(i), select wE Wand \lip) E WG such that wZV(p). By construction wE \l(p) and Vip) E. \lG(p). 
Since .'VI is a G-model, v' only HatiHfies the propoHitional variahle p. (Conditions (i) and (ii) of 
Definition 2.3.7.) By construction \l(p) only satisfies the propositional variable p. Thus both wand 
V(p) satisfy the same proposition variables. To show the forth condition, assumewZ\l(p) and wRv 
for l1', /' E Wand V(p) E W G. Select the unique q E 1>n such that I' E V(l)' (This is possible 
since .VI is a G-model). Now vZV(q) by definition of Z and V(pJRGV(q) by definition of RG, 
confirming the forth condition. To show the back condition, assume wZV(p) and V(p)RG\l(q) for 
ll(p), \l(q) E IrG and wE W. By df'finition of RG, there exists w'; v tV with 11/ E V(p), v E V(q} 
and Wi Rv. But by condition (iii) of Definition 2.3.7, one has to. w' E \l(p) with w'Rv implying toRv, 
as required. 
To show uniqueness, let /vIf (Wf, Rf, v~G) be a bisimilar G-model over 1>n with #~-vf = n 
and bisimulation Z'2 such that Z2 and are total. In order to show that /vic is isomorphic to 
.Vlf, define the function f: WG wf as follows: Given V(p) E WC , select the uniquew2 E TVf 
that satisfies the propositional variable p. Existence OfW2 is guaranteed by the definition of G-
models. Uniqueness is guaranteed due to the constraint that l-Vf n. Then f(V(p)) = 'W2. Since 
# \l'G TL f is a bijection. By construction of f, condition -(i) of Definition 2.3.2 is satisfied. 
To prove condition (ii), select V(p), \l(q) E We such that V(p)RcV(q). By construction of M G, 
3w E V(p).3v E \l(q) such that toRv. Now since Z2 and are total, .3w2 Wp with WZ2W2. 
By the forth condition of Definition 2.3.4, E ivf such that 'W'1Rfv2 and VZ'1V2. Thus v and 
V2 satisf~' the same proposition variables. implyillg that 1'2 E vF (q). By construction of f, one 
has that f(V(p)Rf f(ll(q» as required. The converse requirement that JCf/(p))Rf f(V(q») implies 
V(p)RGV(q) is argued in the identical way using the total bisimulation Z;Z. D 
The above theorem shows that I can associate a unique G-model cOIltaining exactly n-worlds with 
any G-model over 1>". This uIlique G-model will, by construction, allow me to specify the amount 
of, and names of the logicatoms in a logicatom universe. As shown in Example 2.3.2, a substitution 
map allows one to specify the beliefs of each logicatom. Finally, a relation generating function will 
specify the relations between the logic atoms. This will naturally be required to induce the G-model 












Definition 2.3.8. A \ogieatolll ll11iwrs(' OVPl PropCaln comprises the tuple (A1G,~. Rr) w1l('J"(' 
.:Vl c = (lVc, RG , V c ) is a G-model, ~ : iPn FOTm(iP n } is a substitution map and . 
Rf : Fo/'m(iPn) -+ P(iPn) a relation generating function satisfying the following property: 
If /I, IJ iPn is such that q E RA~(p)L then Vw E V(p).Vv V(q) one has that wRcv. 
The constraint that needs to be satisfied in Definition 2.:3.8 ensures that the relation generated 
by the relation generating function in the logicatom universe and the relation in the G-model are 
equivalent in terms of the mapping from the modal model to the logicatom universe. The rest of this 
suhsection will focus on showing that the G-model itself is completely defined by the substitution 
map and relation generating function, allowing me to conclude this section by arriving at the final 
definition of a logicatom universe as a pair comprising a substitution map and a relation generating 
function only. Towards this end, I define the concept of G-Axioms and G-defining propositions. 
Definition 2.3.9. Consider a model of the basic modal language M (W, R, V) over 
iPn = {Pi,.'" Pn} Let A = {¢ I .;Vi Fe ¢} be the set of globally true formulae in M. I say the 






A contains all propositional tautologies in Form(iPn ) 
(D(¢ -+ V') (04~ ---> 00)) E A 
(~Pi) E A 
{p,-+-,pji1S;i,j nandilJ}CA 
{,pi I 1 S;i S; n} n A = 0 
Further, I spf'cify the G-defining proposition rp~ of the model M that satisfies the G-axioms as 
-i.C '-C'M .- (",=0", Ip, ~ ~Pj)) 
(/\ {lb I 1/) E A {p, (2.3.1) 
Definition 2.;~.9 specifies the class of models that I am interested ill. The requirements Taut and 
K just mean that the models under consideration are a subset of the normal modal logic K (See 
Section 2.1.7). It will be shown that GI, G2 and G3 specify the unique naming constraint as well 
as constraining the minimum number of worlds in the model to be n. I will show that the G-definillg 
proposition (j)~ of the model represents all the information required to specify the geometry of a 
logicatom universe i.e. the G-model. The next set of theorems will show one how the G-defining 
proposition and a G-model are related, providing me with the tools to create the final equivalent 











Lemma 2.3.3. Consider II model .A1 = (IF, R, V) in the basic modal language over 1>n wdh n ~ 2. 
If M satisfies G-axioms. then # W ~ n. 
Proof. Choose wE H7. From Gl and G2 one has 
n 
Ai, w f= V Pi (2.3.2) 
i=! 
jE{I .... ,n} M. lJl f= Pi -+ 0p) (2.3.3) 
Formula 2.3.2 implies that at least 1 propositional variable is true at w. Formula 2.3.3 implies that 
at most 1 propositional variable is true at w. For assume M. w P Pi and A1, w ~ />j for somei j. 
:.row.VI.u' Pi, Formula 2.3.3 and modus ponens imply M,ll' F ~Pk for every k 1= i, specifically 
for k = j contradicting M. w f= Pj· 
Now assume #~V < n. Since only one propositional variable is true at any world with the rest 
false, and since n 2, there exists Pm E 1>n such that ill!, 'U' -:Pm for any w. Thus M 'Pm 
contradicting G3. 0 
I have shown that the G-axioms provide one with the minimum amount of worlds required in a 
G-modd. I will now show that they specify the exact nnmber (i.e. n worlds for a G-modd over 1>nl 
if one considers all bisimilar models and selects a model with the smallest number of worlds. 
Theorem 2.3.4. Consider' two models.;VI (W, R. V), .VI' = (W', R', ll') over 1>" that satisfy 
G-a.rioms. Define A = {q) I M f= q)} and A' = {<b I .M' 1>}. If 
(2.3.4 ) 
then M' is bisimilar to ]V!. Further, the bisimulation Z and its converse Z~ are total. 
Proof. Define the relation Z c W X IV' as follows: Vw W, w! E 11" wZw' iff wand w' satisfy the 
sallle propositioll "ariables. In order to proV(' that tid:- is a hisillllliation. I Heed to show that Z is 
lIoll-empty and satisfies the three conditions specified in Definition 2.3.4. Now from Lemma 2.3.3, I 
have that Z is non-empty since both models contain at least n worlds and each model has at least 
one world satisfying ( A 'Pi) I\Pj for every j n. Thus every world in W is related to at least 
'"= l,F/J 
one world in BTl, and vice versa, showing that Z is non-empty, and further that Z and Z~ are total. 
By construction, Z satisfies condition (i) of Definition 2.3.4. 
To prove the forth condition, assume wZw' and wRv. Select the unique Pw'P" E 1>" such that 
W E ll(p",) and v E V(p,.) respectively. This is possible since Al, Al' satisfy the G-axioms (thus 
every world satisfies one aIH] ouly one propositiollal variable). Now M, 11 Pv and wRv implies 
M. wOp,). Since M, w ~ Pw, one can conclude that .lVI, W F Pw -> Op". For any other U E ~F, 
one has M,u f= Pll' -+ 0pv since }lIt,U f= -'Pu for u 1= w. Thus M F Pw -> Op,> Using 2.3.4, one 
can conclude that 
./\.1' F Pw Op" (2.3.5 ) 
Since wZu" impliesw and w' satisfy the same proposition variables, one has jVl', w' F PWl which 
together with 2.3.5 and modus ponens implies that /VI', Wi FOp,,, Thus 3v' E W' sueh thClt w'R'v' 











conclude ~'ZV' and t.hus the forth condition, as required. 
Proving the back condition is a symmetrical argument. Assume u-Zw' and Wi R'l". Select the 
unique PtC', Pt" <Pn such that w' E V(Pw') and v' E V(Pt,!) respectively. Now .A..f', Vi f= Pv' and 
11" R'u' implies A1', 11" f= Op",. Since j\-1', w' Pw', one can conclude that ."'1', w' f= P1IJ1 0p!!" 
For any other H' E 1'v'. OIlC has M',71' Pw' -+ 0pu' since j\-1',lI' ~ 'PIL" for 11' T w'. Thus 
M' Pw' -+ Op,., Using 2.3.4 one can conclude that 
(2.3.6) 
Since wZw' implies 11' and w' satisfy the same propositional variables, one has ,\-1. w f= Pw', which 
together with 2.3.6 and modus ponens implies that M. w f= Op",. Thus 3v E W such that wRv 
and M, v f= P,," This implies that v and v' satisfy the salll" proposition \'ariahlt's allowing mit' to 
conclude I'ZU' and thus the back condition as required. 0 
Lemma 2.3.5. Consider two models .\-1 = (W, R V), .\-11 (W', RI. VI) over <Pn that satisfy G-
axioms. Dejine A {1> I M f= qJ} and A' {1> I .;\.1' f= . Further. If'f 1>~ I 9~' be the G-dejining 
propositions for .. "'1 and M' Tespectivdy. Then 
[. mG -"G 
r·K '+",M -+ .pAl' 
iff A n {Pi -+ OPJ lIS i,j S n} A' n {PI -+ Op) lIS i,j S n} 
PTOOj. Assume A rl {pi -+ Op) lIs i, j S n} N n {pi -+ Op) lIS i, j S n}. TheIl by 2.:U. OIlt' 
has rK 9~ Conversdy a,'lsume A {P, - 0p} i 1 S i,j S n} i A' n {Pi Op] lIs i, j S 
Tt} and 9~1 +-> 1>~,. Without los~ of gell('ralit~·. (lIlt' can aSSllltlP that j \vith 1 S i, j S Tt such 
thnt (Pi -+ O]lJ) E A and (p, --7 Op)) tt N. Thus 
I ,G ,G 
'K 4J,M 9M' 
G ) (G c=} r K (rjJ_~ 1\ (p, ~ .. OPj) +-> ¢.fv1' 1\ (p, --+ 0Pj)) 
=? f-K (Pi"'; Op))) +., 1. 
result.ing in the contradiction sought after. o 
Theorem 2.:3.4. together with Lemma 2.3.5 shuws that the G-defining proposition of a model that 
satisfies G-axioms, determines the model up to bisimulation. The next set of theorems steer one 
towards the isomorphism required to generate a unique G-model. 
Theorem 2.3.6. Let M = (W, R, V), .;\.1' (j;VI, RI. V') be models oveT <Pn that satisfy G-axioms. 
If the mudell:i have the same G-defining p7'Oposition (i.e. I-K rjJ~ivt -+ rjJ~/) and #W #1V' Tt, 
then .;'vi ,is isomorphic to M'. 
Pmof. Since M, M' an' models over <Pn with equivalent G-defininl!, propositions, Throrcm 2.:1.4 and 
Lemma 2.3.5 imply that they are bisimilar with bisimulation Z. Define the map f : M -+ M' by 
feu') = u/ iff wZw' , with Z as defined in Theorem 2.3.4. Since Z~' is total, f is surjective. Select 
Wj,UJZ E W such that f(wd f(w2). By (li'finition of f,ll'l andw2 satisfy the same proposition 
variables. Since there are only Tt worlds in lV, one must conclude that 11.'} 11.'2 implying that f is 











By uefinition of Z, wE F{p) implies f(w) E V'(p). Conversely, one also has f(w} E V'(1') implies 
w V(p), thus satisfying condition (i) of Definition 2.3.2. 
To prove condition (ii) in 2.:l.2, assume wRv. By definition of j, one has wZj(w}. By condition 
(ii) of (the hbimulatioll) Definition 2.3.4, there exists a v' E W' such that vZv' and f(w)R'v'. But 
vZvl implies v' = j(v}, proving that j(w)R'F(v). Conversely assume f(wjRlf(v). Now wZf(w) 
and condition (iii) of Definition 2.3.4 implies that there exists v E W such that t'Zf(v) and 'WRl' as 
required. Since f is bijective, it follows that it is an isomorphism. 0 
Theorem 2.3.7. Let.lVi (W, R, V) be a model over <I>n that satisfies G-a.xioms and <p~ its G-
defining proposition. Then there exists a bisimilar model /v/' = (~r'. R', \/') with an eq'uivalent 
G-defining proposition and # W n. 
Proof. Construct till' modd .'Vi' over <I>11 as follows: Define vll' = {wp I p E <I>n} containing n worlds 
indexed by the proposition variables. Define VI by V' (1') = {wp } for all~' l' E <I>n. Define R' as 
follows: Choose p, q E <I>n- IfVw E Vip), ]v E V(q) such that wRu. then wpR'wq. 
n 
Now A1' sarisfif's G-axioms by construction: One has JU', u'p F l' implying 11[', wp F V Pi' This is 
i-el 
true for any l' E <I>n, thus satisfying G 1. Similarly, hy definition 1\{', ll'p 'q for any q E <I>n with 
pi q. Thus M',wp 1= P ~ ---q. Further for Tip, Jy[',w" ~ P ---q since Iv[',w" F ,po Thus 
M' Fe P ~ ~q. for p, q E <I>n with pi q satisfying G2. G3 is trivially satisfied since M ' , wp 1= l' for 
f'n'r~' P E <Pn· 
To show equivalent G-defining propositions, a.',sume /\11 F p -+ Oq. This implies that for every 
wE V(p), there exists a v E V(q) such that wRv. To show this, select wE V(p). Thf'Il M, wI- p. 
This together with M F P~"'" Oq and modus ponens implies M. wI- Oq. By definition, this implies 
that there exists a world v HllCh that wRv and M, v I- q, concluding the statement. above. By 
definition of R' above, one ha.'l 'WpR'Ulq . Now since .. Vi', Wp I- P and M I , Wq I- q, one can conclude 
that MI, Wp I- Oq. Finally since V' (p) = wp. Olle ltaH JVi I I- p -+ Oq. 
Conversely assume .. Vi' p -+ Oq. Since V'(p) = {U'p} Hml V'(q) {u'q} (the proposition variables 
an' tnIf' at OHe uuiqup world only) Olle can deduc(' that wpRlwq. By definition of R' , Vw E V (p), 
=iv E i/(q) such that wRv. Thus M, wI- Oq for every W E V(p). Thus M /-. P -+ Oq. 
I have shown that M' satisfies G-axioms and has an equh'alent G-defining proposition to ./Vi. By 
Theorem 2.3.4, I have that .M' is bisimilar to .lVi, and by construction # tV' n. 0 
The theorem above concludes my objective: Firstly it shows that I can associate a unique model 
that satisfies G-axioms with a G-defilling proposition i.e. the model containing the least worlds. 
Secondly, by construction, this model is a G-model, bince it dearly satisfies the conditions bpecified 
in Definition 2.3.7. Now, all I need to do is prove that every G-model satisfies G-axioms, and I will 
have that every G-model can be represented by a proposition in Form(O, <I>n). 
Theorem 2.3.8. Let M = (W, R, V) be a G-model over <I>n. Then M 8ati8fie,~ G-(Lrioms. 
Proof. To show Gl, select IV E W. Since M is a G-model, there exists p E <I>n such that 'W E V(p). 
Thus .. Vi. w pc p, implying that /\11, W F V~'=l Pi' Since UJ was arbitrary, one can conclude that 
.IVi f= V7 = l Pi' il~ 1'('(1 IIi red. 











P E <PH such that til E VIp). 
Case(i): Assume P = Pi' Thus M, W F p,. Since M is a G-model, and Pj i= Pi, one has 
Vip) n V(Pj) 0. Thus ill f/. V(pj). Thus M, ill F 'Pj resulting in M, ill Pi 'Pj 
Case(ii): Assume P i= Pi· Siure M is a G-modeL one has Vip) n V(Pi) = 0. Thus w 'Ie V(p,) 
implying }v1, w i-'- 'Pi' One can thus conclude that M. tc 'p, V 'Pj which is equivalent to 
M, til '- Pi -~ -'Pj 
Since 'U' iYWi arhitrar~·. Olle has JIvl f p, -.~ 'Pj fori i= j as required. 
To show G3. aSSUlllP then' exists Pi E <Pn such that M I- ,pi. Since M is a G-model, there exists 
a 1l' E lV such that 1l' E V(Pi). Thus M. 11' F p" arriving at a contradiction since M I- ,pi implies 
)\'1,w~ 0 
I have completed the representation proofs and shown that every G-model can be represented by a 
G-defining proposition in Form ( <> , <P n). 
Example 2.3.3. The geometry of the logicatom universe in Example 2.3.2 is completely determined 
by the G-defining proposition 
d> ( (p I\,Ci 1\ 
/\ (p 1\ Oq) 
1\ (qI\Or) 
1\ (r f\ Oq) 
The disjllllctioll ((]I 1\ .q 1\ .r) V (']I 1\ q 1\ V (-p I\.q 1\ 1')) captures the unique naming con-
straint while the remainder of the proposition captures the relation. 
The advantage of proving that every G-model can be represented by a G-defining proposition is that 
I '\vill be able to show that the information inherent in the G-model of Definition 2.3.8 is actually 
superfluous. Firstly note that the relationship between the modal relation, the relation generating 
function and the substitution map of Definition 2.3.8 can be rewritten using a G-defining proposition 
Oc as follows: 
"K cbc --+ (p Oq) iff q E RJ(~(p)) 
Constraint 2.3.7 allows one to completely determine the G-defining proposition 
((. RJ) b~' 
(2.3.7) 
from t he pair 
(2.3.8) 
The term CYI Pi) 1\ C,j=~;,tj (Pi --+ <Pj)) captures the unique naming constraint while the term 
(A A pOP) captures the relation. This allows me to specify the final definition of a i=l p,ER;ip;} , J 











Definition 2.3.10. A IogicHtolll Hniwrs(' OWl' PrupCH1n is defined as the pair (~, Rr). wll('I"(' 
E, : iPn ~ Form(iP n ) is a substitution map and Rr : Form(iP n ) -> P(iP n ) is a relation generating 
fUllction oyer PropCaln . 
The importallce of this elegant defiuition will become evidem ill the next section. Finally, the 
transition function can now be viewed as a function that maps the substitution map to a new 
suhstitutiolllllap with the local constraint imposed. Formally, dcfille E {E, I ~ : iPn -> Form(iPn )} 
comprising the set of all substitutions over iP n . The transition function is a map T : E -+ E satisfying 
thp 'local' constraint. This allows mp to state an equivalent definition of a theory network: 
Definition 2.3.11. A tll('or~' lletwork 0\'('1' PropCal n ('ollsists of the tnp],> (~. Rj. T) wllE'l'(, (~, Rrl 
is a logicatolll uuin'rsl' O\'('r PropCaln and T . E -> E is a local transition function mappillg a 
substitution lllap to a new substitution map according to the local constraint: 
[T(~)J (p) = T (~(P), ~(q) I q E R,(((p»)) 
i.e. the transition function operating OIl p E iPn is a function of the belief of the logicatom named p 
and the beliefs of alllogicatoms that are related to p. 
Oncl' again. tht' tlwory llt,t\vork (( Rfl T) can be represented as a series of logicatom universes 
((~.Rf).(T(~).Rf).(T(T(£,)),Rr) .... ). In terms of llotatioll. I will usually define a theory lletwork 
by Rf , T) and represent each application of the transition function using a time parameter 
t E {O,1,2, ... } i.e. ~t+l T(f,d. Thns (T(T(~o»).Rr) would 1)(' rq)J'('sl'llted as (6, Rf }· TIlt' 
following examples encompass transition functions that satisfy the local constraint specified. 
Example 2.3.4. The transition function I have used in Example 2.2.3 is that of the constrailled 
uniforlll substitution transition function defined ill Definitioll 2.:Uj. In these examples, given a 
logic atom f1 E U, we consider all logicatorns R(fl) in the irnage set of fl, using the local relation 
generated by the relation generating function Rf of the logicatom universe (U, RI ). T11(, hdi('f~ 
of logic atoms in R(fl) are then uniformly substituted in B(fl) to create a new belief. Now it has 
been shown that a logicatom universe (U, Rj ) can iw l'qni\'al(,lltl~' rppn'sPllt('d as (.;. Rf ) for SOil\(, 
substitution map'; : iPn --. Form( iPn). The constrained uniform substitution local transition function 
T : E -> E is t hen defined by: 
(2.3.9) 
or using the time parameterised notation, 
(2.3.10) 
One can use the logical connectives to create a large number of these transition maps such as 











or uRing the time parameterised notation, 
~t(p)Et!NIIP) V 1\ ~dq)EIIHli 
QER!(l') 
Finally, a simple example of a transition function is given by 
[T(lj(p) :=-c t;(p)i 




where r is some substitution map. As will be shown in Section 2.5.3, transition functions of this 
type allow one to replicate the dynamics of cellular automaton systems using theory networks. 
I now have the tools to go and investigate if the theory networks described formally satisfy all the 
rcquirf'mf'nts loosdy specifif'd in Sf'ction 2.2. I pud this snbsf'ction with a notf' on thf' notation 
used. When referring to logicatom universes, I will use either Definition 2.2.3 or Definition 2.3.10 
depending on the context. When I analyse theory networks at a particular point in time i.e. a 
logicatom universe, I will ignore the time subscript. On the other hand, if I analyse theory networks 
over time, the time subscript will be attached to the substitution map, and be incremented by 1 
on each application of the transition function. In these cases, I will also parameterise logicatoms 
Il(t) with the time parameter. The relation of a logicatom universe will always be assumed to be 
generated by a relation generating function, and will therefore not have a time parameter attached 
to it. 
2.4 Knowledge within theory networks 
I will now analyse two specific examples of theory networks, with the objective of showing how 
knowledge can be modelled using t,heory networks. Section 2.4.1 focuses on modelling geometric 
knowledge. Section 2.4.2 shows how the dynamics of theory networks can be viewed in context with 
dynamical theories of logic i.e. belief revision. 
2.4.1 Beliefs describing G-Models 
I have created an entity (the logicatom) that lives in a space (the logicatom universe) and believes 
'.,omething' about the space it lives in. The objective of this section is to show how the current 
definitions enable one to define what this 'something' actually is. I will focus on various examples 
motivated by geometrodynamics, that display the essence of how to construct a theory network that 











an example of a logicatom believing something about the geometry of the space wherein it lives. 
The previous section provides the tools to show how this is actually possible. Using our previous 
results, if a logicatom believes a G-defining proposition, its belief can be uniquely represented as a 
G-modeL In order to facilitate this, I simply extend the definition of a logicatom over PropCaln to 
one over the basic modal language JV! L( 0. <pn). 
Definition 2.4.1. A logicatom f.L over ML(O,<pn) is dpfinpd as an element of the cross product 
<Pn x Form(O. <p,,). represented as an onkred pair (p,</)) where p E <Pn is a propositional variable 
and Q E Form( 0. <pn) is a modal formula of the basic modal language. 
In extending the definition of a relation generating function over PropCaln , to one over the basic 
modal language 1\1 L(O. <pn ), I speeif\' that til(' fUlIction generates sets of pairs (p. q) of propositional 
variables p, q E <Pn. The reason for this will become clear in the examples below. 
Definition 2.4.2. A relation generating function over Af L( 0. <P n) is defined as a function 
R{: Form(O, <pn) .. -+ P(<pn x <pn) that maps modal formulae to sets of propositional variable pairs. 
Thp dC'finition of a logicatom llnivprsc over PropCaln is now easily extended to one over the basic 
modal language AI L(O, iPn ). 
Definition 2.4.3. A logicatom universe over JUL(O, iP n) is defined as the pair (.;, Rf). w!t('f(' 
t.; : iPn -7 Form(O. <p,,) is a substitution map and Rf : Form(O, <pn) -7 P(<pn x <pn) is a relation 
generating function over 1\,[ L( 0, <Pnl. 
Similarly for theory networks, one has 
Definition 2.4.4. A theory network over AI L( 0, <Pn) ('olt:-;ist:-. of tit!' tupi(' ((, Rr, 1') wbn(' ((, RrJ 
is a logic atom universe over Af L( 0, iI>,,) and l' : r.: --; r.: is a local transition function mapping a 
substitution map'; E L to a new substitution map 1'(0 E L that satisfies the local constraint: 
[T(O] (p) = l' (';(p),f.,(q) i (p,q) E RM(p)) 
Now if a logicatom over 1v1 L( 0, if>n) believes a G-defining proposition. one can view the belief (1.<; 
a purely geometrical structure i.e. a G-modeL Example 2A.l shows one interpretation of this 











Example 2.4.1. Define the relation generating function Ri : 0 x <l>n --+ P( <l>n x <l>n) over NI L( 0, <l>n) 
by 
{(p.q) I t-K <jJ (p ---> Oq)} 
The induced local relation R in the logicatom universe is defillcd hy 
JLRv iff (N(JL), N(v)) E RfB(JL)] 
Intuitively, this says that logic atom f.L is related to v iff logicatom It believes it is related to logicatom 
//. Consider the logicatom universe U over PropCa14 d('fil1('d in th(' Figure 2.5, when' th(' belie'f of 
each logic atom named p, q, 1,.5 is a G-defining propositions in <l>p = {p, q, r}, <l>q = {p, q, r, S}, 
<1>1' = {q,I,.5} and <1>" {p} respectively. 
A{P -> ~q)/\(p -> ~r) 
I\{q -> ~P)I\«I-> ~r) 
l\{r->",p)A{r ...•... ,'1) 
I\(r-> 0'1)1\('1 -> Os) 
q 
Figure 2.5: A logicatom universe with beliefs that are G-defining propositions 
~ow by construction, each logicatom belief is a G-defining formula. This allows one, as shown in 
Figure 2.6 (over the page), to interpret each logic atom belief as a representat.ion of the geometrical 
structure of a logicatom universe i.e. a G-Model. 
I will now proceed to construct an example of a theory network over AIL(O, <l>n). I will define the 
transition function in snch a way so as to ensure the' beliefs of the logic atoms are always G-dC'fining 
propositions. Towards this end, I will define a concept that will be used throughout the remainder of 
this thesis when constructing relation generating functions and transition maps for theory networks; 
that of a proposition 6 E Form( 0, <l>n) requiring a propositional variable p E <l>n. 
Definition 2.4.5. A propositional variable p E <l>n is required in a proposition 'I/J E Fonn(O,<I» iff 











Figure 2.6: How each logicatom views its universe 
Example 2.4.2. Let ¢ := (Oq 1\ p) V (O-,q 1\ p). Then q is not required in ¢ and p is. This can be 
shown by noticing that 
I- K ¢ ....... (Oq 1\ p) V (0 -'q 1\ p) 
iff I-K ¢ +--> (Oq 1\ p) V (-'Oq 1\ p) since Op ....... -,O-,p 
iff I- K ¢ ....... p since I- K ((p 1\ ¢) V (p 1\ -,¢)) ....... p 
Returning to theory networks over M L( 0, <1:>11.), first note that any G-defining proposition 
¢o E M L( 0, <1:>11.) can be expressed as 
¢o := ¢c 1\ ( 1\ ¢) 
(pi,p,)E<I>" x<P" ij 
where 
represents the co-ordinate structure (the unique names of each logicatom) and 
represent the relational structure. Finally, given a set of G-defining propositions 8 = {¢t, ¢2 , . . . , ¢k} 
over <1:>n and propositional variables p, q E <1:>11. , define the subset 













Figure 2.7: A transition rule for logicatoms with beliefs that are G-defining propositions 
Example 2.4.3. Let (~,RJ,T) be a theory network over ML(O,<I>4) where (~,RJ) is the logicatom 
universe over ML(O,<I>4) defined in Example 2.4.1 and <I>4 = {p,q,r,s}. Define the local transition 
function T : L: -> L: mapping a substitution map ~ E L: to a new substitution map T(O E L: 
as follows: Given x E <I>4, the set ex = {~(I) I (x, I) E RJ(~(x))} contains the beliefs (G-defining 
propositions) of alllogicatoms related to the logicatom named x. 
The set <I>X = {I E <I>4 I :l7jJ E ex u ~(x) such that I is required in 7jJ} contains all the propositional 
variables required in every G-defining proposition in ex and ~(x). Now 
[T(~)l (.r) = cPc(x) 1\ ( 1\ cPuv(X)) 
(u,v)E<!>X x <I>x 
where cPc( x) represents the co-ordinate structure over <I>x and 
cPuv(x) := { u -> Ov if ##8J~v 2 ! or f-K ~(x) -> (u -> Ov) 
T otherWIse 
(2.4.2) 
The above transition rule behaves as follows: If the majority of logicatoms (more than half of the 
logicatoms) that I (a logicatom) am related too believe a G-defining proposition that implies u -> Ov, 
then I will believe this on the next iteration. If I (a logicatom) believe a G-defining proposition that 
implies u -> Ov, then I will believe this on the next iteration. The effects of this transition function 
operating on Example 2.4.1 is shown in Figure 2.7. 
The examples defined thus far should show the reader how useful theory networks are in modelling 











2.4.2 Beliefs describing monotonic rules 
Consider a belief represented by a proposition 1> in some logic. Belief change encapsulates the prob-
lem of incorporating a new 'fact' represented by the propositionu, in the same language. Dynamical 
theories of logic such as logic programming have been formulated in several frameworks to analyse 
this type of problem. Logic programming is a field of artificial intelligence that uses logic directly as 
a prognilIlluing language, focusing on the representatioll of knowledge in flux, unlike that of classical 
logic. In particular, logic program updating was born in a seminal paper by l\farek and Truszczyliski 
[48] who introduced a language for specifying updates to knowledge bases known as revision pro-
grams. This field of research has proved very usefnl in modelling dynamic knowledge. A detailed 
review of the subject is available in [54,5,4,45,46]. Another framework is that of probabilistic rea-
soning [31] that combines both logic and probabilities, providing one with a formalism that admits 
the power of logic as well as allowing one to express rules with different levels of firmness and to 
change beliefs in response to a dynamic environment. In the belief revision framework, belief change 
is implemented using a set of constraints (known as postulates) on an operator 0 which modifies 
the set rj) of currently held beliefs to produce a new set 1> 0 1b implying the new information ~). In 
particular, the AGM (Alchourron, Peter Giirdenfors and David Makinson) postulates [3] form the 
startiug poiut in this field. :\1ure recent work has shown that these postulates only cater for specific 
types of belief revision such as when one is obtaining new information from a static world, and not 
for cases where the world described is dynamic [60]. 
Default logic is an example of non-monotonic reasoning. Non-monotonic reasoning is best explained 
using a direct quote from McCarthy [49]: "Consider putting an axiom in a common sense database 
asserting that birds can fly. Clearly the axiom must bl' qualified in some way since penguins, dead 
birds and birds whose feet are encased in concrete can't fly. A careful construction of the axiom 
might succeed in including the exceptions of penguins and dead birds, but clearly one can think up 
as many additional exceptions like birds with their feet encased in concrete as one likes. Formalised 
non monotonic reasoning provides a way of saying that a bird can fly unless there is an abnormal 
circumstance and reasoning that only the abnormal circumstances whose existence follows from the 
facts being taken into account will be considered." -John McCarthy 
Nonmonotonic reasoning gained momentum in 1980 with the publication of an issue of the Artificial 
Intelligence Journal devoted exelusively to the subject. Various papers therein extended the classical 
logic system in various ways. For example, McDermott and Doyle [50] introduced a modal operator 











known'. Auto-epistemic logic [56] is one of the nonmonotonic logics that ean be obtained from the 
approach of McDermott and Doyle. It was in this same issue that Reiter [68] developed another 
exalllple of a nUll-llloIlotOllic logic kllown as default logic. Default logic (Ollsists of classical first 
order logic together with default rules. 
Definition 2.4.6. A defu'ult 'rule d takes on the form 
The default comprises 
the prerequisite prcq( d) :~~ 'UJ 
the consistency requirements or justijimtion:; jllst (d) := ai, q!2 •.• , 
and the con:;equent nllls( d) :::C~ 71. 
The prerequisite ~) together with the consequent ') is known as the monotonic ntle 'I The de-
fault rule w¢: .<f;'k~-"- is said to eonsist of a monotonic rule :J!. and the consistency requirements 
rl rl 
{at.al, .... }. 
The default rule lj':Q>I'<P2",<Pn is interpreted as follows: 'If 1/' is derivable and for all i (1 ::; i ::; n), 
'I 
is not derivable, then derive ,/'. 
Example 2.4.4. Consider the default with free variables: 'If x is a quaker and it cannot be proved 
l' 'fi I d I h . 'fi ' Th' . t d <juak"dx):pacifbt(x), tllat x IS not a paC! st t lCll ec uce t at x IS a paCI st . IS IS represen e as -~afi~t{x)---'. 
Definition 2.4.7. Rule-based reasoning encompasses a set V of proposit.ions in classical logic to-
gether with a set 'R of monotonic rules fu=.2>:,. 
') 
V f- H. 6 holds iff there is a finite sequence of propositions 01, ... ,¢" with := rjJ such that for every 
i E {l. 2 .... , n}, either 
where the inference I- defined in classical propositional calculus or 
• there exists a rule .:t..!-~7~~ E R such that 
The following simple example shows one how rule-based reasoning works. 
Example 2.4.5. From {p} and the monotonic rules {"q'''. ·,~q,P}. {r} can be derived i.e. {p} f- R .,. 
1. -. -'p : since {p} f- -"p in PropCal 
2. q : using the rule =.P. and 1. 
q 











4. r : using the rule'~(L1!. and 3. 
A default theor'y is defined to be a pair (D, li-') where D is a set of default rules and W a set of 
first order propositions. I will end at this point, except to note that interpreting the default rules 
as mappings from some incomplete theory to a more complete extension of the theory motivated 
important concepts such as extensions in default logic. Even though this has been a very superficial 
review on the extensive field of belief revision (and in particular, default logic), it provides me with 
the tools required to show that the dynamics of certain theory networks can interpreted in terms of 
rule-based reasoning. 
Lemma 2.4.1. Consider a theory netwoTk T (~,Rr. T) o/wr PropCa1n with <Pit = {P[,P2:" .,Pn}. 
The local r'eiation generating function R j is defined by R f ( dJ) = {Pi E <Pn I f-- rP-+ p,} and the 
transition rulp encop8ulated uS'ing cO'flstmincd uniform substitution i.e. T(~)(pd ~(l)i)Elnr'p,), FOT 




Pmoj. Ow' 11<'<,<1S to prove that IT(t.)~(p,) is derivable from ((p,) and the monotonic rules R(p,). 
This is done by first noting that 
(2.4.5) 
with 1) not requiring PJ for any PJ E Rf(f;,(p')). This relation is obtained by noting that if f-- rP -7 q 
then f- dJ .- (q /1.1/;) with ¢ not requiring q. An inductive argument will result in expression 2.4.5. 
Applying the constrained uniform substitution transition function results in 
(2.4.6) 
















together with the monotonic rule 
(2.4.10) 
allows one to deduce 
(2.4.11) 
for every p) E Rr(I;(Pi)), and thus 
1\ (2.4.12) 
P,ER,(f;ip.)} 
This together with expression 2.4.7 gives one 
(2.4.13) 
Finally, using 2.4.6, one deduces t;(p,) !--n(p,l [T(()](Pi) as required o 
The above lemma tells one that the updated belief of every logic atom in the theory network defined 
ran bp viewed <I.'> just a consequence of monotonic mIps, SI1f'cified b:v thp substitution map t; and 
relation generating function Rf. applied 011 till' CUlTPllt lwlipf. Thus OIlP ntH see that seIPcting 
a particular transit.ion function and local relation allows one to put theory network dynamics in 
context with belief revision, in particular, rule-based reasoning. This important example of a theory 










2.5 Theory networks and cellular automata 
Birds do it! 
Bees do it! 
Even theory netw01'ks do it! 
37 
This section details the relationship between theory networks and cellular automata. Section 2.5.1 
provides au overview of the va;;t fidd of cellular autoIllata. For the purpose of t1th; thesis I :;hall 
simply define a cellular automaton system and focus on its application to modelling self-replicating 
systems. Section 2.5.3 then shows how theory networks can emulate the dynamics of cellular au-
tomaton systems. Theory networks thus inherit a large portion of research done within cellular 
automaton systems. in particular. the applications of cellular automata systcms to vario11s ficlds of 
study. This is important in terms of the construction objective stated, for the following main reason: 
Equating memes with the quantum of knowledge, one can view a particular belief as being made 
up of a whole set of memes. Now some beliefs are constructed in such a way, so as to make self-
reproduction a fundamental part of the belief e.g. an evangelical religion. Thus any mathematical 
structure that claims to model memes must be rich enough to model entities (made up of memes) 
that have the capability of making copies of themselves. 
2.5.1 The cellular automaton system 
Ulam proposed the concept of cellular automata. Ulam's idea was to construct a mathematically 
defined moue! of the phy:;ical universe in which Olle could build a wide range 'machines'. The model 
\vould have cells with connections and a set of locally defined laws that held at every point in the 
spacc. Thesc locally defined laws encompa."Ised transition functions that specified how the state of a 
cell changed with respect to the state of all its neighbouring cells. Conceptually, cellular automata are 
portrayed using an array of identical processing units called cells that are interconnected throughout 
the cellular space in some regular manner [67]. Each cell can typically be in anyone of two or more 
possible states that can change over synchronous time t 
cellular space using the concept of a lattice geometry. 
0,1,2.3, .... I will formally define thE" 
Definition 2.5.1. An n-dimensional lattice geometry (L, U) consists of the set L c;:; zn of cells and 
a set U c;:; L x L of edges. The edges define the neighbours of the cells. One can generate the edge 
set U using the concept of direction vectors. Given x E L a direction vector d x E Z" is such that 
(.r.:r + elx ) E U. One can thus equivalently ddine all '1I-<iimPllsiollal lattice g{'Olllelr~' as (L, D) where 











Example 2.5.1. Examples of various lattice geometries are provided by Meyer [53] . In particular, 
the two dimensional honeycomb lattice geometry is shown Figure 2.8 below: 
Figure 2.8: Two equivalent representations of the honeycomb lattice geometry 
The set of cells L = ',f}. In order to define the direction vectors, Meyer defines the notion of even 
and odd cells. A cell (x,y) E ',f} is odd iff x + y is odd, otherwise the cell is even. The direction 
vectors are then defined as follows: If J! is even then Yx E {( 1, 0); ( -1, 0); (0, I)} else if J! is odd 
then Yx E {(l,O);( - l,O);(O,- l)} This allows one to invoke the following 'co-ordinate system' for 
the honeycomb lattice: 
, , , , , , 
.. --{-1 ,2)' -------- -(0,2r ----- ---- '(1 ,2r ----------(2,2r- ------ ---(3,2r- ---------(4,2) ---
, , , , , , , , , , , , 
----{-1,1) -- -- ---- --(0,1 r ---- --- ---(1,1 r --- -- -----(2,1 r -- ---- -- --(3,1 r --- --- --- -(4,1) ---
, , , , , , , , , , , , 
----{-1,'0) --- -------(O,Or - -- ---- -- -(1 :Or ------ --- -(2,Or -- --- --- --(3:0r -- --- -- .. -(4,0)'--
, , , 
Figure 2.9: A co-ordinate system for the honeycomb lattice 
Cellular automata models are usually defined on an isotropic space. Towards this end, the notion 
of a Regular Lattice Geometry is defined. A n-dimensional lattice geometry is regular if it can be 
transformed into itself by translations in n independent directions i.e. the space is isotropic. Using 
the definition of direction vectors, I can define a Regular Lattice Geometry as a lattice geometry L 
together with a direction set D = {Yi11 :=:; i :=:; n; Yi E zn} of linearly independent vectors such that 











Example 2.5.2. The triangular lattice is an example of a regular lattice geometry. The set of cells 
is once again L = y} . 
// .0 \. 
Figure 2.10: Two equivalent representations of the triangular lattice 
The set of direction vectors is defined by D = {(I, 0); (-1,0) ; (0, 1); (0 , -1); (1, 1) ; (-1 , -I)} 
Definition 2.5.2. A Cellular Automaton System consists of a la ttice geometry of cells (L , D) 
together with a field W : N x L -t S . The natural numbers N label the discrete synchronous 
time-steps. S represents a finite set of possible states that each cell can be in and includes a 
single quiescent state (i .e. a null state). The field W defines the state of each cell at a given 
point in time. w evolves according to some local rule (referred to as the transition function) 
Wt+1(x) = F (Wt(x + d) IdE D(x) U 0) where D(x) is the set of direction vectors defining the 
-t 
local neighbourhoods of x, and ° represents the O-vector in L. The field Wo is constrained to map a 
finite number of cells to a non-quiescent state. The transition function F is constrained to map cells 
in the quiescent state and whose neighbours are all in the quiescent state to the quiescent state. 
Note that the last two constraints imply that Wt will always map a finite number of cells to a non-
quiescent state. These constraints thus enable one to model cellular automaton systems using finite 
lattices. This finite property will prove important when I show that theory networks can simulate 











Example 2.5.3. A popular example of a cellular automaton system is Conway's [6] model called 
'Life'. The regular lattice geometry used by Conway's life is the double triangular lattice geometry. 
Here L = 7l,2 and D = {(I, 0); (-1,0); (0, 1) ; (0, -1); (1, 1); (-1, -1); (1, -1); (-1, I)} 
Figure 2.11 : The double triangular lattice used in Conway's life 
The set S = {O , I} consists of two states with the transition function defined as follows: 
1. If at time t, a cell is in state 0 and exactly 3 of its local neighbours are in state 1, then the 
state of the cell at time t + 1 is 1, otherwise it remains 0 
2. If at time t, a cell is in state 1 and either 2 or 3 neighbours are in state 1, then the state of 
the cell at time t + 1 remains 1, otherwise it becomes 0 
A classic example of the 'emergent behaviour' evidenced in cellular automata is that of the 'glider' in 
Conway's life [39]: A particular configuration of cells in state 1 move across the lattice and maintain 
their shape with a period of four time-steps. 
- - - -
t" to + 1 t,,+2 t,,+3 t,,+4 
Figure 2.12: The 'Glider' in Conway's life 
A host of other structures can be created, and through their interactions, it can be shown that life 
can simulate a universal Turing machine [6], allowing one to deduce that it can be programmed to 
perform any desired calculation. 
Depending on the properties of the transition function F and the field w, one can define various types 
of cellular automata including deterministic, indeterministic [52] and probabilistic cellular automata 
[9]. There are various equivalent definitions [40] and representations [76] of cellular automata, 











S and a dimension d, one defines the latt'ice as the set L = Zd and the shift space as the topological 
product S'L {f : L S} where S is given the discrete topology and SL the product topology. 
Each lattice direction determines a natural shift operator' rTi. TheIl a purely dynamical definitioll of 
a cellular automaton system is as a continuous map G : SL -+ SL that commutes with every rT,. 
2.5.2 Self-reproducing automata 
"VOll Neumaull was interested ill the general question: vVhat kind of logical organisation is sufficient 
for an automaton to be able to reproduce itself? The question is not precise and admits to trivial 
versions as well as interesting ones. Von Neumann had the familiar natural phenomena of self-
reproduction in mind when he posed it, but he was not trying to simulate the self-reproduction of 
a natural system at the levels of genetics and biochemistry. He wished to abstract from the natural 
self-reproduction problem its logical form" [9]. The notion of using cellular automata as the platform 
in which to model self-reproduction was suggested to von Neumann by Ulam [9J. Von Neumann 
then proceeded to show that self-reproducing automatons could be designed, by constructing a 
two-dimensional automaton system with 29 states per celL The lattice used was the 'box lattice 
geometry'. Here L Z2 and D =" {(l,O):(~l,O):(O, 1):(0, I);}. The transition function was 
deterministic and the same for every cell in the space. His genius came in specifying a particular 
cellular configuration that would self-replicate. Von .:\eumaun was able to exhibit a universal Turing 
machine embedded in a cellular array. Further, his universal computer was modified so that as 
output, it could construct in the cellular array. any configuration described 011 its input tape. This 
universal constructor would construct any machine described on the tape and in addition, also 
construct a copy of the input tape, attaching it to the constructed machine [43]. Self reproduction 
happened when the machine described on the tape was the universal constructor itself. The actual 
structure occupied tens of thousands of cells and was never practically implemented. Since this 
seminal work, various researchers have studied the algorithms needed to support self-replicating 
syst,ems i43. 65. 67]. The machines have been significantly simplified to structures that occupy 
relatively few cells (orders of ten) with the number of states each cell can take on significantly 
reduced. Some of the most exciting new research has been in showing how self-replicating structures 
can emerge in cellular automaton spaces. In the cal,es mentioned thus far, models of self-replication 
were initialised with an original copy of the structure that would self-replicate, the transition function 
workiug for this specific structure only. Chou aud Rcggia [66] showed that certaiu cellular automaton 











2.5.3 Projected theory networks 
Theory networks by construction, share many traits with cellular automata systems. The logicatoms 
are analogous to the cells, the local relation specifies the lattice geometry while the cell states can 
correspond to the various beliefs. However, the fundamental difference is that the neighbourhood of 
a logicatom is dynamic. As opposed to structurally dynamic cellular automata [41], the structure 
changes in theory networks are all determined locally and not by some global function. Theory 
networks are in fact more general structures: I will prove this by showing that theory networks can 
imitate the dynamics of cellular automata systems. The example below will show the methodology 
I will follow to achieve this objective. 
Example 2.5.4. Consider a cellular automata system defined on a I-dimensional lattice geometry, 
with S = {O, I} i.e. the cells can be in 1 of 2 states. The automata are indexed using the integers 
Il. The transition rule F is defined as follows: If at time t , a cells left neighbour is in state 1 and 
the cell is in state 0, then the state of the cell at t + 1 is 1, otherwise it is O. This simple cellular 
automata system is shown in the diagram below, with an initial configuration and the 3 succeeding 
time steps. 
t=1 
.. 1- _ .. ~ \ 
.--{ c_3 ,,: 
' ___ " 
.... -- ... , " 
t=2 .. -~' c_
3 









--\ C4 )--- -
.... --, 
, " -< C4 f---
" --' 
.. --- ... 
--< C4 )----
Figure 2.13: The I-dimensional 'left neighbour' cellular automata system 
Observe that since the state space S of the cellular automaton system is just {O, I}, one can represent 
the transition function using propositional logic. Using Wt (x) to represent the state of cell x at time 
t define 
(2.5.1) 
This observation allows one to link theory networks with cellular automaton systems. In particular, 
define the theory network (~o, Rf , T) over PropCabn for some large n E N, as follows: Let 










Rf : Form(iP2n) ---7 P(iP2n ) is defined by 3 
Rf(if» = {p E iP2n I if> requires p} 





'Pi /\ P i -l 
'P- n /\ Pn 
if i i- -n 
if i = -n 
43 
(2.5.2) 
\ I I ,'-, 
\ :p .. : .. 
>"-" -~ 
(, --,p~ /\ P3 ,: 
-~ - """A , , 
-- '- ;p,; :' 
:"'--'-~ , , 
: ~P, /\ p, ~. 
\~ ~/ 
--, 
" ~: ,/ ,: .. , ---~ 
~, ~A /\ {J, ,: 
.'>-''' ' '(.' ,I 
" . ,.;I 
...... : .•.. ~--" ... ----~ -----~'-----------------------~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~::: ~: '-:-/:~/ 
Figure 2.14: The associated cellular automata system 
Finally, the transition function T is defined by 4 
(2.5.3) 
The initial configuration of logicatoms, together with the following 2 time steps is shown in Figure 
2.14 . In order to see that the theory network above simulates the defined cellular automaton system, 
define the valuation function V : iPn ---7 {O, I} by 
ifi E {-1,-2, 1} 
otherwise 
Inductively extend this valuation to propositions in Form(iPn). Now define the state of a logicatom 
J1. to be V(B(J1.». One sees that only the logicatoms named Po and P2 are in state 1 initially. The 
3See Definition 2.4 .5 











next iteration sees the logicatoms named PI and P:l in state L the rest in state O. The third iteration 
sees logicatoms named P'2 and P4 in state 1, the rest in state O. \Vhat is in effect happening is that 
the beliefs are being updated in such a way so as to specify the state of the logicatom in terms of the 
initial configuration. Thus at time f 1 in the diagram above, the logicatom named PI has belief 
'Po 1\ P-l which may be interpreted as saying that. it will be in state 1 iff initially Po was in state 0 
and P-l was in state 1. 
I will use the above example to illustrate how a theory network can simulate a cellular automaton 
system. 
Definition 2.5.3. Let 7 = (';0 RJ , T) 1)(' a tllPury Ilptwork OWl' PropC'al/L' Let a : Form(P r.} S 
be a function mapping propositional formulae to a finite state space S that includes a single quiescent 
state (a null state). The pair (7, a) is known as a projected theory network. 
The motivation behind adding the state function a to a theory network tuple in Definition 2.5.3 
is that. it will allow one to analyse the dynamics of a particular projection of the beliefs of each 
logicatoms. In particular, the 'state' of a logicatom JL named p at time t in a projected theory network 
(~o RJ. T, a) will be a(~t(p)) In Example 2.5.4, this projection was just the usual valuation map in 
PropCal" (See section 2.1). The state space in that example was none other than {TRUE, FALSE}. 
This concept of projecting to a state will be used again in Chapter 4. I will now show how a restricted 
class of projected theory networks simulate a particular class of cellular automata systems. 
Theorem 2.5.1. Let C w, S, F) be a cellular automaton system with a finite lattice geometry 
of cells a field w describing the initial states of the cells, the set of states.') = {O, J} restricting the 
cells to one of two states and a transition function F. Then there c;/'i.'it.~ (J ]11'Ujecfcd theorynf:iwork 
7 that simulates C. 
Proof. To prove the result, I represent the cellular automaton system C using propositional logic. 
Let PL = {py lyE L} and define Px {pz Z = .r or E D(:r)} PL, where D(:r:) is the 
set ('(JIlt aiui II!!, all the Ilf'ighhonrs of x. TIl(' followillp., COll;;t ruet iOll PJ"()('('ss associatps it proposition 
9:r E Form(P x ) with the transition function defined at cell x. If the cell x has n 1 neighbours, 
thPrp will be 2" possible configurations of states that the cell together with all its neighbours CH.ll be 
in. Each of these configurations implies the next state of the cell. Consider the configurations that 
imply the next state of cell .T to be L Call this set of configurations C . .:'\ow for every configuration 
C E C, define the unique proposition 1\ qc(z) where 
~ow define 
zE 4>" 
if cell z is in state 1 in configuration c 
if cell z is in state 0 in configuration c 
¢~ := V 1\ qe(z) 
cEC zE4> J 
(2.5.4) 
(2.5.5) 
All I have done is used propositional logic to describe a formula that only uses boolean variables. By 











x is in state 1 iff il(px) 1) will map to the next state of cell x. Intuitively, I have rewritten 
the cellular automata transition function F and specified it using a set of propositions q)~') one for 
every cell. I define the substitution function 
(2.5.6) 
that embodies the cellular automaton transition function F. To observe this, define the valuation 
\~J : <PI, - {O, I} by 
(2.5.7) 
where wdx) is the field describing the states of the cells at time t. Then 
(2.5.8) 
~U\Y (,()llstrnct till' projectl'd tlH'or~' lli:'twork (t;o. RI) a) 0\'('[' PropCalL as follows: The initial 
substitution map t;o is given by 
(2.5.9) 
The relation generating function embodies the req'uires relation defined llsing Df'finition 2.4.:). 
RA ¢) {PT I 6 requires p,.} (2.5.10) 
The transition function T is given by 
(2.5.11) 
for every P.T E <P f.' The state map a : Form ( <P rJ .--; 5' with state space S {D. I} is given by: 
rr(¢) (2.5.12) 
where \~) represents the valuation V,,(Px) wo(x) inductively extended to all propositions in 
F07·m(<pn l.u'o(x) is just the initial cell states of the cellular automata system. To prove the 
result, I will show that Wt (:J:) = rr(c't-l (Px)), for every .I: ELand all times t ? 1. This will be done 
by induction. Firstly note that 
(2.5.13) 




using 2.5.7 and 2.5.8. In particular, 2.5.15 is obtained by observing that if Q,~) E Form(<p n ) are 
propositions such that I/(¢) = il(1/!), then il(<;6~) = \;T(lP''). (The uniform substitution inference 
rule in the Hilbert style system specified in Section 2.1). :\ow sinee V,,(~t-l (px» %(Px), one has 











Thcorelll 2.0.1 shows that theof.v networks call silllulate tIl(' dynamics of a 2-statp (5 = {n, I}) 
cellular automaton system. nut 'Life' is a 2-state cellular automaton system that can simulate a 
universal Turing machine [6]. This implies that theory networks have the capability of simulating a 
universal Turing machine. Since both have the capabilities of simulating universal Turing machines, 
one can conclude that they are mathematically equivalent from a simulation perspective. However, 
as I believe I have showed (and will continue to show) in this thesis, the expressive language available 
in theory networks (by construction) makes them a superior modelling platform. 
2.6 Summary of Chapter 2 
The logicatolll and its dynamic uuiverse, the theory network was defilled. III there most general 
format, these logic atoms have been defined over the modal language in description logic, making 
them an ideal platform with which to model the dynamics of knowledge. It was shown how the beliefs 
of logicatoms can be represented as purely geometrical structures i.e. G-defining propositions. A 
case study also showed how the dynamics of certain theory networks can be viewed in terms of rule-
based reasoning. Finally projected theory networks were defined, allowing one to analyse how the 
dynamics of a SI)f'cified projection of a logicatom 's belief evolved over time. The existence of projected 
theory networks that emulate the dynamics of 2-state cellular automaton systems was affirmed, thus 
showing their equivalence with cellular automaton systems and their ability to simulate a universal 











Incorporating Natural Selection 
"Natural selection is the main agent controlling the composition of a species during the cour'se of 
time, el'iminating certain variants and thus preventing change in some direct'ions, making other 
variants more pr'evalent and hence producing evolutionary change in other directions" 
In this chapter I will mathmiiatically derive the necessary and suffici('nt requirements for it, to be 
said that naturaJ selection regulates the dynamics of a space. I will then proceed to investigate if the 
dynamics of theory networks can be said to be regulated by natural selection. The results obtained 
will lead me to the construction of a mathematical space, known as an inverted theory network, 
whereupon I prove that there exists an inverted theory network that is regulated by natural selec-
tion. 
Section 3.1 and 3.2 provide an overview of the principle of natural selection and its applications 
in various fields of study. In section 3.3, I mathematically formalise the concepts introduced, and 
provide all the necessary proofs to imply that a structure is regulated by natural selection. As an 
aside, Section 3.4 shows how this formalism can be applied to explain why sex evolved. In section 3.5, 
I achif'vf' the construction objf'ctive by defining a mathematical space that is rf'gulated by natural 
selection. Section 3.6 summarises the results of this chapter. 
3.1 The biological requirements for natural selection 
The theory of evolution, proposed by Charles Darwin in his influential work 'The origin of species' 
[141, explains the development of new living organisms from pre-existing ones. Darwin's theory can 












1. THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION: This states that natural living organisms have been evolving 
since the dawn of life [44]. 
2. THE THEORY OF COMMON DESCENT: This purports that all observed species on earth are 
the modified de'seendants of one' or a fe'w simple organisms [14]. 
3. THE THEORY OF GRADATION: This asserts that the evolutionary process comprises small 
gradual changes in the organisms from one generation to the next. 
4. THE THEORY OF NATURAL SELECT[ON: This defines the process that governs evolution. Nat-
ural selection can be viewed as a regulating principle in which the environment (encompassing 
factors such as climate, competition with other organisms, availability of certain types of food 
etc) determines which members of a species will successfully reproduce and thus pass on their 
traits to the next generation. 
Now all living organisms can be viewed as a duality of their genotype (the underlying genetic 
coding), and their phenotype (their manner of response to the environment, encapsulated in their 
behaviour, physiology and morphology) [26]. The relationship between a genotype and a phenotype 
is very complex in natural organisms. A single gene may simultaneously affect several phenotypic 
traits (pleiotropy) and a single phenotypic characteristic may be determined by the simultaneous 
interaction of a number of genes (polygeny). Natural selection operates on the phenotypic expression 
of a genotype with the consequence of regulating the frequency of this genotype in a population. 
Natural selection thus facilitates the rise of highly complex organisms from simple ones, through 
the continued preferential survival and reproduction of those members of the environment that 
have traits best suited to deal with the environment [44]. The nea-Darwinian argument asserts 
that natural selection is the predominant mediating evolutionary 'force' that prevails in shaping the 
phenotypic characters of organisms in nature. Within the context of theory networks, the primary 
question that requires answering, if one is to prove (as is required by the construction objective) that 
natural selection regulates the dynamics of a space is: WHAT ARE THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT 
REQUIREMENTS FOR NATURAL SELECTION TO OCCUR? Darwin stated that natural selection occurs 
because individuals have varying traits, some of these traits are linked to differences in fitness 












Definition 3.1.1. Evolutionary biology states that the necessary and sufficient requirements for it 
to be said that natural selection regulates a space, are [47]: 
1. HERITABILITY: This embodies the requirement that the traits must be inheritable. 
2. DIFFEHE:\TIAL FIT:\ESS: The requirement of differf'utial fitness mf'ans that the variation in 
traits affects reproduction and survival rates of the individuals, i.e. fitness. 
3. PHENOTYPIC VARIATION: The requirement of variation means that different individuals in 
the environment have different phenotypic traits. 
3.2 Natural selection in action 
In recent years, the regulating principle of natural selection has been applied to research spheres 
over and above that of evolutionary biology. Holland [38] used the principle to devise his genetic 
algorithms for mathematical optimisation. Evolutionary computation has become an intensely re-
searched field [26]. Edelman [20j used the principle in his theory of 'I'\eural Darwinism', explaining 
how the neural structure of the brain is constructed and maintained. As mentioned earlier, Dawkins 
[15] proposed it as the regulating principle of memes. In this section, I will review three applications 
of natural selection that. are relevant. to this thesis. 
3.2.1 Cosmological natural selection 
In Chapter 1, I hypothesised that natural selection is the regulating principle required by Wheeler 
for the observed physical laws and initial conditions to arise out of the "unpredictable outcome of 
billions and billions of elementary quantum phenomena". In other words, I am saying that physical 
law as we know it evolved by natural selection i.e. Einstein's theory of general relativity is just one 
set of the fittest laws that have survived the battle thus far. In order to show that this is not as 
ludicrous a claim a,..., many will initially think it is, I revi<'w an analogous (yet rlifferent) hypothesis on 
how natural selection played a role in observable physics: Smolin's Cosmological Natural Selection. 
Q. Smith and L. Smolin independently suggested a mechanism for the evolntion of universes by 
natural selection. Smolin [72] ash.>d the question: "Why are the laws of physics and initial conditions 
of the universe such that stars exist?". Stars account largely for the variety of phenomena observed 
in the universe they synthesise the higher nuclei and keep large regions of the universe far from 
thermal equilibrium. On the other hand, stars exists due to (at least) two fundamental constants of 
physics: the ratio of 1040 between the gravitational and other interactions of nucleons and the fact 











explains these fundamental constants would explain why stars exist. Smolin proposed the following 
explanation as to why t.hese const.ant.s are at the current observed values. 
Firstly, he proposed two postulates regarding spacetime singularities formed by gravitational collapse 
as predicted by the Einstein field equations: 
1 The singularities give birth to new universes. 
2 The physical constants, represented by the parameter Pnew of the new universe are perturbed 
by a small amount relative to the original constants [iold. 
Smolin also assumed that the parameters are such that they always cause the new universe to recol-
lapsE', thus always ensnring that the new universe has at least one (kscendent, although I do not find 
this assumption necessary for the argument. The parameter p influences the number of singularities 
that a universe can hl1vf', and thus the number of dpscendants - the rf'fjllirement of differential fitness. 
The assumption that the physical constants of the descendent universes are small perturbations of 
the parent universe's constants, gives one the requirement of heritability and variation. Thus one 
can conclude that natural selectioll regulates the frequency of these parameters in the space com-
prising all these universes. It intuitively follows that the parameters that determine the maximum 
amount of singUlarities in a given universe will after some time, dominate this space (although time 
would need to be defined in this context). This then leads one full circle in answering the initial 
question: "The parameters of particle physics are such that most changes in their values should lead 
to decreases in the expected number of black holes in the universe." This is the "most intriguing 
passage" in Lee Smolin's theory [7r;: the fact that rh(~ hypothpsis may be confirmed or rduted 
through a combination of astrophysical observations and theory. Smolin analyses these parameters 
[73J and proposes three observational tests [74J. 
;"Iy hypothesis. although similar, is fundamentally different. T propose that the laws of physics 
governing the universe evolved by natural selection. In Smolin's cosmological natural selection, 
physical law evolves as the parameters change from one universe to the next, but remains constant 
within each universe. In my scenario, the physics of the early universe would be different from the 
physics we observe today. This topic will be expanded upon in Chapter 4. For now, it suffices to 
say that the application of nat,ural selection to physics is a seriolls field of study. 
3.2.2 The human thought process 
Goertzel [29J reintroduced the hypothesis of the evolving mind. The formulation of this hypothesis is 











process going on in your head is actually a process of evolution by natural selection" [29]. This is not a 
new hypothesis, but can be traced back to Darwin and H. Spencer (1873) in 'The study of Sociology'. 
In this hypothesis, one views the complex process of thought, in which the total environment (all your 
current beliefs, feelings, memories etc) determines which new thoughts or beliefs survive to create a 
new environment. From my perspective, Dawkins' hypothesis incorporates this theory. Whether the 
meme's environment is a society of many people or a single human brain, the regulating principle 
should in principle remain identical. Modelling the dynamics of beliefs within a society is thus 
equivalent to modelling the dynamics of beliefs within an individual. However, the relevant point is 
that natural selection as the regulating principle of knowledge arises in various contexts. 
3.2.3 The clay hypothesis and the origin of life 
If one accepts Darwin's theory of evolution, one can conceptually step backwards in time and ask: 
'What was the structure of the early organisms or replicators? Biology teaches us that the nucleic 
acids (the genotype) are responsible for replication and mutation. The proteins mediate the func-
tions of the cell (the phenotype). This complex yet elegant structure could clearly not be a starting 
point [13]. Research originally focused on finding simple independently reproducible subsystems 
constructed using organic material. However in 1966 an alternative suggestion was made by A.G. 
Cairns-Smith. He hypothesised that the early replicators were constructed from inorganic material 
and were in fact the ordinary crystals observed in nature. He went on to propose that the crystals 
of choice for the first genetic material might be nOll-otiter than day minerals [B]. 
In order to understand this hypothesis, the analogies between the behaviour of crystals and biological 
organisms need to be clarified. Firstly, crystals replicate in the sense that new crystal layers form 
from solution onto pre-existing layers. As crystals replicate, environmental conditions can cause 
changes / mutations in the structure. An important aspect of this is that the mutations in the 
structure will continue to be replicated thereafter the requirements of heritability and variation 
are satisfied. Finally, a mutation in the structure can cause the momentum of the crystallisation 
process of the solution to increase (or decrease), resulting in more (or less) copies of the mutated 
crystal per unit time the property of differential fitness. One can conclude that natural selection 
regulates the space of crystals. 
The structure of an individual crystal is analogous to the genotype of an organism, while the phe-
notype encompasses properties of the structure which include 











• Interaction Properties: How the crystal structure interacts within the environment (the sur-
rounding solution which can include other crystal structures, temperature, availability of chem-
icals/elements in the solution etc) according to currently accepted physical laws (chemistry, 
quantum mechanics etc) 
As candidates for the early replicators, clay minerals have very positive properties. Clay minerals are 
h~·tlrolls almnillosijicatps that are charaett'l'bed b~' crystal sizl's Ipss than 2J1m in diameter. Clays have 
amazingly diverse microstructures comprising a wide variety of crystals [13]. The abundance of clays 
Oil ('art h (:::t::50% of sedimentary rocks) is a result of synthesis occurring due to the crystallisation of 
solutions that are in constant supply from rock weathering. The important point is that the process 
of clay synthesis is a crystallisation process i.e. a self-assembly, and that there is ample of this 
structure on the earth. To move from clay minerals to the biological replicators of today, one needs 
to map an evolutionary path from a purely inorganic replicator to the organic structures evident at 
The clay hypothesis states that this transition occurred 
• as inorganic structures mutated to allow the addition of organic elements into their structures 
• and environmental conditions (which could be as simple as the availability of this organic 
molecule) gave the structure a competitive advantage over other structures. 
How organic elements can change the phenotype of a crystal is evidenced in the following statement 
by A.G. Cairns [13]: "If you want to control the direction of growth of crystals, one of the standard 
ways of doing it is by adding organic molecules so that they absorb on certain faces and prevent 
certain faces growing faster than other ones." Research into the clay hypothesis (see [13]) shows 
detailed scientific argument substantiating the hypothesis. If we accept this hypothesis, we can see 
that natural selection is a powerful regulating principle in that it provides an emergent path from a 
purely physical model (crystals and their interactions according to the governing laws of quantum 
theory) to the biological model (genes and their phenotypes). 
3.3 The mathematics of natural selection 
I offer yon a choice either- believe that natllml 8election as the requlating principle in natnre is an 
ab.5ol71te truth, or abandon mathematics. 
This section mathematically formalises the concept of 'natural selection regulating the dynamics of 
a space'. This results in a proof showing the necessary and sufficient requirements for the process of 











any system regulated by natural selection. The foundation of this equation was laid in the derivation 
of the Price equation [61, 62J. 
3.3.1 The Price Equation 
Price [61, 62, 32] derived his equation as follows: Let PI and P2 be populations (sets) of a single 
species, such that PI contains all parents of n. aud P2 consists of all the offspring of Pl. Prin' ';.; 
objective was to measure how the frequency of a particular trait T changes as one moves from the 
parent to the child population. Assume there are N individuals {1: 1,1'2, ... , X'N } in PI and let q( i) 
represent the frequency of trait T in individual Xi. For simplicity purposes, one can think of q as 
a boolean function q ; PI --+ 2 on P j in the sense that an individual Xi has the trait (i.e. q(i) 1) 
or not (i.e. q{i) = 0). In Price's original argument, 0 :; q(i) :; L but this generality does not 
affect the essence of the final results I am seeking. Let z( i) be the number of offspring of individual 
Xi. For simplicity purposes, only consider asexual reproduction. (This will be generalised to sexual 
and 'polysexual' reproduction in the subsequent section.) Let g' (i) be the number of offspring of 
individual Xi that have the trait T and define q' (i) g'(i)Jz(i). Let Ql = 
be the frequency of trait T in the parent and child population respectively, where 7j represents the 
Hritllllwtic llWall of the sequence (q(l), q(2) .... , q(N)). Finally, define ,6q(i) = q'(i) - q(i). Now 
Price observed that 
(3.3.1 ) 




On substitution, Equation 3.3.1 becomes 
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Price thus arrived at the relation 








where p(z,q) is the Pearson correlation coefficient and a(q).a(z) are the variances of the series q, Z 
respectively. I have used the statistical relation 
Cov(v, w) = p(v, w)a(v)a(w) (3.3.4) 
for any series 11. w. Price's derivation showed that the change in frequency of a trait T from the 
parent to the child population is dependent on the variance of the trait T in the parent population 
(i.e. the (1 (IJ) term) and p( z. q), the correlation between a parent having the trait and the amount of 
offspring (i.e. Differential Fitness). Price however stopped at this point, arguing that the =-"~=-­
term would be insignificant under certain conditions, and only focused on the covariance term. I 
will now reconsider this argument and show how all of Darwin's requirements for natural selection 
can be expressed in a single equation. 
3.3.2 The equation of natural selection 
Evolutionary theory [47] states that in order for natural selection to regulate the frequency of a 
characteristic (trait) in a population of individuals, one requires: 
I : Heritability - This characteristic must be inheritable. 
II . Differential Fitness This t.rait must affect the reproduction and survival rates of the individ-
uals. i.e. their fitness. 
III: Phenotypic Variation Different individuals must have varying traits that result in different 
morphologies, physiologies and behaviours. 
The biological sciences assume that if these principles hold, a population will undergo evolutionary 
change. I will proceed to formally prove that these requirements are necessary but not sufficient for 
natural selection to occur. In order to proceed, I need to define the space wherein natural selection 
occurs, and what it is that natural selection acts OIL In the biological sciences, Dawkins [16] defines 











seminal work [14j, natural selection acts upon individuals. Competing theories proposing gene se-
lection [15], individual selection, gronp selection, whole environments and combinations thereof [47] 
have been advocated. In fact, the qnestion "What is the unit of selection'?" encapsulates a central 
theoretical problem of evolutionary biology [16]. This question falls outside the scope of this thesis 
due to the fact that the principle of natural selection is independent of the unit of selection. In 
particular, Lewontin [47] argues how the principles of natural selection can be applied to molecules, 
cells, populations, ... in fact, any set of entities that have the variation, reproduction and heritability 
properties mentioned above. 
I consider a finite set W that comprise the units of selection. I follow rVlayr's terminology and call 
the elements of W selectons [16]. 'What these selectons actually represent is determined by the COll-
text. Thus in the biological case, if one &'lsumes a particular gene sequence determines an observable 
phenotype, then a selecton w E W could actually be a sequence of genes. In Smolin's Cosmological 
Kat ural Selection [72], a selecton would be a universal constant that together with other constants 
determine the physics of a universe. 
I define the sct of replicators n = P (W) as the power set of the units of selection. I am thus 
assuming that a set of selectons completely determines a replicator. n will represent the complete 
set of replicators with lower case Greek letters 1>,1./1, ... denoting individual replicators. 
Finally, I define a binary relation 8 over n that will model the replication process. The idea is that. 
for any 2 replicators q). 1/) En, 1>8'1./) means lP is a successor (child) of predecessor (parent) 1>. The re-
lat ion S gives rise to the set of all successors S( (])) {V' I <t>81j'} and predecessors 8~ ( VI) {¢ I 1>81./'} 
of replica tors rP and 1/) respectively. 
Consider H, HI c n satisfying U 8(1)) H' and U 8~('1p) ~ H. These constraints state that 
<iJEH 1/JEH' 
HI comprises all the successors of Hand H contains all predecessors of HI, One doesn't necessarily 
have equality in the latter case since some replicators in II might have no successors. 




designates the amount of successors of a replicator 0. The assumption here is that all predecessors of 
a replica tor contribute equally to the successor population. Thus if a successor has m predecessors, 










The frequency of a selecton w in replicator ¢ i:s defined by the fUllctioll 
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For biologists, it is important to note that sincew can only have a frequency 0 or 1 in a replicator, 
the biological example of alleles will require the use of Wo and WI as two copies of the gene with the 
allele on in one and off in the other. 
The weighted selecton frequency q' (9: w) of w in all successors of 9 is given by 
~( '.) '(A. ):cc '" q(1b, w) ~¢q ~/,w .6 C(1/J) 
wESt 1') 
(3.3.7) 
In the case where C(1./.1) is a constant for all repiicatorsli' (e.g. sexual reproduction in natural 
this reduces to the usual definition of :selecton frequency in a population i.e. q'(¢,w) 
'111./ .. ,1/') 
Finally, define the frequency of a selecton w in the sets H and HI as 
Q(H.w) ----,;-;-.---- an d Q ( H' , w) -'---;7'.,.,-- respectively. 
~fy objective is to represent Q(HI,w) in terms of Q(H,w). I am interested in what aspects affect 
the change of frequencies of a selecton in the populations. Towards this end, I define elements 
H' as siblingslPI rv iff S~ ) = S~ (1j!2) i.e. they have the same set of predecessors. 
This relation is transitive ('IL'1 "" ~ ¢d and 
reflexive (¢l "'wd, and hence an equivalence relation on HI. One can thus uniquely partition H' 
n 
into the disjoint union of the equivalence classes of siblings: H' U W, with each Wi containing 
i=1 
the set of siblings with common predecessors. 
Siucp (J,:'1 ,....,~'2) =} (C(lhl C(1j.'2)) one can define C{Wj) C(1/'l for any ~'E W,. 
;.row any function I : n x W --> IR :satisfies the property 
L L 1(1/', w) 
¢(CH 0ES(,p) 
n 
L C(W,) L I(l,'· w) 
Fej 1/:EW, 
One obtains this by noting that if ¢J, (/)2 E H is such that <PI, 
(3.3.8) 
U S~ ( 1/') then 
1j..EYl, 
S( 
Using 3.3.8, I have 
n w, = Wi· F\lrther, the sum is over exactly C(W,) copies of this same set. 
L z(9) 
tb(H 
'" '" _1_ = #H' 
6 6 C("'l 













L z(¢)q'(¢,w) L q(¢,w) (3.3.10) 
</JER f/' 
The selecton frequency in the successor set HI is thus given by 
Q(HI,w) 
#H' 
L q'(¢, w)z(dJ) 
001 
(3.3.11) 
I first consider the case of asexual reproduction only. I thus constrain the generality by assuming 
that V ~;, E HI one has C( 1/) = 1 i.e. all successors have one predecessor. Decomposing H into the 
2 disjoint subsets Ho {cp HI q(dJ.w) = O} and Hi = {~: E H I q(~!. 11') = I} whose union is H 
and observing that L f(4), w) = L [1 q(¢, w)]f(¢, 11:) and 
f/" 47E f/ 
1(9. w) = q(¢, w)f(dJ, w) is true for any function f : 7?- x W 1R allows me to rewrite 
(bE 
;LJ.l1 as: 
L Z(¢)ql(¢, 11') + L Z{¢)q'(cp,W) 
Q(HI,w) oEf/" <PEf/, 
( 
.
L Z(¢)) (L.z(¢)q,(¢,w)) (L Z(.¢J) ( L z(¢)ql(.¢,w)) ¢Ef/" </JE Ifn </JEIf, </JEIf, 
1= Z(¢) L Z(</» + L Z(¢) -L Z(~ 
rPEf/ ¢C:H" ¢Ef/ ¢Ef/, 
( 
L.. [1 - q(¢, w)] Z(6») ( L [1 - q(q;, 11').] Z(dJ)q'(O. tv)) 
¢r::H If 




L q(¢,U.'lZ(¢)) ( L q.t.dJ1Wlz(¢)ql(¢:W)) 
<PER <PER (3.3.12) --L z(O-) - L q(¢, W)Z(¢) 
<PElf oEIf 
Now note that the term -'-'-__ c-r-:--c;-;--,,-..,--,- in the equation above calculates the ratio of the 
number of replicators in H' containingw (the [z{</»q'(¢. tI')] term in the numerator) that have 
predecessors not containing w (the [1 q( 6,w) 1 term in the numerator) to the number of replica tors 
in HI that have predecessors that don't contain w. If I defiue Pm(w) to be the probability that an 
arbitrary successor Ii' with predecessors s~ ( 1jJ) { (/J 1 , (1)'2, ••. , rbc} will have the selecton v; given 













I: [1 q{tP, wl] Z(¢)ql(dJ, Wl] 
') & ,-1>r.=_-'_1-=-~ __ _ 
PmlW = I: [1 q(¢,11')]Z-(¢)--
1>E II 
(3.3.13) 
where & represents the expectation value. 
q( <P.w )z( <p )q' (<P. w) 
In order to analyse the term .::...::-.:....-.,-~,......--.-.--.:--, I define the probability of inheritance p,(w) to be 
the probability that an arbitrary successor¢l with predecessors S~(1/J) = {OJ, , ...• Oc} has the 
selecton w given that one of its predecessors in S~· ('!i') has the belecton i.e. conditional probability 
that a selecton w occurs in a successor 'IjJ given that it occurred in at least one of its predecessors ¢ E 
S~ This happens due to mutation and inheritance and is thus the probability that the selecton 
Illutated [Pm(w)] or that the sdectoll was illherited [p,(w)] and no mutation occurred [1 - p",(w)]. 
pdw) [1 p",(w)] + Pm(w) 
[ 
2; q .. (.o. u'JZ{¢)ql(O, W)] 
& 'P,=II . 
I: q(o, wlz(o) 
<D'= II 
(3.3.14) 
Finally, using an identical observation to that of Price in his formulation of the Price Equation 
[61, 62]' I have 
I: q(¢, w)z{O) 
¢EII . u(z) . I: z(q) '. = p(q, z)u(q) Z + Q(H, w) (3.3.15) 
oEif 
#Fl z(o) 
Here p(q, z) r=============~=~=========== is the Pearson Corre-
~ l (#H} 
lation Coefficient. u(q) = 
(#11) ,2:: q(¢,tIJ)2_( L q{<p.wlf 
,,-,P,~,-II_--,-( #';:-H=-",)~L"-'.'_II_=L-- is the population standard deviation and 
ij -=-~,.-- is the population mean. I substitute Equations 3.3.13, 3.3.14 and 3.3.15 into Equation 
3.3.12 and arrive at the Equation of Natural Selection for the case where all successors have one and 
only one predecessor: 
Q(H' . w) - Pm(w) 
(1 - Pm(w)) ( 
u(z) ) w) p(q, ;;)u(q)-~- + Q(H. w) (3.3.16) 
First note that Equations 3.3.14 and 3.3.13 implicitly assume normal distributions for Pi(W) and 
Pm ( w). (The validity of these equations is numerically illustrated in the appendix.) 
Now Equation 3.3.16 describes how the frequency of a particular selecton changes over time. Since 
natural selection regulates this process, I can conclude that any asexual reproductive system reg-











Pi (W), Pm (W), a( q) and p( q, z) are the mathematical analogues of heritability, variation aud differ-
ential fitness respectively. 
~ow I consider the more general case where E H', C( = C (i.e. all successors have exactly 
C prectcccssors). For this case, I 1lse the intuitive1l0ss of Equation ~.3.1fi. Ddine 1Jw (H) to be the 
probability that an arbitrary successor 1j; E H' has a parent in H containing the selecton under 
consirkratioll. Using this definition togeth0f with th0 d0finit.ion of Pm ('11') and pdtl'), I can say that 
the frequency distribution Q(H' , w) for replicators constrained to having only one predecessor is 
given by the probability that the selecton mutated or that it did not mutate and was inherited from 
a parent having the selecton; i.e. 
Q(H', w) [1 Pm(w)] p,(wlPw(H) + p",(w) (3.3.17) 
This is exactly of the form of Equation 3.:3.16 if I define Pv·(H) := p(q. z)a(q) + Q(H, w). This 
states that the probability of a parent having a selecton is determined by the frequency of the 
selecton in the parent population and the covariance term specified by Price [61]. 
I now have the tools required to derive the form of Equation 3.3.16 for the case of constant C parents. 
Consider any successor .t/J with C predecessors. The probability that a predecessor does not have 
the selecton is given by 1 Pw(H). The probability that all its predecessors don't have the selecton 
is given by [1 - P11'(H)f. The probability that at least one of t/J's predecessors has the selecton is 
given by 1 [1 Pw(H)lc. Thus the probability that 1f.' has the selecton that was inherited with 
no mutation occurring is given by [1 Pm(wl] p, [1 [1 - PwUl);C] The probability the 1/) has the 
selecton due to mutation is given by p,nCw). Thus 
Q(H', w) = [1 Pm(W)] Pi(ll') [1 - [1 Pw(H)(] + Pm(w) (3.3.18) 
The generalised form of the Equation 3.3.16 for replicators with exactly C predecessors is thus given 
by: 
Q( H', 10) Pm(w) 
(1 Pm(w)) 
(~U.19) 
One could arrive at Equation 3.3.19 using an identical argument as in the asexual case, except that 










Prn{W) + p,(w)(1 [
. . (j(Z)] C-l 
p",(w))(1 1 - Q(H, w) p(q. z)O'(q)T ) 
[; mE H __ --:-:----:-
[
I::: [1.. q(¢., 1.L.')l ... Z(¢)q'(¢, W)] 




I conclude by deriving the equation of natural selection for the most general case that of multiple 
non-constant parents Le. VI/.! E H', eCtp) ?': 1. To achieve this, define pc(H) as the probability that 
an arbitrary Sllccessor in l/J E H' has exactly C predecessors in lJ. Now if I consider any successor 
1/-' E H', I can deduce that the probability that one of its predecessors has the selecton is given by the 
#H #H 
weighted sum I::: pc(lJ) (1- [l-Pw(H)I C ) where I::: pc(H) 1. Using the identical argument 
r=! r=l 
implemented in the derivation of 3.3.19, I can conclude that the most general form of the equation 
is given by: 
Q(lJ', u') .Pm(W) () I:#li .. ·lJ) (1 . [1 
---'--"-~--'- = P til 1)(' I -
(1 Pm{w)) 1., , 
C=l 
. . (j( 
p(q, z)(j(q) _ 
z 
(3.3.21 ) 
I conclude that any reproductive system regulated by natural selection will obey Equation 3.3.21. 
For the interested (or sceptical) reader, the appendix contains numerical simulations confirming 
Equations :t:).20 aIHI :t:t14, relating the probability of mutation and inheritance with the other 
variables of the derivation. 
3.3.3 The mathematical requirements of natural selection 
The derived equations provide me with the tools to formalise the necessary and sufficient require-
ments for natural selection to regulate (and continue regulating) the selecton frequency within a 
space. I proceed by proving necessity. In the case where p, (w) and Pm (w) are constant for all 
generations, and all replicators have the same number of parents, I will show that the requirements 
of 
I Heritability, as specified by p;(u') > 0 
II Differential fitness, as specified by p( q, z) :/ 0 
III Variation. as specified by (j(q) > 0 
are necessary conditions for natural selection to regulate the frequency of a selecton w. I proceed 











1': The requirement of Heritability is embodied in P1(W) terrIl. Setting p,(w) = 0 would result 
in Q(H',11') p"lw) for this and all subsequent generations. The change in the selecton 
frequency of Il' between parent and child populations would thus have a constant expectation 
value of O. The actual change in frequency of the selecton w between generations would all be 
due to a normal random distribution and thus one can conclude that natural selection does 
not regulate the frequency of this selecton 
II': The requirement of DiffcH;ntial Fitnc8s is encapsulated in the (I(q, z) term. Setting p(q, z) 0 
results in the frequency of 11' in subsequent generations converging rapidly to the following 
fixed point$, for the eaSf'S of a.<;exnal and sf'xual reprocluction spf'eified bdow: 
Q(HOC,w) = -1---- for c= 1 
p, + PmP, 
for C'~ 2 
(3.3.22) 
(3.3.23) 
For arbitrary C, one solves a polynomial equation of degree C. I deduce that the selecton fre-
quency change between parent and child populations will tend towards a constant expectation 
value of 0 resulting once again in the frequency being determined solely by random variables. 
I can conclude that after a few generations, natural selection will not regulate the frequency 
of this selecton. 
III': The requirement of Variat'ion is determined by all three terms Pm(w), Pi(W) and a(q). Setting 
Pm(w) 0, Pi(W) 1 and a(q) = 0 will imply no variation in this and subsequent generations. 
This case is handled in [II']. (Note that if one of the conditions Pm(w) > 0, Pi(W) < 1 or 
a( q) > 0 hold, then variation will persist, even if a( q) 0 is true in anyone generation.) 
This establislw" that the neces"ary reqnirements for nntnraJ sPi(x'tion are exactly those specified b:v 
Darwin, for the case where Pi(W) and PmCw) are constant through all generations. Now one can 
argue that Pi(W) should be constant for all generations - the probability that a successor will inherit 
a selecton from one of its parents only depends on the replication process. However, this is not 
necessarily true for Pm(w), since evolution occurs through the process of cumulative selection [15]. 
To clarify this, first note that a selecton can be viewed as the phenotype of some gene complex. 
Consider the following toy model: Assume there exists a species A that has no method of viewing 











from B to C is far more likely that to mutate from A to C. Thus the probability of mutation of 
the selecton 'view light in colour' changes depending on its environment i.e. the other selections in 
the replicator. Thus one call argue that the proof ill [II'] dhow is Hawed for this case. However, if 
the mutation probability is very small, then one can still say that the average expectation value of 
change in [II'] is zero, thus retaining the validity of the argument. 
For the ease of sufficiency, one notes that Equation :3.3.19 has infinitely many fixed points that 
satisfy the three requirements. For the case (' 1, th('s(' fix('d point aw specified by: 
Q( H co , w) ::;0 _Pl-,[=-l __ pm-,--( w---.:) l_p_(q-,-,.,.-z __ )(}_( q_)_(J.=.~z-:-) ,.-+_P_l_n_{ u-,,-') 
1 p;(w)(l Pm(w) 
(3.3.24) 
For the other eases (e.g, C> 1), one solves a polynomial equation of degree C. (These fixed points 
are called evalutianar-y stable systems in biology.) Now it is important to note that these fixed points 
exist only if the replication relation S (and hence the term p(q, z)) is a deterministic function of the 
space of replicator" i.e. the correlation with fitness depended only upon the characteristics of all 
the other replica tors in the population. The reason that natural systems do not cease to evolve is 
due to the fact that replicators are linked to non-deterministic chaotic systems e.g. the weather. If 
S was a non-deterministic function, then Equation 3.3.19 would have no fixed points that satisfied 
the three criteria specified by Darwin. I thus formulate the fourth criterion that has always been 
implicitly assumed in evolutionary biology: 
IV: Non-Deterministic Replication - The reproduction and survival rates of individuals is a nOIl-
deterministic process. 
As an aside, note that the derivation of Equation 3.3.19 would proceed identically as shoWIl if one 
had defined the function q by q( 1), U) = - where U W is a set of selectons. This 
{
I if U C ¢ 
o otherwise 
shows that natural selection can operate on individual selectons, sets of selectons, individuals or 
groups as argued by Lewontin[47]. 
I will conclude this section by emphasising an important point. It is assumed that one cannot say 
that natural "election is the regulator of the selecton frequencies if the frequency is determined solely 
by statistical distributions i.e. the expectation value of the frequency remains constant through all 
gpucratiolls. :'Iiow if Pm (w) ? p, (w), one cannot say that natural selection is the dominant regulating 
principle, even if the expectation value changed with time. Randomness would playa greater role 












3.4 The evolution of sex 
This section will detail an application of the equation of natural selection to a topic outside the 
scope of this thesis and should be viewed as an (interesting) aside to the main objective. The topic 
of interest is the evolution of sex. Can Equation 3.3.1 9 facilitate in the explanation of why sex 
evolved? Biology has currently produced no satisfactory answer to this question. Sex is costly. Sex 
implies recombination of gene complexes, resulting in the break up of favourable gene complexes. 
Mathematically, this is explained by using the probability of inheritance. In the asexual scenario, if a 
replicator has a particular selecton, then Pi ::;:; 1. In the sexual scenario, if a replicator has a selecton, 
then p, ::;:; ~. Thus in the sexual case the species must be fit enough to survive and reproduce, but 
then give up half of that for its partners half. Further, asexual species do not have to invest energy 
in finding a mate. On the other hand, asexual species have a higher rate of extinction relative to 
sexual species. Various arguments have been put forth to explain this. Group selectionists argue 
that sex increases a groups ability to respond to a changing environment and is thus selected for. 
Other postulates inelude that sex is advantageous when rapid evolution is necessary. There are 
various other arguments as to why sex is costly as well as theoretical arguments that attempt to 
explain why sex evolved [80]. I will attempt to explain why sex evolved using the natural selection 
equation derived in the previous section. 
In order to analyse the problem statement, I investigate the relationship between the change in 
frequency of a selecton and its correlation with fitness. The frequency of a selecton in an asexual 
popUlation is governed by Equation 3.3.16. Defining ~Q( w) 
Equation 3.3.16 as 
Q(H'.l1') - Q(H, w), I rewrite 
~Q('U.') Pi(W) [1 Pm(w)] [P(q, Z)~(q)O'{z) + Q(H, wlj + Pm(w) Q(II, w) (3.4.1) 
For whilt Yaim's of p(q, z) does the selecton frequency increase (or stay constant) from one generation 
to the next i.e. ~Q(w) ~ O? I solve for p(q, z) in Equation 3.4.1 and arrive at: 
) [ 
Q(II, w) Pm( w) 
p( q, Z > --;---;---;-












Figure 3.1 below shows a plot of the simulated results for Equation 3.4.2 1 The x axis represents 
the initial selecton frequency. The y axis represents the minimum value the correlation coefficient 
p(q, z) can have to still ensure that the selecton frequency does not decrease. The results are plotted 
for 2 values of Pm(w) E {160' 1~0} with the other simulation parameters (see appendix) set to: 
npredecessors = 1000, nSUGcessors = 2000, C = 1, Parent Constant = True, Pi = 0.95. 
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QIH,w) : Initial Frequency 
Prob. Mutation - 0.01 Prob. Mutation - 0.05 I 
Figure 3.1: The simulated minimum value of the correlation coefficient Pmin (q, z) that will guarantee 
an increase in the selecton frequency 
The results are very intuitive: The frequency in most cases will only increase if the correlation 
coefficient p(q, z) > O. In the case where Pm = 0.05, one sees that the selecton will remain and 
increase in the population even if one has a slightly negative correlation associated with this selecton 
i.e. the selecton detrimentally influences fecundity. This is because the mutation rate Pm will 
replenish the selectons (that are selected out) in the population. 
I repeat the process for sexual reproducing species. Using Equation 3.3.18 with C = 2 one derives: 
p(q, z) :::; (J(q~(z) (1 -Q(H, w) + 
p(q, z) 2 (J(q~O'(z) (1 -Q(H, w) -
1 [Q(H'W)-pmCW)]) 
Pie W) (1 - Pm(W)) 
1 [Q(H'W)-pmCW)]) 
Pi(W) (1 - Pm(W)) 
(3.4.3) 
(3.4.4) 
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Figure 3.2: The simulated minimum value of the correlation coefficient Pmin (q, z) that will guarantee 
an increase in the selecton frequency for sexual reproduction 
Figure 3.2 shows the simulated results for the same 2 values of Pm (w) E {160' 1~0}' and with the 
other parameters being identical to that of the asexual case: nPredecessors = 1000, nSuccessors = 2000, 
Parentconstant = True; except that C = 2 and Pt = 0.65. (The justification for dropping p;,(w) 
down from 0.95 in the asexual case to 0.65 in this sexual case is given as follows: Pi represent the 
probability of inheritance given that at least one parent has the selecton. Now if both parents have 
the selecton, the probability that the successor will have the selecton should be equal to that of the 
asexual case i.e. 0.95. If one parent has the selecton, one can argue that the probability drops by a 
fa.ctor of 2. i.e. 0.475 . The the probability of inheritance given that at least one of the predecessors 
has the selecton should be somewhere between these two values. I chose Pi = 0.65 which is less than 
the average, so as not to distort the comparison I am about to make.) Now compare the results for 
Pm = 0.01 for sexual vs asexual reproduction. 
To interpret the results, note that complexity in species arises due to cumulative selection - not 
understanding this concept led to Sir Fred Hoyle's memorable misunderstanding of the theory of 
natural selection [17]. Hoyle compared natural selection to a hurricane blowing through a junkyard 
and chancing to assemble a Boeing 747. Cumulative selection entails small incremental changes in 
every generation that leads to the complexity observable today. Consider the following toy model. 
One has three traits T I , T 2, T3 with complexity increasing from TI to T2 to T 3. Further, assume 
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Figure 3.3: The simulated minjmum value of the correlation coefficient Pmin(q , z) that will guarantee 
an increase in the selecton frequency for sexual and asexual reproduction 
to a species fecundity, T2 is detrimental and T3 is beneficial again. The analysis above shows that 
T2 will always be selected out in asexual reproducing populations. However, in sexual reproducing 
species, it can still remain and increase in the population even though it is detrimental to fecundity. 
This will allow T3 to evolve in sexual species, but not in asexual species. This is why sexual species 
are observed to be more complex than asexual species. Now use this argument for the characteristic 
of sexual reproduction itself. Sexual reproduction is a trait that could have initially been detrimental 
to the species. However, it was allowed to remain in the species for long enough to allow complexity 
to arise, resulting in the trait of sexual reproduction being beneficial , as is observed today. 
3.5 Formal structures regulated by natural selection 
The most important assumption in the derivation of the equation of natural selection was that 
the entities in the space replicate and that they are defined by a set of selectons. The notion of 
replication comes naturally in logicatoms, since one can view the relation as determining the next set 
of parents. Thus, to complete the construction objective, I need to define what the units of selection 
are in logicatoms. Subsection 3.5.1 describes how I represent the 'selectons' of a particular class of 
logicatoms. This representation allows me to formally state the hypothesis that needs to be proven 











regulated by natural selection. Finally, Subsection 3.5.3 shows how the construction objective is 
achieved using 'inverted theory networks'. 
3.5.1 The logicatom's selectons 
Brink and Rewitzky [8] emphasised the paradigm triangle between a logic, its algebra and the 
semantics, unifying the various ways of looking at the same reality. This paradigm is very useful 
when attempting to analytically simulate structures built using propositional logic, such as the 
proposed theory networks. 2 The semantic representation also fulfills the requirement of representing 
the 'selectons' of logicatoms. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the semantics of propositional logic, 
known as possible world semantics, uses the idea that any proposition can be represented by the 
set of worlds in which it is true. Soundness and completeness of propositional calculus imply that 
two propositions will be logically equivalent iff they are true in the same set of worlds. A world w 
is just a valuation w : Form(iP) -+ 2 = {O, I} defined inductively on the structure of ¢ E Form(iP n ). 
In terms of notation, I will denote the set of all possible valuations by rr. Given a proposition 
1/' E Form(iPnl. tIlP sN [1/J], called the meaning of cp contains all worlds in which VI is true. i.e. 
Iv] = {w E W Iw( lji) ,= I}. The propositional tautology T is then represented 
while the contradiction ~ is represented by the empty set 0. 
the whole set lV, 
Example 3.5.1. In PropCal3, one has 2:1 possible worlds depicted in the table below. 
The table shows the mapping Wi : <1>3 --, 2 which extends to a valuation on the set of all formulae 
Form( iP: l ) using the following iterative definitions: 
w(.r/J) 
w(q; V 11') 
W(¢;/\1/J) 
n' - w(6) 
w(¢)Uw(1j,) 
11'(6) n 
All propositions can be represented by the set of worlds in which they are true. 
Thus [pd = {Wl,W;l,W,,,W7} ami [PlI\P2] = {W;l,W7}' 











One now has the tool::; to display a more intuitive representation of logicatom universes from a 
'natural selection' perspective. In particular, I identify the selectons of a logicatom as being the 
worlds comprising the belief. To see this, consider the following example of a logicatom universe U 
over PropCal3. 
Example 3.5.2. Depicted in Figure 3.4 below is a logkatom universe over PropCab where we 
denote the beliefs using well formed formulae, as has been the representation up to now. The 
relation generating function Rf : Form(iP3) --+ P(iP:;) is defined by Rf(¢) {p, E iPs I I- 1> --+ Pi}. 
Figure 3.4: Representing the beliefs using propositions 
The semantic representation of the propositions allows one to depict the beliefs of the logicatoms as 
in Figure 3.5 below: 
Figure 3.5: Representing the beliefs using world semantics 
From this perspective, a world is the unit of selection. A set of worlds determines the belief of a 
logicatom. Thus one analogises 'genes' with 'worlds'. It is important to note that as in the case 
of genes in biology, one can have the properties of pleiotropy (a single world can simultaneously 
affect relations with several logicatoms) and polygeny (a relation between two logicatoms may be 
determined by multiple worlds) depending on the choice of the relation generating function. An 











Example 3.5.3. Consider the logicatom named P3 ill the logic atom ulliven:ie defined in Example 
3.5.2. Its belief is semantically represented by [-'1)11\ pz] = {W2' wG}' TIl(' rt'latioll gC'IH'rating fllJl(:tioll 
RI generates it relation t.o the iogicatoms named PI and P:j. Xow to ('yidpll(,(, pl('iotropy, consider 
adding the world lJ'l to the semantic representation of the belief. Now {Wl. '11'2, wd [(PI!\ --'112 !\ 
p;;) V (-'Pl !\ P2)1 which would result ill the logieatulil beillg relat('d to IlU ot 11('1' jogicatolll i.e. a single 
,,'orld can simultaneously affect relations with several logicatoms. 
For polygeny, consider the logicatom named Pl' Its hdid is :';(,lllanticall~' n'pn'sPllt.pd h~' lPz] = 
{W2, li':;, li'G, lL'7}' Assume I remove anyone of these worlds. One has 
{W:;, W(;, W7} 
{102' WG, 11'7} 
{W:.!> tv:;, W7} 
{w;.!, tv:;, WG} 
[P2 !\ !\ ~P3 V Pa)] 
[P2 1\ (-'P1 1\ -1j)a V 1)3)] 
/\ (PI !\ P3 V'P3)] 
!\ ('PI 1\ P3 V 'P3)] 
Thus the removal of anyone world leaves the relation unchanged i.e. it will be related to pz in all 
the cases. 
Mapping the formalism of theory networks to the natural selection variables, one has: 
(a) The individuallogicatoms will be viewed as repiicaLors 
(b) The individual worlds comprising the belief of a logicatom will denote the selectons 
(c) The local relation of the logicatom universe represents the successor-predecessor relation re-
quired in the formalisation of natural selection. The relation is however 'inverted'. If IlRv, 
I view v as a parent of child 11. The reason is that the belief of v will update the belief of 
/1. meanillg that selectons will 'flow' fwm v to II i.e. the belief of a logicatom determines its 
'parents'. 
3.5.2 In search of evolving theory networks 
For the remaiuder of this chapter. J only ('onsider the class of tllPory network:,; (C RI , T) over 
PropCal" with the transition function defined by ~t""I(P) := IT(~tl](p) = (~t(p))l;tlHJ(P). This is 
jnst thp ('()nstraillf~d uniform substitution transition function, as defined in Definition 2.3.6. Various 
classes of relation generating functions will be analysed, in search of evolving theory networks. I 
proceed to define a few concepts that are necessary in achieving the construction objective. Firstly, 
in terms of notation, I will refer to any variable p E <Pn as an affirmed variable, while 'j) E Form ( <p,,) 
will be known as a negated variable. 
Definition 3.5.1. The class of implication r-elations comprises one of the following 3 relations 
definf'd on a logic at om llnivenw: 
(a) Affirmed Implication Relation: JiRv iff I- B(/l) ~ N(v) and Y B(/l) <-+ -L. The generating 
function for this relation is given for any ¢ E Form ( <pn) with rj) :F -L by 











(b) Negated Implication Relation: IlRvifH- B(Il) ---4 1N(v) and¥ B(Il) <--+ L The generating 
function is given for any (j'; Form( if>n) with </) .l by 
Rkp) {p E if>n I f- ¢-~ ,p} 
(c) Affirmed or Negated Implication Relation: IlRII iff f- B(I1') N(v) or B(Il) 
,j\l(lI) and ¥ B(Ji.) <-> L The generating function is given for any 0 E Form(if>n) with ¢ i .l 
by Rj(o) {p E if>n I f- ¢ -> -'p or f- ¢ -> p} 
Now consider the propositionlPl (p 1\ ,q) V (-'P 1\ q). It is obvious that both variables p and q are 
required to express this proposition. Further, if I restrict the connectives to 1\, V and -., then p, .,p, 
q and .q are required to express this proposition. On the other hand, consider 1jJ2 pV(-.pl\q). 
Once again both variables are required. However in this case, I can expressl/'2 without using,p 
since~'2 is equivalent to q V (]I 1\ '1]). I will now formally define this concept independent of tlIe 
logical operators used. 
Definition 3.5.2. Only the affirmed variable p is required in proposition ¢ iff 
(a) p is required in cb and 
(b) :30:. (3 E Form( if>n - h)}) such that ¥ 0: +--> {J and f- dJ <-> [( 0: /\ p) V3] respectively. 
Analogously, 
Definition 3.5.3. the negated variable "p is required in proposition 6 iff 
( a) p is required in 1; and 
(b) l3 E Fmm( if> " - {p}) such that ¥ 0: *-> /3 and f- dJ *-> 1\ .,p) V fJ: respectively. 
This provides me with the final set of local relation definitions used in the remainder of this chapter. 
Definition 3.5.4. The m'inimum var-iable class of relations comprises the following 4 relations: 
(a) Affirmed Or Negated Relation: J.iRII iff N(II) is required in B(p). 
(b) Affirmed And Negated Relation: pRII iff N(II) and .,N(I1.) are required in B(J.i) 
(c) Only Affirmed Relation: IlRv iff only N(v) is required in B(p) 
(d) Only Negated Relation: J.iRII iff only -,N(v) is required in B(J.i). 
One can also form combinations of the above such as: ttRv iff ;V(II) is required in B({i) and it 
is not the case that only .,N(v) is required in B(Il). I will use the local relations defined (and 
combinations thereof) to investigate whether various examples of theory networks are regulated 
by natural selection. Towards this end, I need to show that the selectons (worlds) within each 
logic atom satisfy the requirement of heritability, differential fitness, variation and non-deterministic 











its building blocks. I thus use counting arguments as the foundations of my proofs. This will allow 
me to calculate the probability that a logic atom is related to k other logicatoms (for a given local 
relation in the theory network). Counting arguments will also be used t.o calculate the probability 
that a particular world is an element of a logicatom's belief (using possible world semantics) given 
that it. is an element of a related logicatom's belief. 
3.5.2.1 Calculating the parameters of natural selection 
Sections 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3 and 3.5.2.4 are riddled with tedious combinatoric proofs (apologies to the 
reader) that calculate the various probabilities sought after. To top it all off, the work results 
in a negative answer - a t.heory network cannot be regulated by natural selection since, being a 
deterministic system, it cannot satisfy the requirement of non-deterministic replication. However, 
the results of this section are important for the following reasons: 
(a) Some results will be reused when simulating pregeometries in Chapter 4 
(b) The probability parameters of certain theory networks will be used to show interesting char-
acteristics of rule-based reasoning from a natural selection perspective. 
(c) The met.hods of proof shown are good tools for any person wishing to do further research in 
this topic. 
I will use this section to basically explain the approach followed and summarise the results. With 
regards to prob, ( w), the probability of inheritance of a selecton (world) w, one needs to calculate 
the probability that a logicatom fl. is related to say k other logicatoms, and given that one of these 
logicatoms has the selecton (i.e. the world w is an element of the meaning of it's belief), 11 will have 
the selecton after the transition function has been applied (i.e. the world II' will be an element of the 
meaning of the updated belief of III The first calculation involves the relation generating function, 
since this determines the local relations. The second calculation involves the constrained uniform 
substitution function, since this determines the updated belief. Table 3.1 shows the results of these 
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.)h- H(n k)) if n > 1 and 
if n =::> 1 and k = n 
" 
imply at least one affirmed 
(negated) variable and are 
true in exactly k worlds 
#fI;(k) = 2:: J(±(n.k, 
imply at least one affirmed 
or negated variable and are 
, true in exactlv k worlds 
Idon't imply a;lY affirmed 
, variables and are 
t=1 
J((n. k, t) 
Table 3.1: Counting arguments of constrained subsets of Form(ipn) 
where 
J(± (m + 1, k, s + 1) LK±(n 1,k,l) 
I~l 
and 
( :,,-1 ) L-l . 22::/((n 
1=1 
L k, I) if 11 > 1 and k <:: 2,,-1 
K(l1, k,t) = 












These formulae allow us to build expressions for the probabilities sought after. for example, given 
o E Form( <Pn) such that ¢ implies no negated or affirmed variables, the probability that W E [¢] for 
any world w E U' is given by 
prob(w E [¢]) 
J(n.k) 
This is observed noting that the number of propositions, not implying any affirmed or negated 
variable, and are true in exactly k worlds, is given by .T(u. k). The probability that an arbitrary 
world is in a set with k elements is given by . The result follows. 
Table 3.2 summarises the results of calculating these probabilities for various classes of theory 
ndworks oy('r PropCal" for large n, as well as showing wether the requirements of natural selection 
arf' satisfif'd or not. Thf' thf'ory networks under eOIlflidpration are t.heory net.works governed hy thp 
cOllstrailled lllliform substitution transition rule [T(';t)](p) (~t(p))<;tlHII")) with the 
relation generating function specified in t.he first column. 







Affirmed Implication 1 0 ./ ./ x 
Relation '2 
Affirmed or Negated 1 1 
X 
Implication Relation 4' 4' 
Only Affirmed 3 1 ./ ./ ./ 
Relation 4' 4' 
Table 3.2: The natural selection parameters and satisfied requirements of the theory network anal-
ysed 
In the case of the negated implication relation, I calculate the probability of inheritance p('oiJ; Vl1.') 
of an arbitrary world to be O. Since heritability has not been met, I stop there. In the case of the 
affirmed implication relation, I have the property of inheritance, but since the mutation probability 
is 0, this leads to the requirement of variation not being satisfied. In the case of the affirmed or 
negated implication relat.ion, I have proiJ. (w) probm{ lJ.:), which does not satisfy 3.3.25. Finally, 
the last case of the only affirmed relation satisfies Darwin's three requirements. but can still not be 
said to be regulated by natural selection since one does not have non-deterministic replication. I 











implication relation and constrained uniform substitution transition function. As shown in Table 
3.2, heritability and differential fitness are satisfied while variation is not. Now the dynamics of 
this theory network was interpreted in terms of rule-based reasoning in Section 2.4.2. I believe 
that this shows why rule based reasoning cannot model thought - variation is not maintained since 
profJ",(II') = 0, and variation is required for creative thought. The rule based consequent (the 
updated beliefs of a logicatom) has a meaning comprising a subset of the union of the meaning of its 
parents' belief. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that rule-based reasoning can be said to 
satisfy two of the requirements. I now proceed to detail the calculations that have been summarised 
in this section. 
3.5.2.2 The requirement of heritability 
The hereditary criterion specifies that if a predecessor has the selecton, there is a non-zero probability 
that the successor will have the selecton. I proceed to prove some theorems that will show how 
certain theory networks have the property of heritability. Consider an arbitrary logicatom J.l(t) in a 
logicatom universe at time t and let {Vi (t) : i { 1 , 2 .... , k} , k S; n} be a non-empty indexed set 
of logic atoms related to fl.(t). Given w E ~F, I am required to calculate 
(a) probi(w): the probability that. w [B(J.l(t + 1))j given that it is an element of at least one 
parent's belief i.e. 3j E {1,2, ... ,k} such that wE [B(Vj)]. 
(b) probm ( w): the probability that w E [B(IL(t + 1))] given that it is not an element of any parent's 
belief i.e. Vi E {l,2, ... ,k} 11) rJ. [B(vd] 
In the proofs that follow, I have used the alternative notation for uniform substitution that lends 
itself to these proofs. To remind the reader, let t;: ifln --; Forrn(ifl n ) be some substitution map, such 
that 
To get a feel of how I approach this problem, I will show how theory networks using the negated 











Theorem 3.5.1. Tluur:lJ networks O('(r P1VpCaln using constra'ined uniform substitution as the 
t/'aT/Sit/OIi function and the nf:gated implication reiatiol/ (,lRv iff'r Blll) ----> -,N(v)) have the property 
that prob, (w) 0 for any world w E W: 
Proof. Consider an arbitrary logicatom fl(i) in a logicatom universe at time t and let 
{Vi (, t) : i { 1,2, ... , k} j k :s; n} be a non-empty indexed set of logicatoms related to 11.( t), For ease 
of notation, define 
B(/1.(I.)) rtJ 
B(I/ilt)) 
N(Vi(t)) := Pi 
Assume w E ['</';] for some j E {1,2, .. "k}. :.JOW ciilln' logicatollliO an' rclakd aceonliug tu th(' 
Hegated implicatioll H'lation, the following 1101(1::; for thp iwlipf of fl(t): 
(3.5,1) 
where u E Form( iPn ~ {Pj}) not requiring Pj' This is deduced from the fact that fl(t)Rvi(t) for every 
i, implying that (/J 'P, for every i. Applying the constrained uniform substitution transition rule 
(See Defiuitioll 2.3.6), one obtains 
B(fl(t + 1)) An (3,5,2) 
Since w f/ ['1f!}j, one can deduce that w f/ [B(f1.(t + 1))]. This is true for any w, concluding that 
jJTob;{ w) = O. 0 
The above theorem allows one to conclude that theory networks governed by the negated implication 
relation are not regulated by natural selection, However, in the theorems that follow, it will not 
suffice just to prove that prob i (w) > 0, For example, if probi (w) = i and probm ( w) ~,one 
cannot claim that the heritability condition is satisfied since this inheritance will be 'swamped' out 
by random mutation. I therefore need to show that probdw) jJTobm(w) > 0 for any world w, 
The next set of theory networks that will be analysed are those governed by the affirmed implication 
relation, the aJjirmed 01' negated 'impl'ication relation and the only aJjiTmed rdat'ion. Thp proofs 
require counting arguments that. are detailed in the subsequent lemmas. 
Lemma 3.5.2. Consider the subset 8;t (respectively 8~) of Form(if>n) defined by 
{<;DE Form(if>n) I 
{¢ E Form ( iPn ) I 
E if>" with f- Q -+ p} 
E iPn with f- ¢ ----> .,p} 
(3.5.3) 
(3,5.4) 
8;t ) comprises all the forml1lae in Form(if>,,) thatiml'ly at least one affirmed (negated) pr'opo-
sitional variable in if> " ' Define P+ (n) .= #8;; and F- Cn) #8~ . 
Then F+(fl) F-(ll) F(n) where 
{ 
(
n-1 ( TI ) 












Proof. I proceed to prove the result for F+ (n) since an identically symmetrical proof shows the 
result for F- (n). The formula is clearly true for n = 1 since PropCah has 2 wff {.l, p} that imply 
the single propositional variable p. Now assume the formula is true for all integers less than or equal 
to n. For the case of II, + 1, one needs t.o count all the propositions in .F'orm(<pnH) that imply at 
least one affirmed propositional variable in <Pn .,..1. I build up this set using the following constructive 
process. 
To constmct fornmbw implying only one affinned propositional variable, choose some p E <PnH. 
Define the proposition dJ := p t\ 1/.; with 1/.' E Form( <Pn+ 1 ~ {p}) not implying any affirmed variable 
and not requiring p. Siu('c there arc c1xactly 22 " propositiollS up to logical equintin)("c ill Form( <Pn+ l 
{p} ). OllP eall dedllce that the number propositiom; not illlplyillg allY propositional variable is 22" 
F+(n) (by definition of F+(n)). Thus thc 1l11111ber of propositions in PropCalnH that imply p and 
no other affirmed variable is 22" F+ (n). This is true for any variable P E Form( <PnH), thus 
H'suItillg in (n + 1 -- F+(n)) propositiollS ill PrupCal,,+1 that imply exactly one propositional 
variable. 
tor formulae' implying k affirmed propositional variable.,; with k ::; 71, proceed similarly. Select k 
variables Pl:P2'" ·,Pk E <Pn +1 • De'fine the proposition (/):= (0t Pi ) 1\ 4' with 4' E Form(<pn +1 ~ 
{PI: P2, ... ,pd ) not implying any affirmed propositional variable and not requiring PI, ... 1 Pk. There 
i~r(' ('xactl~· 22"+' - k propositions up to logical equivalence in Forrn( <P n -,.1 ~ {Jh, p:z,. . 1 Pk} ), and thus 
22"+' k F+(n + 1 k) proposit.ions not implying any affirmed propositional va.riable. Further, 
there are ( ~ + 1 ) ways of choosing k distinct variables from a set of n + 1 variables. Thus, 
one obtains ( ~ + 1 ) (22"+'-k ~ F+(n + 1 ~ k)) propositions in Form{<pn+d implying k affirmed 
propositional variables. For k n + 1, one has 1 proposition ( /\ p) implying all the affirmed 
PE$,,+ 1 
variables. This together with the contradiction (.l) adds 2 to the SUIll, resulting in the formula 
above. 0 
Corollary 3.5.3. Define the sets 
~~(k)={ 
~;; (k) = { 
¢ E Form( <pn) I 3pl,' .. ,Pk E <P" with Pt # Pj for i # j such that 
k 
I- (f; -> /\ Pi and .v ¢;~., q for any Ij E <P" {Til, ... ,pd } 
i=1 
¢ E Form ( <pn) I :JPll"': Pk E !j)" with Pi # PJ for i # j such that 
k 




comprising all formulae that imply exactly k affinned (respectively n.egatcd) pmpositional variables. 
Define the number of elements in the sets by C+(n, k) = #~+(n, k) and C-(n, k)~:: (n, k) 
respectively. Then C+ (Tt, k) = G- (71, k) = G( n, k) where 
{ 
(~) (22 ,,-k ~F(n~k)) 
C(n,k) = 
1 
if k < n 
(3.5.8) 











P7'00f. Once again, I prove the result for the affirmed propositiollal variables ollly - the negated 
variable case being an identically symmetrical proof. The result is clearly true for n=1. Note that 
the ('Ullt radkt iOll (~) is omitted Rince this does not imply an exact amount of variables. For n > 1, 
choose k variables {PI, .... Pk} frolll <Pn with k < n 
Define the formula ¢:= (]A Pi) 1\ 1jJ with 1/' E Form( <P1t {PI, ... , Pk}) not implying any affirmed 
,=1 
propositional variables. Using Lemma 3.5.2, there are exactly F(n - k) propositions that imply 
at lC<k'it one affinlleu variable. Thus there arc (22'" F( 11 - k)) propositions 1/; that imply no 
affirmed propositional variables. Since thpre are ( ~ ) ways of choosing k propositions out of <Pnl 
n 
one arrives at the above result for k < n. For k n the result is the single formula 1\ Pi 0 
;=1 
The above lemmas provide me with the tools to C111aiyse theory lletwork:; governed by the affirmed 
(respectively negated) implication relation. For theory networks governed by the affirmed or negated 
implication relation, the following counting lemma:; will be relevant. 
Lemma 3.5.4. Consider the subset Y n of Form( <pn) defined by 
Tn =:co E Form( <Pn) I E <Pn with I- ¢ -4 P or I- <}; -p} 
Y n comprises all formulae that imply at least one affirmed or negated p1'Oposit'ional variables. Define 
H(n) = #Y n . Then 
ifn> 1 
H(n) (3.5.9) 
Proof. The equation is clearly true for n = 1 where we have the 3 formulae { p. --p} implying at 
least one affirmed or negated variable. Now assume the formula is correct for all integers less than 
or equal to n. To construct a proposition 1.; E Form( <Pn+l) implying exactly k affirmed or negated 
variables with 1 S- k < n + 1, select k elements {p 1) ... , l)k} c::c <Pn~ 1. For each element Pi define (Ii 
k 
such that q, p, or q, := --Pi. The propo:;ition d> : = 1\ q, /\~, with 11; E Form ( <P n+ 1 _. {Pl , ... ) pi.;} ) 
;=1 
and '11' not implying any affirmed or negated variables in <Pn+ 1 {Pl .... ,Ph'} satisfies the requirement. 
~ow there an' exactly 22 ,,+I-k propositions up to logical equivalence in Form(<pn +1 {PI)'" ,pi.;}) 
and by assumption, exactly H{n + 1 - k) of the:;e propositions imply at lea:;t one affirmed or 
, k 
llcgatp(1 YariHhk. Thus then' are - H(n + 1 k) propositions up to logical equivalence 
in Forrn(<pntl - {PI, ... ,pd) that do not imply any affirmed or negated propositional variable. 
further. there are ( ~ ) po:;sible ways of choosing k variable from <Pn and 2k possible ways of 
deciding whether the variable or its negation is selected. This is true for all 1 S- k < n + 1. For 
1{ -.,.-1 
k = n + 1. there a1"(' possible propositions of the form 1\ qi where qi := p, or qi := "Pi' Finally 
i=l 
the contradiction adds 1 more formula to the set. I thus have 












By induction, the proof is concluded. o 
Corollary 3.5.5. Define the set 
f" (k) { cb E Form( iP.,.) I , ... ,Pk E iP" with Pi i PJ for i j such that 
'ii E {I, ... , k} f- if> Pi ur f- cb 'Pi 
alld Y (p -t q and Y 4> 'q for any q iPn ~ {PI,'" .pd } (3.5.10) 
comprising all formulae that imply exactly k affirmed OT' negated propositional variables. 
Let J(n, k) = #fn(k). Then 
{ 
2k ( ~ ) (2 2,,-k_ H(n ~ k)) 
J(n, k) = 
2n 
if n > 1 and k < n 
(3.5.11 ) 
if n 2: 1 and k = n 
Proof This is clearly true for n .c:; I. C:'·Jut(' that OIln, agaill. the nHltradktiull (..L) is omitted since 
this does not imply an exact amount of variables.) To construct every cb E f n (k) spIed k variables 
{PI-··· ,Pk} c::: iPn with k < n. For each variable p, define qi such that qi Pi or qi := 'Pi. The 
k 
proposition q):= 1\ q, 1\ '1j; with V' E Form( iP,,+ 1 {PI, ... ,pd) and ll' not implying any affirmed 
i=1 
or negated variables in 1>n+l {Pl,.··,pd satisfies the requirements stipUlated for rn{k). Now 
then' arc exa('tl~' -k propositions up to logical equivalence in FOT'm(1)n ~ {Pl"",Pk}) awl by 
assumption, exactly H ('II - k) of these propositions imply at least one affirmed or negated variahle. 
Thus tlwrc are 22,,-k H(n k) propositions up to logical equivalence in Fo'rm(1)n ~ {PI, ... ,pd) 
that do not imply any affirmed or negated propositional variahle. Further, there are ( ~. ) possible 
ways of choosing k variables from iPn and 2k possible ways of deciding whether the variable or its 
n 
negation is selected. For k = n, thew are 2n possible propositions of the form 1\ qt where qi Pi 
i=l 
or q, "Pi' The result follows. o 
The counting lemmas and corollaries above allow one to answer questions such as: "\That is the 
probability that a logicatom /1. is related to k logicatoms?" for the various classes of relations used. 
However, in order to calculate the prohability of inheritance (and as shall be showIl, mutation) one 
further needs to aIlswer questions such as: 'Given 1] E Form( 1>,,) with I] not implying any affirmeu 
propositional variable, what is the probability that w E .11] for some w E lV?' Now if there are no 
'constraints' imposed on ''I, this probahility would be exactly ~, since any world w is in exactly half 
the propositions (np to logical equivalence) in Form(1)n}. However, this is not the ease when the 
sample of propositions considered is 'constrained', as is evidenced in the next example. 
Example 3.5.4. Consider the set Q = FOT'm(1)2) ~ Y2 (with Y 2 defined in Lemma 3.5.4) of all 
propositions in PropCab that do not imply an affirmed or negated propositional variable. Let the 
variahles ill 1>2 be iP2 = {P, q}. The nHmlw]' of proposit iOll:' ill Form( iP2) that imply at least 1 
affirmed or negated variable is given hy H(2) =c 9. Thus #q = 222 9 7. These are listed as 











One needs to represent these propositions using the possible world semantics in order to calculate 
the probability that any world is in one of these formulae. Towards this end, define the following 
worlds in PropCal2' 
p q i Valuation 
0 0 Wo 
1 0 11'1 
0 1 W2 
1 1 11'3 
The propositions in Q are thus represented by 
I 4>: Proposition in Q [¢] : Semantic Representation #[4>] 
q->p {wo. WI, w:,} 3 
p'-"q { 1110, l1i:l} 2 
.(p *- q) {w[,w:!} 2 
i P->(j fWD, 'til:,?, 1J1;;} 3 
'pv'q { 11'0, Wj , '11'2 } 3 
I pVq {Wl,W2,W;I} 3 
i 
T {wo) WI, W2, ll';,} 4 
This allows one to calculate the probability that w E l¢l for any 11.' {illO' 11'1, ill 2 , W3} and ¢ E Q. 
In particular, one evaluates p(w E [diD ¥. 
The above example shows how a constraint on the sample set of propositions changes the prohability 
that any world is contained in one of the formulae. In order to generalise this result, first note that 
for an arbitrary suhset U ~ H', given /II E n', one has p( 111 U) = . Thus knowing the size of 
of constrained propositions ¢ will allow us to calculate the required probability. This 
observation also allows one to understand why the probability in the example above is greater than 
a half. The constraint imposed in Example 3.5.4 is more likely to eliminate a proposition whose 
mpaning ha.'l fewer plpments. The constraint that no affirmpd or m~gatpd variable is implied will 
ahnl~'S includE' fill propositions with a world sN ('(milt grpater than and exclude propositions 
with a world Sf't count, of L The counting lemmas below detail this concept. As before, I first 
consider the case of implying only affirmed (respectively negated) variables. 
Lemma 3.5.6. Denote the variables in <Pn by <P" = {Pl,P2, ... ,Pt,. .. ,p,,}. Define K+(n,k,t) 
as being the n'umber of propositions in Fonn(<P7J that are true in e;mctly k worlds and impl!! the 
affirmed variable Pt while not implying any of the affirmed variables PI-I, Pi .. 2, ... ,PI' Then 
( 2,,-1 ) .. K+(n I, k.l) ifn> 1 and k -5 2,,-1 k 
K.J..(n,k,t) = 













Proof. The result is dearly true for k n 1 since there is only 1 formula (i.e. 9 PI for 
<PI = {Pl}) that implies an affirmed variable and is true in 1 world only. In the general case, any 
fnrllluia 9 E Form(<pn) with #[9] > will imply no affirmed propositional variable. This is 
deduced by noting that if a formula 9 implies an affirlllecl variahle Pt. the affirmed variable lllU"t he 
true ill all till' worlds ill [¢]. But every affirmed variable is true in only 2n - 1 worlds, resulting in a 
contradiction. One therefore only needs to consider the case of k :::; 2n --1. 
For the case n 2, one has the following world representation 
])-1 PI World 
0 0 Wo 
1 0 WI 
! 0 1 W2 I 
! 1 1 W3 
For t L consider the variable PI which is true in 11'2 and 11"3. There are ( ;) K+ (2, k, 1) 
possible ways of choosing propositions true in exactly k worlds and implying PI' 
For t = 2, there are ( ~ ) possible ways of choosing propositions true in exactly k worlds and 
implying P2' 
In the ca'3e k = 1. T have douhle couuted a propositioll (Lp. [p f\ -,q] = {W2}), resulting in 
(~) (~) 
( 2) Wl-(l.k,l) k 
as required. 
In the case k = 2, I have 1 = K+ (2,2,2) proposition true in 2 worlds implying P2 and not implying 
[il. This concludes the case for II = 2. 
Now a""ume that 
( 
,)"-1 ) 




holds for n ::; m, for every 1 ::; k ::; 2n - 1 and 1 ::; t ::; n. Consider the c&''le n m + 1. 
(3.5.13) 
( 
2km ) For the case t = 1, one has exactly . possible propositions that imply Pl and are true in k 
worlds, as required. Assume Equation 3.5.13 holds for the ca'3e fI m+ 1, 1 ::; t. ::; .~ and 1 ::; k ::; 2m . 
( 2m) For the ca"e t s+ 1, one has exactly k propositions that imply Ps+l and are true in k world". 
The crux of the argument is to note that exactly K+(m,k,s).K+(m.k . .5 1), ... ,K+(m,k, 1) of 
the ( ~m ) propositions imply Ps, PS-ll ... ,PI respectively. This is deduced by observing that if 
~'J Form( <Pm) is a proposition that ililplie" the affirm cd variable [Is and doe" Hot imply the affirmed 











variables Pm+ . Ps and does not imply the aflinlled variables Ps-l . Ps-:!. . ... ,Pl' Thus 
(3.5.14) 
showing that Equation 3.5.13 holds for n 
follows by induction. 
m + 1, for every 1 ::; k ::; 2" 1 and 1 ::; t S; n. The result 
o 
Corollary 3.5.7. Let TI;t (k) = {q~ I #[1>] = k} n e;t be the set of formulae in Form(if>n) that imply 
at least 1 affirmed variable and are true in exactly k worlds with k 1. 
Then #II;t(k) = 
Proof. By definition of K+( n, k, t) in Lemma 3.5.6, the result follows. o 
Define /{- (n, k. t) to be the number of propositions in Form(if>n) that are true in exactly k worlds 
and imply the negated variable Pt while not implying any of the negated variables Pt-l' 1Jt-2, ... ,Pi 
An identical proof to Lemma 3.5.6 shows that K- (n. k, t) = K''-(n, k, t). 
Lemma 3.5.8. Denote the variables in <Pn by if>n {p],p;!,,,.,Pt, ... ,Pn}' Define K(n,k,t) as 
being the number- of propositions in Form( <P~. that are tTll(; in e.I'acl,ly k worlds and imply the affirmed 
variable Pt while not implying any of the affirmed or negated variables Pt-l, -"])t-1, Pi-'2, -'Pt-:!., ... ,PI, 'PI, 
Then 
( 2n - 1 ) 2 k K(n l,k,l) if I! > 1 and k S; 2n - 1 
K(n. k, t) = 
1 ifn k=t. 1 
(3.5.15) 
0 otherwise 
Proof. This proof is identical to Lemma 3.5.6, except that now one needs to excise the formulaes that 
imply affirmed or negated variablm; when counting. Since th(' lmmb('r of propositions in Forrn(<p n ) 
that are true in exactly k worlds and imply the affirmed variable Pt while not implying any of the 
affirmed or negated variables Pt-], 'Pt-l ,Pt-'2, 'Pt-2, ... ,PI, 'PI is equal to number of propositions 
in that are true in exactly k worlds and imply the negated variable 'Pt while not implying any of 
the affirmed or negated variables Pt-l, 'Pi-I,Pt-'l, 'Pt-'l"" .Pi- 'PI. thi::; introduces tll<' fador of 
2 in the recursive formulae, leading to the result. 0 
Corollary 3.5.9. Let TIn{k) = ({¢ I k} rl rn) be the set of formulae in Form(1!n) that imply 
at least 1 affirrned or negated variable and arc true in ('J:actl,lj k worlds w'ith k ~ 1. Then 
11 
#TIn(k) = 2 L K(n, k. t) (3.5.16) 
t=l 
Proof. By defiuitioIl of K(n. k, t), the result follows. o 
Corollary 3.5.10. The number of propositions in Form ( if>n) true in exactly k worlds not implying 
any affi'fTned or negated variables is given by 
( k













Proof. There are ( ~n ) propositions in Forrn(iIl n ) true in exactly k worlds. Thus there are 
( 
2n ) k - #ITn (k) true in exactly k worlds Hot illlplying auy affirmed or negated variables. The 
result follows. 0 
Lemma 3.5.11. Let ¢ E Form(iPn ) Tn he a proposition that w,plles no negated OT afJimwd 
variable. Then faT any '11' E Hl, one has 
prob( W E [<1>]) 
,l(n, k) 
(3.5.18) 
Proof. The number of propositions in Form( iPn ) Tn that are true in exactly k worlds is given by 
.1(n. It) in Lemma 3.5.10. The probability that an arbitrary world is in a set with k elements is given 
by . The result follows. 0 
One now has the counting tools to calculate the various probabilities in the theory networks under 
consideration. 
Theorem 3.5.12. Thcor.1J 'fIetworks orer PmpCal" having the constrained uniforrn s'ubstitution tran-
sition function and the local r'Clation determinr'd by the afjilmcd or negated implication T-equin,ment 
have the following properties for' any world W E W: 
(a) pl'ob;(w) ~ ~ for n ~ 6 
(b) probm(w) ~ t for n ~ 6 
Her'e J!ro!J;(w) is the probability that a logicatom will contain an arbitrary selecton (a world w) after 
an iteration .. given that one of its parents has the selecton. Similarly prob", (w) is the probability that 
a logicatom will contain an arbitr'ary selecton ( a 'World w) after- an iteration, given thai none of its 
parent.s has the selecton. 
Proof. Consider an arbitrary logicatom [t(t) in a universe at. time t and let 
{v,(t) : i E {L 2, ... ,k} , k :::; n} be a non-empty indexed set of logicatoms relat.ed to [t(t). For ease 
of llotatiuH, define 
B(,L)(t) if> 
B(v,)(t) := 
N(v,)(t) := Pi 











where qi := Pi Or q, := 'p, and ,EI E Form( <Pn - {Pl . .... PI.:}) uoes Hut imply any affirmed or negateu 
variable in <Pn {PI, ... ,].Jd. Applying tli!' l"OllstmillPd uniforlll suhstitutioll tram;itioll mit'. Ollt' 
obtains 
B(p,(t + 1)) (3.5.19) 
with 'TIl := lj'i or 7]i :,.c= depending on whether q,: Pi or qi 'Pi respectively. 
To prove (a), assume 3j E {l, ... , k} such that W E Consider the case when Ii: < n. Now 
wE [B(j.t(t + 1))] iff wE' for every i and W E r,8]. The table below shows the various cases that 
can occur for i E {1, ... , k} - {j} 
k 
In 2 out of "1 cases, one has that W [1),] i.e. a probability of ~. The probability that Ie E [ /\ 
i=l,i"fJ 
is equal to ~k. 1. For the case when i j, since W E [li'J], one has w E [1])] iff % := PJ' Once again, 
this can happen with a probability of~. Finally, using Equation 3.5.18, one has the probability that 
u·8 is given by 
.I(n - k,l)12 k - n 
prolJ(w rJ) = --=--=--,------
H(n - k) 
Combining these, one concludes that the probability of inheritance for the case when a logicatom is 
related to k logicatoms with k < 11., is given by 
:.;11 ~. 
L J(n k,l)12'/l 
probdk) 
1=1 
F'·< H(n - k) 
(3.5.20) 
For t,he case when k = 71, /3 <, T resulting in the probability being equal to ~ n. To complete the 
analysis, one needs to calculate the probability that a logicatom is related to k other logicatoms. This 
is given by the probability that ¢ implies k affirmed or negated variahles relative to the probability 
that ¢ implies at least 1 negated or affirmed variable. Using Equation 3.5.11 and 3.5.9 one obtains 




t; (H{n) 1) I(n,n) + ---:....,--,..---(H(n) - 1) (3.5.21) 











For (b), assume that w t/: for everyi. 
For the case k < n, 1t' E B(p.(t + 1)) iff U' E /3 and q, := 'Pi for every i. 
The probability that q, := -'Pi for every i is given by the number of propositions that imply exactly 
k negated variahles relative to the total amount of propositiollS that imply k affirmed or negated 
variables. Using Equations 3.5.8 and 3.5.11 one obtains 
G(n, k) 
prob( q, := 'Pi for every i) = . 
I(n,k) 
As before, the probability that W E La] with ;3 E Form(if>n_.k) and a not implying any affirmed or 
negated variables given by Equation 3.5.20. Thus for a logicatom related to k other logic atoms with 




For the case k n, one has 1] ..... T resulting in probm(w, n) = 
As before, the prohability that the logic atom is related to k other logicatoms is given 
Summing over k, one obtains 
(
n_'l [ 2i=k J(n -. k,l)l2 k - n j ) 
_1_.. L G(n, k) l(;~" k _. HI1I ~ k)) + G(n, n) 
H(n) 1 k=l \ • 




The aboye theorem shows that theory networks governed by the affirmed or negated implication 
relation and the constrained uniform substitution transition function do not satisfy the requirement 
of heritability since probi (w) = probm Cw) for large n. 
Lemma 3.5.13. Thwry nctwu'rks over Pl'OpCuin having the constmineduniJorm substitut'ion transi-
tion function and the local relation detem~ined by the affirmed implication relation have the following 
propeT'ties fOT any world w E W: 
(aJ pTobi(u') ":-' ~ Jar 11 ? 6 
(b) probm(w) 0 
Proof. Consider a logicatom Jl( t) in a universe at time t and let {Vi (t) : i E {L, ..• k} , k 'S n} be 
a non-empty indexed set of logic a toms related to Jl( t). ror ease of notation, define 
B(Ji)(t) ¢l 
B(v,)(t) 1/'; 











To prove (a), assume E {1. 2, ... , k} such that wE [Ii']], Now since Jogicatoms are related using 
tIlt' afflrmed implication relation, one can infer that 
k 
I- 4? <-'> A. P J 1\ (J 
.i~1 
(3.5.24) 
with (3 E Form( <Pn ~ {P1, ... ,Pn}) not implying any afflrmed variable in <P" {Pi, ... ,Pn}) for any 
.J. AppJ\"illg tliP trallsitioll rnlp. om' ohtaills 
k 
B(Ji(t + 1») A. ibJ /\ 3 (3.5.25) 
J=1 
:;ow by assumption, we have W E ['II'j]' Thus W E B[Ji(t + 1) iff W E f3 and W E 'Ii'; for every 
i E {I, 2, ... , k}. The probability that W E ,3 is }. The probability that w for every i is ! k-l 
(sim'C h.\' m,;slllllptioll. W is in 1/;j) this does not contribute to the term), Thus the probability that 
w E B[jL(t + 1)] is equal to ~ k if J1 is related to exactly k logicatoms at time t. The probability 
that 11 is related to k logicatoms is the proportion of propositions that imply exactly k propositional 
variables, relative to the number of propositions that imply at least one propositional variable. Using 
the previous lemma, I have 
prob i (w) = -'---"----------- (3.5.26) 
The table below shows how the value of this term converges rapidly to 0.5. 
To prove (b), assume w t/:. 
the result. 
for every i. By Equation 3.5.25, one has w t/:. B(Ji(t + 1», concluding 
o 
In conclusion. theory networks goveTned by the affirmed implication relation and the constrained 
uniform substitution transition function satisfy the natuml selection reqnirernent of heritability. 
Lemma 3.5.14. Theory networks over Pm11wln having the uniform substitution tmnsition function 
and the loml relation determined by lhe onl:t; aJji"'med Telation( JLRv ij] only N(v) is required in 
B(Ji)) have the following properties for any world wE W: 
(a) prob;( V}) 3 4" 
(b) probm ( II!) = ! 
Proof. Consider a logicatom Ji(t) in a universe at time t and let {v,(t): i {1. . .. ,k}, k ~ n} be 
a non-empty indexed set of logic atoms related to Ji(t). For ease of llotation, define 













To prove (a), assume 11) [Vi;] for some j {L2, ... ,k}. I am tlms a::;::;U1uiug that at least 1 pnl'cnt 
has the selecton. 1 llC('e1 to calculate tiJe probability that 11) E B(fL(t + 1). Now since fLRvJ we have 
(3.5.27) 
for some propositions o.j, Pj E Form( ip,,) not requiring qj and 0.] <+> L \Ve deduce this since only 
N(vj{t)) is required in B(fL(t)). Now using tlw cOllstraillPd uniform substitution tram-;ihull rule we 
obtain 
B(JL(t + 1)) (3.5.28) 
Now by assumption we have 11) E llPj]. Now for any proposition X Form(iPn ) we have ill E [xl with 
probability 1. Thus the probability that w ¢ fo.)ClI'l/ql .... , l,'ik/qkll anel w ¢ , ... ,I/Jk/Qlr)] 
is equal to l x ~ t. The probability that II! is in at least one of the propositions is 1 - ~ = ~. 
\Ve can conclude that in a truly random sample (randomly select the beliefs of each logicatom), the 
probability that W E [B(tit+di is 0.75, thus concluding part (a) of the proof. 
To prove (b), assume Vi {L2, ... ,k} w ¢ . Now since JlRv; for every i, we have 
I-- ¢ +--> 0., 1\ q, V f3i Vi E {l, 2) ... , k} 
Applying the uniform substitution transition rule, one obtains 
B(J1.(t + 1)) (3.5.29) 
Since U' ¢ [l/'L W E [B(fL(t + 1))] iff wE !Ji(1j't!fJl, ... , 1!'k!Qk). This can happen with a probability 
of~. 0 
Thus, theory networks governed by the only affirmed r'elation and the constrained uniform s'ubstitvtion 
transition function satisfy the natural selection requirement of heritability. 
3.5.2.3 The requirement of differential fitness 
Section 3.3 quant.ifies the requirement of differential fitness using the correlation between a replicator 
having a selecton and the corresponding number of offspring. In theory networks, this would mean 
that one is required to show that there is a correlation between a logicatom believing something, 
and the amount of children the logicatom has. Now first observe that in the case of theory networks, 
it looks as if this property has been turned on its head! What a logicatom believes determines 
its parents, who in the next generation, will update its belief according to the transition function 
specified. One canllot immediately see a way that a logieatoIlls' belief can influence the amount of 
children it has i.e. the amount of logicatoIIls that will be related to it in future generations. 
In order to solve this problem and prove that there exist theory networks that satisfy the requirement 
of differential fitness, consider the following argument: 
Let jl(O) be a logicatom in some logicatom universe Uo of a theory network at time t = 0, that 











that it is related to itself at time t = O. Due to heritability, any logicatom v(O) that is related to /1(0) 
at time t "~~ 0 will have a small non-zero chance of believing at time t = 1 what /1(0) believes. This 
means v{l) is more likely (compared to the case when 11(0) is not related to itself) to be related to 
/1(1) at time t L Further, any logicatom 1](1) related to v(l) will also have a chance of believing 
what v(l) believes, implying that there is a non-zero chance that it will be related to /1 in the 
future. In summary, if I (being a logicatom) am related to myself, anything that is related to me 
is more likely to be related to me in future generations. But if there is more chance of logicatoms 
being related to me, then there is more chance that I will be a parent, and thus there is a greater 
chance that I will have more children in future generations. So the belief can influence the amount 
of children in future generation. This argument is the essence of the proof for differential fitness 
below. 
The concept that will prove central to the proof of' differential fitness is that of' iuheriting a trait from 
a parent. Now a trait might be the phenotype of a single selecton, or might require a combination 
of selectons. The work so far has focused on the probability of inheriting individual selectons. The 
particular trait that I am interested in is the property of whether a logicatom /1 is related to a specific 
logicatom (say the one named p). Towards t.his end, define the boolean function representing this 
trait as 
Trait(/1, p) = { ~ if /1Rv with N(v) p (3.5.30) 
otherwise 
vVhat I need to analyse is the conditional probability that a logicatom /1 will have this trait given 
that one of its parents has the trait i.e. 
Prob(Trait(/1,p) = 1 I :3v with JIRv and Trait(v,p) = 1) 
This will naturally depend on the relation and transition function under consideration. The following 
two lemmas provide the fundamental results that I require to prove the differential fitness property 
in the theory networks that satisfied t.he heritability requirements in the previous section. 
Lemma 3.5.15. CO/isider a theory network O(lIT PropCaLn. governed b:1J the affirmed implication 
relation and the constmineduniform S1tbstit'ution transition function. Define 
P1 (/1,p,t) = Prob(Trait(/1(t + 1),p) = 1 I :3v such that /1(t)Rv(t) and Trait(v(t.),p) 1) 
F'o(/1,p, t) = Prob(Trait(p.(t + 1 ),p) 1 I '<:/v such that /1(t)Rv(t) one has T(v(t),p) = 0) 
(3.5.31 ) 









Proof. Assume logicatom /l( t) is related to logicatoms vdi) . .... Uk ( 




res ult ing in 
88 
Now since one is using the 
for some proposition 7] Form( <pn) not requiring the variables {ty' (v 1), ... , N (v k )} C <Pn and not 
implying any affirmed variables in iD" {N(v1), ... , N( uk)}. Thlls OlIP (,Hll eonclmle that 
for every i. Now if there exists a j E {1,2, .. . ,k} such that v) (t)R)"P(t), where ).P(t) is the unique 
logicatom with name]1. Olle CHll cUlldlldp that f- B(vj(t)) ~ p. This implies that f- BUl(t+ 1)) --7 p. 
Thus B(/l(t -+ 1)) is the contradiction ..L or /It+lR),':+l i.e. Tmit(/lI",l,P) L 
On the other hand, if no such j exiHts. B(/l(t + 1)) is the contradiction . 1 or Trait(j1(t -+- 1),p) = 1 
(this is the case when 7] p) or Trait(/l(t + 1 Lp) = 0 (this is the case when 7] does not imply pl· 
The chance that B(/l(t + 1)) is a contradiction as equal in both scenarios for a truly random sample, 
and one can thus eliminate these cases. For the C3."le when B(j1(t + 1)) is not the contradiction, one 
has that I\(p.,p,t) 1 and Po(Jl"p,t) =~. Thus PdlL,J),t) > Po(jl"pJ) as required. 0 
Lemma 3.5.16. CUII8ilier u theory nrtwork (Jucr PropCaL" governed by the only affirmed relation 
and the constrained unifoml substitution tr'ansition function. Define 
Pli /l, p, t) Prob (Trait (p,( t + 1), p) = 1 I =Jv such that /l( t) Rv( t) and Tr-ait( v(t) 1 p) 1) 
Polp,.P, t) = Prob{Trait(p,(t + I),p) 1 i Vv sitch that p,(t)Rv(t) one has Trait(v(t),p) = 0) 
Then 
(3.5.32) 
jor any propositional variable p. time t and logicatom p,. 
Proof. Consider an arbitrary proposition ¢> E Form( iD,,). Let 
711 Prob(¢ requires only p) 
712 Prob(¢> requires p and -,p) 
713 Proo( ¢ requires only -,p) 
714 Prob( rj; does not require p) 
(3.5.33) 
Clearly 1f1 + 1f'}. + 1f;l +- 71 1 = L 
Now assume logicatom /I(t) is related to logicat.oms VI (t), .... Vk(t), Consider the case where Vi E 
{l, 2, ... , k}. o Ill' has Tmit( Vi( t), p) = O. This implies that p,( t) is Hot related to allY logicatolll 
whose beli"f [equineS onlY]1. Since we are using the only affirmed relation, we cannot say anything 











On the other hand, assume there exists a j E f L 2 ..... k} such that j/j(l)R).,1'( t), where NJ(t) is the 
unique logicatom with name p. Now since one is using the only affirmed relation, one can conclude 
that 
f-- B(JL(t)) ...... (0: 1\ N(vj(t» V ~1) 
for some propositions 0:, f3 E Form( <I>1l)' Thus 
f-- B(jL(t + I}) ...... (0:' 1\ B(vj(t)) V iJ'} 
Since vj(t)R).,P(t}, one can conclude that f-- B(vj(t» +-4 (1 t. P V 6) for some propositions ~y,6 E 
Form(<I>,,). Thus f-- BUI{t + 1» ...... (n" /\ p V ,iJ") for SOlIlP propositions nil, ,6/1 Form(iP,,}. Now 
note that in the case when 0:" requires only p or does not require p or requin's p and 'p, and 6" 
requires only p or does not requ~one has thatl~rJi(t + 1» requires only p. Also note that in 
the case when (X/I requires only 'p and pI! requires only p, one has that B(Ji(t + 1» requires only p. 
Thus 
Pt (II., p. t) > ( 1f 4 + 1f 3 + IT 1 ) ( 1f J +- 1f.J + iT 21f I 
iTI (1ft + 1f2 + 1f;1 +- 1f!l + 1fdiTl + 1f3 + 1f4) 
1fj+1f1 +1f:l+1fj) 
> 1ft 




The results of these lemmas are now used to prove that the theory networks satisfying the heritability 
requirement in Subsection 3.5.2.2 satisfy the differential fitness requirement of natural selection. 
Theorem 3.5.17. Consider theory networks~. . ...1,8811111(; buth 111(' qOl'emui by the coflstmined 
uniform substitution transition function and the afJi'f1flCd implication relation (the only ajJinned rda-
t'ion respectively). Further assume that log-icatom Ji in ~ is self-refer-ential at time t while logicatom 
Ji in is not. Let St(Ji(t)) {v(t) I v(t)RJi(t)} be the successor set of Ji at time t for theory 
network ~. Similarly, let S2 (jt( t)) be the successor set of p, at time t for the011} network 72 D(~finr 
Tn} # U Sdv(t)) 
v(t)ES, (/l(tl) 
rrt2 # U S2(II(t» 
)/(IJE S2(llit)) 
If m 1 m2. then 
Prob(#Sdp,(t + k) >= #S2(/1(t + k))) > ~ (3.5.35) 
for t > 0 and k > 1 i. e the number of children that f.1 fathers in ~ in two or more generations is 
likely to be yn:ater than the wrr'(,8pmuling number of childreN that Ji father-sin 72. 
Proof. IItl and m2 represent the number of logicatoms that are related to logicatoms that have 
the trait I am interested in i.e. being related to Ji.. As shown in Lemma 3.5.15 (Lemma 3.5.16 











heritable. Assume the probability of inheriting the trait in Il and'h. is PRo Then there are likely to 
be PRmj (PRm2) logicatoms related to {L in the next generation in Tr ('h. respectively). If mintz, 
then the amount of logicatoms related to {L is likely to be equal in both theory networks. However, 
in Tr, there is a more likely chance that JI (t + 1) RJi.( t + 1) than there is in 'h.. All things being equal, 
one will have more grandchildren in the following generation t = 2. It is this discrepancy that leads 
to the result sought after. 0 
3.5.2.4 The requirement of variation 
In terms of the requirement of variation, Section 3.3.3 states that the probm(w) > 0 for variation 
to persist from one generation to the next. By Lemma 3.5.13, variation will not persist in theory 
networks gov€med by the affirmcd implicatioll rdatioll. III sUlllIlmry, thcory networks govcmcd hy 
the only affirmed relation and the constrained uniform substitution transition f1lnction satisfy the 
requiremcnts of heritability, differential fitness and variation. 
3.5.2.5 The requirement of non-deterministic replication 
All theory networks clearly do not satisfy this requirement. They are deterministic systems. Given a 
configuration at time t, one can predict the exact configuration at time t+ 1. Thus even though I have 
shown that there exists a class of theory networks whose dynamics satisfy the three requirements of 
natural selection, they will still always evolve to a fixed point. 
3.5.3 The answer in inverted theory networks 
In order to overcome this hurdle, I turn to physics to try understand what more is required of the 
sought after structure. In particular, I consider the arrow of time. 
3.5.3.1 The arrow of time 
Looking closer at the problem, one notices that the unwanted determinism in theory networks 
actually acts in the wrong direction. To understand this, consider the following example. 
Example 3.5.5. Let Tr ,Rj , T) and 72 ((2, Rio T) be two theory networks, both governed 
by the affirmed implication relation and the constrained uniform substitution transition function. 
The substitution maps 6 and define the logicatom universes U, and U2 represented in Figure 3.6: 
The reader can easily confirm that both these logicatom universes will evolve, in the next time step, 
to the logicatom universe represented by U', 
The above example shows how all future states are deterministic, while past states are not a topsy 
turvy scenario that one expects to find in Carroll's wonderland, However, this ends up being my 
saving grace. Firstly, note that this asymmetry in time is a required component for a pregeornetry in 











Logicatom Universe U1 Logicatom Universe U2 
------------- ----_. ---_. -#-. _.-
Logicatom Universe U' 
Figure 3.6: Non-isomorphic universes evolving to isomorphic universes 
one the time reverse of the other [23].:3 But this is not embodied in the physics. From an observational 
perspective, this symmetry is clearly not realised in nature. However, this fundamental asymmetry 
in time is simply embodied in theory networks - the one direction is deterministic, the other not. 
Secondly, this property allows me to complete my construction objective. Just 'invert' the direction 
that the theory network evolves. In other words, run the example in the above diagram backwards. 
Starting at logicatom universe U' proceed to U1 or U2. The non-determinism is embodied in the 
fact that there is no property that specifies the choice of say U1 over U2 • This also allows me to 
leave wonderland - the past is fully known; the future is unknown, yet constrained by the state I'm 
currently in. 











3.5.3.2 Inverted theory networks 
Formally, an inverted theory network represented as T-1 0\"('1' PropCaln is once again specified 
h~' tllp tuple ((, Rj , T). The difference comes in that for a given time t, it consists of the set of 
all substitution maps T~ J (t) = {(1, (2, ... , (d satisfying the property that every theory network 
(i, Rj , T) specified by each substitution (, will detprlllillisticall.v l'H)ln' to ({, Rj , T) after t time 
::;tep::; according to the usual definitiou of a theory uetwork. III term::; of notatioll, I ::;ay that each 
substitution map (, specifies a 'possible future' to';. I will also decrement time to index the evolution 
of the individuallogicatoms (and substitution maps). Thus if /l.(t) is a logicatom in the logicatom 
universe specified by';, and ( E P-l(l) is a possible future one time step away, the corresponding 
logicatom in the universe represented by ( is denoted as '/' (t 1). The superscript tells one which 
future is uuder cOIlsideration. and the time ilJ(kx (t - 1) tells one that I am one state away from 
the initial specified llniverse.4 Other than this, the representation of inverted theory networks is 
identical to that of theory networks. I can represent the logicatom universe of each possible future 
using G-models and consequently, G-defining propositions. I have thus not lost the property that 
logicatoms have the 'ability' to describe their universe. I will now proceed to show that inverted 
theory networks are the sought after structures required to complete the construction objective. 
Firstly I need to clarify the notions of predecessors and successors, since everything has been turned 
on its head. In theory networks, if at time t one had J-t(t)Rv(t) then one regarded J-t(t + 1) as a 
successor of v( t). This was clear since the belief of lI( t) influenced the belief of p(l + 1). 
In inverted theory networks, given a possible future ( one time step away from';. if J),C,(t-l)Rv( (t-l) 
then I say that lI( (t - 1) is a (possible) successor of fl.{ t). Figure 3.7 below shows an example of a 
logicatom with its successors in two possible futures. The definitions for the probability of inheritance 
and mutation are now respectively: 
(a) prob7(w): the probability that W E [B(v({t - 1))] given that it is an element of at least 1 
predecessors belief i.e. there exists a logicatorn J-t such that J-tc, (t 1 )Rv( (t 1) and W E B(/-t(t)). 
(b) prob~,,(w): the probability that 1.1) E [B(v((t 1))] given that it is not an element of any 
predecessors belief i.c. fix every iogicfltom. /i such that /i( (t -1 )Rv( (t-l), one has 1.1) </:. B(I1'( t)) 
Example 3.5.6. Figure 3.7 below shows two possible futures of an inverted theory network, together 
with the successors of logicatom l in both futures By definition, logic atom l has m, t, j as successors 
in possible future (1 and n, j in possible future (:/ 
must be emphasised that configurations can exists that have no possible futures. In cellular automaton systems, 











Possible Future 'I Possible Future '2 
Logicatom Universe; 
Figrne 3.7: Non-deterministic replication in inverted theory networks 
The following theorem proves that the requirements of heritability, variation, differential fitness and 
non-deterministic replication are satisfied in a particular class of inverted theory networks. 
Theorem 3.5.18. Let 7- 1 = (.;, Rj , T) be an inverted theory network over' PropCaL", governed by 
the affirmed implication relation and the constrained uniform-substitution transition function. Let ( 
be a possible future of ~. Then the following properties hold: 
(a) probi(w) = 1 
(b) 0 < probm(w) < 1 
(c) Any logicatom p( t) in ~ that is self-referential (i. e. p( t )Rp( t») has at least 1 successor (v< (t-l» 
in ( 
Proof. To prove (a), consider any logicatom v< (t - 1) in the possible futrne (, and let the set 
{p~(t), ... ,p~(t)} contain aJI its predecessors in~. Assume that there exists j such that w E 
[B (p; (t» ]. Since the local relation is the affirmed implication relation, the following property holds 












Thus one may conclude that 
(3.5.37) 
for some dJ not requiring N[v«t - 1)]. The constrained uniform substitution transition function 
implies that 
(3.5.38) 
for some q./. Now since w E [B[JL1(t)]L one has that wE :B [v«(t IJ], thus proving the result. 
For (b), one clearly has prohm < 1 since if this were not the case, probm 1 together with (a) 
would imply that the beliefs of all successors of a logic atom in an inverted theory network are a 
tautology, which is clearly not true. Further, if probm = 0, this together with (a) would imply that 
all successors of a logicatom p. in an inverted theory network will believe the same belief as 11, another 
dearly false statement. (The reader needs only look at Figure 3.7 to confirm these arguments) 
For (c), assume there exists a self-referentiallogicatom Il.(t) in ~ that has no successors. By definition, 
this implies that for every logicatom v«(t - 1) in (, it is not the case that v<(t - l)RJ.L«t 1). 
Since no logicatom is related to J.L\. (t - 1), the definition of the transition function implies that 
the belief of J.L< (t - 1) cannot change (when moving forward from a theory network perspective). 
Thus B [p«(t -1)] B [Pt]. But since pet) is self-referential, this would imply that J.L«t - 1) is 
self-referential, contradicting the fact that it is related to no other logicatom. 0 
The theorem above tells one that inverted theory networks regulated by the affirmed implication 
relation and the constrained uniform substitution transition function satisfy: 
(a) The requirement of heritability, since prob,(w) 1 and probm(w) < probi{w) 
(b) The requirement of variation, since 0 < probm ( w) < 1 
(c) The requirement of differential fitness sillce a particular property of a logicatoms belief eon-
strains the minimum amount of successors of the logicatom, showing that there can exist 
relationships between the belief of a logicatom and the number of successors i.e. the correla-
tion is non-zero 
(d) The requirement of non-deterministic replication is clearly satisfied (by construction) since 
the various possible futures imply that the number of successors of any logicatom is not set in 
stone. Figure 3.7 shows how logicatom 1 has 3 successors in one possible future and 2 successors 
in the other. 
3.6 Summary of Chapter 3 
The requirements of natural selection were formalised through the derivation of a generic equation. 
Inverted theory networks were defillcd and the constructioIl objective was met with the construc-
tion of a particular example i.e. I have succeeded in creating a mathematical space defined using 












In this chapter, I analyse whether inverted theory networks can serve as platforms for modelling 
\Vheeler's pregeometries and creative thought. Section ,1.1 argues how certain observables in physics 
can in fact be modelled using inverted theory networks. The fact that the physical dimension of space 
is three is shown to be predicted by inverted theory networks governed by the uniform substitution 
transition function and the affirmed implication relation i.e. the inverted theory networks governed 
by natural selection. In particular, I review work done by Nagels and show that these inverted 
theory networks will 'on the large scale' look like a 3+1 dimensional curved space. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the arrow of time is shown to be a consequence of the structure itself. Section 4.2 
reviews the basics of quantum theory and argues how it is possible that it could arise naturally in 
the inverted theory network governed by natural selection. Section 4.3 concludes the chapter with a 
discussion analysing whether these structures could model thought and puts forward a proposal to 
achieve this objective. 
4.1 Geometrodynamics 
Einstein confused as all 
as to why the apple d·id fall 
said spacetime's not flat 
and where we all sat 
spacetime was curved like a ball! 
And thus the story goes on 
that Einstein thought very long 
and after many derivations 
wrote fifteen field equations 
and so we continue our song! 
Now as we come to the end 
we must all remember to bend 












or the bright heavy sun 
or equations we'tl all have to mend! 
The geometric behaviour of physics is reviewed using the theory of geometrodynamics [551. The 
motive herein is to show how purely geometric concepts can be used to explain certain classical and 
quantum physical observables. I conclude this section by discussing Wheeler's pregeometry within 
this context. 
4.1.1 Classical geometrodynamics 
Geometrodynamics is the theory that physics can be represented purely using geometry. This 
concept is best understood if one states the two highly contrasted views of the nature of physics 
[78]: 
• Spacetime serves only as the 'arena' in which fields and particles interact. In this view, fields 
and particles, together with the laws that govern them, must be added to the spacetime 
geometry to permit any physics. 
• All physics is a manifestation of the bending of space i.e. physics is geometry 
Currently, accepted physics takes the middle ground in that both the curvature of spacetime (Ein-
stein's theory of general relativity) and external fields (quant,nm field theories such as quantum 
electrodynamics) are used to explain observables. To review geometrodynamics as applied to clas-
sical physics (i.e. non-quantised matter or fields), I commence with the theory of general relativity 
and classical electrodynamics. 
Einstein proposed the following fundamental principles to construct his general theory of relativity: 
1. Principle of General Relativity: Otherwise known as the principle of general covariance: 
All laws in physics take the same form in any coordinate system. 
2. Principle of Equivalence: There exists a coordinate system in which the effect of a gravi-
t ational field vanishes loeally. 
These postulates allowed Einstein to derive the field equations. These encompass tensor equations 
on a 4 dimensional Riemannian manifold: 
(4.1.1) 
In keeping with the spirit of the topic, Equation 4.1.1 is expressed in geometrised units. (The 











dimension of a power of length.) General relativity can be summarised as follows [77]: "Spacetime is 
a manifold A1 on which there is defined a Lorentz metric gab. The curvature of gab is related to the 
matter distribution Tab in spacetime by Einstein's equation". Intuitively, Equation 4.1.1 tells us that 
energy curves spacetime and curved spacetime determines the classical dynamics of energy. (Aside: 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that an analogous concept arises in theory networks: A logicatoms belief 
determines what logicatoms it is related too, and in turn these related logicatoms determine how 
the belief is updated.) The theory has been successful in predicting various observed phenomena 
(Mercury's precession rate, the cosmic microwave background, the expanding universe, the bending 
of light around massive objects to name but a few) and forms one of the foundations of modern 
physics. 
Maxwell formulated his classical theory of electromagnetism after immersing himself in the accounts 
of Faraday's electrical researches. In tensor notation, Maxwell's equations of electromagnetism are 
[77]: 
( 4.1.2) 
where Fab is the spacetime tensor represellting the electric and magnetic field and .fa is the current 
density ,i-vector of electric charge. I have used the notation of square brackets around indices to 
denote the total antisymmetric part of the tensor. The central idea of (classical) geometrodynamics 
is to represent the electromagnetic field Fah and electric current 4-density JU purely in terms of curved 
spacetime. This means that any test charge should behave identically in the curved spacetime as it 
would according to Maxwell's electromagnetic equations. General relativity had done this exactly 
for Newton's theory of the gravitational force field. Classical geometrodynamics explored whether 
classical physics comprising gravitation, electromagnetism, non-quantised charge and non-quantised 
mass could be described in terms of empty curved space. Detail of the work reviewed below is 
available in [78]. 
The first breakthrough was made by Rainich, who showed under what conditions a curvature of 
spacetime can be regarded as due to all electromaglletic fidel. Further he also described how to fiud 
the field from the geometry. The Rainieh conditions involved algebraic relations on the Ricci tensor 
Rab, specifically 
RJI" R" v J u (~R R OJ3) II 4 "<{1 
R R~ =0 (4,1.3) 











:\'O\V con~ider a field Fal> satisfying Maxwell's Equations 4.1.2. The electromagnetic energy-stress 
tensor is given by 
l' 1 (1' L' r ab = ~acrb 
cl1r 
( 4.1.4) 
Solving the field equations 4.1.1 with Tab specified by Equation 4.1.4 would give one a spacetime 
manifold with a Ricci tensor Rab satisfying the Rainich conditions. Alternatively, given a solution 
to the field equations with the Ricci tensor satisfying the Rainich conditions, the electromagnetic 
tensor Fab is specified up to a constant (}, known as the 'complf'xion' of the electromagnetic field. 




Thus classical electromagnetism can be described in purely geometric terms. Einstein taught us that 
gravity could be described in purely geometric terms. Now electromagnetic waves are solutions to the 
Maxwell Equations ·4.1.2 in empty space ja 0 [63]. Similarly, since gravitational waves are solutions 
to thf' SOllH'e free field f'qlIations [77], onf' has gravitational and dectromagnetic radiation described 
in purely geometric terms. The next step is to explain how mass and charge can be described 
using purely geometric terms. To solve this problem, Wheeler introduced the concept of a 'geon' 
(a gravitational electromagnetic entity): A geon is an object constructed out of electromagnetic 
radiation which holds itself together by its own gravitational attraction for a very long time. It owes 
its existence to curvature in spacetime. "Studied from a distance, such an object presents the same 
kind of gravitational attraction a...<; any other mass. Moreover, it moves through space as a unit, and 
undergocs deflection by slowly varying fields of force just (l,,'j does auy other muss. In brief, the geoll 
describes mass without ma...<;s" - Wheeler [78]. 
Wheeler attacked the problem of 'charge without charge' by considering a situation where lines of 
electric force thread through a 'wormhole' in spacetime, symbolically pictured below in Figure 4.1: 
"The t,wo mouths appear to an observer with poor resolving power to be two equal and opposite 
electric charges" - Wheeler [78]. 
I conclude the review of classical geometrodynamics at this point. Firstly note that none of the 
entities described bear any resemblance to the elementary particles (governed by quantum theory) 
of observational science. They are all classical objects. However, the power of using geometry as a 











Figure 4.1: A wormhole with electric flux representiug da:;sical electric charge 
the applicat.ion analysis of inverted theory networks since I only have geometrical concepts to model 
physics. 
It is interesting to note that geometry (although of a more generalised mathematical structure known 
as a fibre bundle [58]) also plays a role in quantum theory. This is experimentally captured in the 
Aharauov-llollll1 (All) effect. Thc All experiment is schematically described in Figure 4.2 hc!ow. 
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Figure 4.2: The Aharanov-Bohm experiment 
solenoid is placed in the middle of the beam. A shield prevents the electrons from penetrating into 
the solenoid. Now lvlaxwell's electromagnetic field Fob in equations 4.1.2 can be expressed in terms 
of a vector potential Ab by: 
(4.1.6) 
In the AB experiment, a vector potential is chosen such that the field vanishes in the path of the 
electrons. Classically, the solenoid cannot have any influence on the electrons. The experiment 
shows however that even though the magnetic field is zero at the points in space through which the 











notioll, of how the phase in a wavei'ullctioll infiuences the outcome, is knowH as Berry's phase [58],) 
This is theoretically explained using the geometric concept of holonomy which is described as the 
effect of parallel trallsporting a vector along a dosed curve, III Riemallnian geometry, this yields 
the Riemann curvature tensor R,brd· The theoretical structure used in the AB effed is that of a 
fibre-bundle, but in both cases, the laws of physics is explained using the rurvature of a space. 
4.1.2 Pregeornetries 
Geometrodynamics fails to supply any "natural place for spin ~ in general and for the neutrino 
in particular. There is no place in geometrodynamics for change in topology; therefore turn to 
pregeometry" [55]. A pregeometry is a basic structure that gives rise to the laws of physics. One 
therefore needs the pregeometry to look like a four dimensional Riemannian manifold on average. 
The first important point in this statement is the four dimensions. Einstein's field equations applied 
to a manifold with one, two or three dimensions demand fiat space - not of any interest in this 
context. The second important point is the concept of continuity - spacetime in general relativity 
and particle physics, is a continuous manifold with continuous co-ordinates. Thus, the pregeometry 
must look continuous in some classical limit. This does not eliminate the option of discreteness. 
Einstein [21], in 1936 expressed the general feeling that "perhaps the success of the Heisenberg 
method points to a purely algebraic method of description of nature, that is, to the elimination of 
continuous functions from physics. Then however, we must give up, by principle, the spacetime 
continuum". Hawking on the other hand states that "although there have been suggestions that 
spacetime may have a discrete structure I see no reason to abandon the continuum theories that 
have been so successful." [36J. The pregeometry must incorporate dynamic topologies, a requirement 
emphasised by Wheeler [55] to model spin ~ particles. It should explain the arrow of time. And 
finally, it should be' fundamentally simple'. 
Since ·Wheeler mentioned the concept of a pregeometry, a vast amount of work has gone into fornlU-
lating this structure, much of which is referenced in [27]. Some of this work that is relevant in my 
context will be detailed later. I do however need to mention one particular approach to the problem, 
namely Wheeler's original suggestion of "pregeometry as the calculus of propositions" [55]. Here, 
'Wheeler hints at the fact that one might need to attack the problem from a completely different 
perspective, saying that it "may be hopeless to learn the basic operating principle of the universe, 
call it pregeometry or call it what one will, by any amount of work in general relativity and particle 
physics." Driven by the principle of Simplicity, he asks: "What else can pregeometry be, one asks 
oneself, than the calculus of propositions?". However, in terms of a detailed description of the idea, 












Is the pregeornetry of physics, hwothesised by Wheeler /79} just one large inverted theory network? 
The objective of this section is to argue that it is in fact so. Towards this end, I will be using the 
geometrodynamies hypothesis [78]. I will thus define and analyse the discrete analogs to geometrical 
concppts defined on differentiable manifolds. This include:;; the 'rlimen:;;ion' of an invertpd theory 
network the 'metric' defining distance and volume measures for inverted theory networks, a.'l well 
as the discrete analogs to concepts such as 'geodesies' and 'curvature'. 
In terms of using inverted theory networks to model pregeometries, one must note that a similar 
structure was proposed by Cahill, Klinger and Kitto [11, 12]. They describe pregeometries in terms 
of 'process physics'. In particular, they hypothesise that the "solution to the end-game problem 
is to avoid the notion of things and rules; rather to use a bootstrapped self-referential system. 
Put simply, this models the universe as a self-organising and self-referential information system 
'information' denoting relationships as distinct from 'things' " [lOJ. No formal detail is given as to 
the exact struct ure of this space. Certain assumptions regarding how their structure evolves are 
made. In particular, an equation governing the relationships between the entities in their structure 
is hypothesised, resulting in a description of 'space and quantum physics'. 
Goertzel et al [30] also start their pre-geometric modelling by assuming the universe is one large 
Ilt:t\vork. They define rules for the evolution of their network and show that they can generate clifford 
algebras from these 'event networks', giving one a basis in which to model quantum physics. It is 
interesting that this thesis has arrived at a similar end-point to the above examples, even though it 
originated from a knowledge modelling perspective. 
To get a feel for what 'large' means in 'one large inverted theory network', consider the following: 
One would assume that the elementary length (say the distance between 2 related logicatoms) in a 
logieatolll uiliverses is one Planck IPllgth (lp = fl ;::::; 1.6 x lO-33crn). This implies that 1cm3 of 
space would consist of approximately 10100 logieatoms. So one is talking about a large (but finite) 
number of logicatoms interacting according to some local relation and transition rule. I hypothesise 
that these local interactions form the 'billions and billions of elementary quantum phenomena' and 
'the laws and initial conditions of physics arise out of this chaos by the action of' natural selection. 
4.1.3 The dimension of spacetime 
The first problem I attack is in describing and analysing the 'dimension' of a logic atom universe. 
Towards this end, I need to define various metries on inverted theory networks. I therefore exploit 
the similarity between logicat.om universes and graph theory and reuse all the definitions available 











Definition 4.1.1. A graph X consists of a vertex set VeX) (the nodes) and an edge set E(X) (the 
links), where an edge is an unordered pair of vertices of X. One says a graph is directed if an edge is 
an ordered pair of distinct vertices. Further, the graph is called simple if the edges comprise distinct 
pairs of vert.ices of X (i.e. an edge cannot start and terminate at the same vertex). 
One can clearly see that a logicatom universe is a non-simple directed graph, where the logicatoms 
U are the vertices and the relation R specifies the set. This mapping just ignores the fact 
that there is more structure to a logicatom than the corresponding vertex. Graph theory is a 
large area of active research in mathematics and there are many books detailing all the concepts 
(subgraphs, automorphisms, homomorphisms) and properties regarding these structures [28]. In 
order to encapsulate the dynamic behaviour of inverted theory networks one would need to consider 
evolving graphs [19]. For my purposes, I borrow the following concepts: 
Definition 4.1.2. Consider an inverted theory network T~l = (~, HI, T) OWl' PropCaln . A path 
between a logicatom p.(t) at time t and logicatom vet - k) Ht time t - k (time is decremented as 
I move along possible futures) is defined as an ordered sequence of k - 1 logicatoms together with 
h · d' f {(I.C·, . (k-l} t'f' h cil' t' tell' correspon mg utures, 171 ,TI2-"'" lh_l sa .IS ymg t e 10 owmg proper les: 
(i) /l(l (t - J)R17?' (t 1) 
(ii) '(t - i -1)Rr};~+l'(t - i 1) for every i [I,k- 2] 
(iii) 11~"-1 (t k)Rv(k(t_- k) 
Here R is the local relation induced by the relation generating function RJ. I say that the path 
PF [,I(t). v(t-- k)] originates at logicatom /1 at time t and terminates at 1/ at time (t k) along the 
possible future F = {(I, (" ... , (d. The length of the path PI [/i(tj, v(t k)] is k and is denoted 
by L(PF [J1(1). v(t - kU· 
The defillition of a path allows me to illherit the Illost natural distance measure used ill graph theory: 
Definition 4.1.3. The distance between 2 logicat.oms at time t for possible future F is defined by 
d(F.tl,v,t) = :\lin{L(PF[/li.Vt'] < t: P PI[P.llVI,J is a path with future F}. luotitl'f words, 
it is the length of the shortest possible path or 'geodesic' between the 2logicatoIns along the specified 
possible future. If no such path exists I set d(p., 1/, t) 00. 
Note that this is not a topological metric, since d(/l, /l, t) is not necessarily O. Once again, borrowing 
concepts from graph theory, I define the neighbourhood of a 10gicatoIn as [59]: 
Definition 4.1.4. Let /1(t) be a logic atom in an inverted theory network T' 1 at time t. A k-
neighbourhoodof/l(t) for possible futureF is the set Nk{F./l,t) {III d(F,/l,1),t):S; k}. I define the 
surface of a neighbourhood for possible future F as the set SdF, /l, t) = {T} I d(F, /l, 1}, t) k}. The 
number of elements of a neighbourhood #Nk(F, /1. t) for possible future F is denoted by Vk,{F,/I., t). 












Dk(F, J-L , t) counts the total amount of logicatoms at a distance k from J-L at time t for possible 
future F. As will be seen, this will be used to get a measure of the 'dimension' of an inverted theory 
network along a possible future . I will motivate the definition of surface sequences using some simple 
examples. 
Example 4.1.1. Consider the inverted theory network displayed in Figure 4.3. The diagram shows 
the relationships between the 11 logicatoms of an inverted theory network that has reached a fixed 
point (i.e. the relations between the logicatoms do not change. The time parameter t can thus be 
ignored in this example.) The surface of the neighbourhood at a distance of 1 from J-Ls is given by 
Sl(J-LS) = {J-L4,J-L6} resulting in D1 (J-L5) = 2. Similarly, the surface of a neighbourhood at a distance 
of 2 from J-L5 is given by S2(J-L5) = {J-L3,J-L7} resulting in D2 (J-L5) = 2 
Figure 4.3: An inverted theory network having a dimension of 1 
Figure 4.3 should convince the reader that the cardinality of the surfaces of every neighbourhood 
around J-L5 is 2. The fact that the cardinality of surfaces of all neighbourhoods around J-L5 is a 
constant, suggests that this inverted theory network 'approximates' a one dimensional space. This 
motivates the definition of the surface sequence of a logicatom at time t. 
Definition 4.1.5. The surface sequence of a logicatom J-L in an inverted theory network 7-1 at 
time t for possible future F is defined by 
~(F, J-L, t) = {Do(F, J-L, t), Dl (F, J-L, t) , D2 (F , J-L, t), ... , DLmaJF, J-L, t)} 
where 
Lmax = maxi d(F , J-L , v, t) I Vv E 7 : d(F, J-L , v, t) i=- oo} 
The volume sequence is analogously defined by 











These sequences are powerful tools with which to analyse the geometry of discrete structures such 
as inverted theory networks. They give one the ability to define the analogous concepts available 
in differentiable manifolds. For example, in general relativity, homogeneity implies that no point in 
the universe has a privileged position . In a discrete structure, one could define this by saying that 
the surface sequence of every logic atom in the universe along a possible future F is identical. The 
example below shows the properties of the surface sequence of a 2-dimensional structure. 
Example 4.1.2. The surface sequence of logicatom f.-l (2,2) in the inverted theory network (that 
has reached a fixed point) represented in Figure 4.4 is E(F, f.-l(2,2),t) = {4 ,8, 12 ... }. The linear 
relationship of this sequence indicates an approximation to a two dimensional geometry, in the sen~e 
that it approximates a subset of ',f}. 
Figure 4.4: A '2 dimensional' inverted theory network 
Intuitively, one expects the surface sequence of a three (four) dimensional structure to adhere to some 
quadratic (respectively cubic) relation . Alternative definitions of the dimension of discrete structures 
are available in [59], although I personally find the use of surface sequences intuitive. I now have the 
tools with which to analyse the dimension of an inverted theory network modelling a pregeometry. I 
am interested in answering the question posed by Wheeler: "How does the world manage to give the 
impression that it has the dimension of three?". Nagels' ingenuity in a great paper headed 'Space as 
a "Bucket of Dust" , [57] provides one with the complete argument as to why certain inverted theory 
networks (viewed as a pregeometry) would give the impression that space has a dimension of three. 











network along a fixed potisible future'! This problem Wati completely solved for the catie where the 
probability that any two logicatoms being related is very small. I will review his work and detail his 
calculations the main reason being that I believe his mathematical methodology to be the most 
relevant in understanding why pregeometries give rise to the 'classical physics' observed - a sought of 
'correspondence principle' for pregeometries. Before I delve into Nagels' calculations, I would like to 
spend some time discussing his crucial constraint: the probability that any 2 logicatoms are connected 
i.s .small. Considf'r thf' inverted theory ndworks governf'd by the affirmf'd implication relation and 
the constrained uniform substitution transition function i.e. the inverted theory network governed 
by natural seleetion. Equation ;j.0.0 tells onf' the number of propositions in ifln that implies at least 
OIle affirmed variable. Thus for an inverted theory network over PropCaln governed by this relation, 
the probability that any 2 logicatoms are related is given by p = . The table below shows the 
value of this ratio for the first few values of n. 
n 2 5 7 
J! 0.375 0.1 7.57 X 10-5 1.40 Ox 10- 19 
One sees that this ratio rapidly tends to O. Thus for the number of logicatoms required in a 
pregeometry (the order of 10100 in 1cm3 of space), one sees that the probability that any 2 logicatoms 
will bf' related is infinitesimally small. Conspquf'ntlv, t hp daRR of invertpd theory networkR that arf' 
regulated by natural selection as specified in Theorem 3.5.18 satisfy N agels' constraint. 
Returning to Nagels' work, I need to calculate the most likely surface sequence of a logicatom j1 in 
an inverted theory network at some time t along a potisible future F: 
(4.1.7) 





DA(F.II" t) > 0 for 0 < A :; 10) 
Lmax is defined in Definition 4.1.5 and corresponds to the largest finite distance from logicatom j1 
at time t along possible future F. VL,I/" , (F,j1, t) is the total number of logicatoms connected (in 











connectivity by stating that there must exist at least one logicatom a distance ,\ from /1 for ,\ less 
than the largest finite distance Lrnax. 
One is required to calculate the probability distribution of the spatial surface series i.e. 
P(/1.t) = Prob[{2:(F,/1,t)}] (4.1.11) 
All the subsequent derivations assume that one starts at logicatom I' at time to fur a fixed possible 
future F. To simplify the notation, I omit the time and possible future parameter. To calculate the 
probability distribution 4. one notes that the following conditions hold: 
This ('xpn'ssct> the Ilotion that t'WI'." logicatolll a distance (i + 1) from 11, must be related to 
at least one logicatom a distance i from /1 (at time to + i when one considers the definition of 
distance) . 
Now at any time, 2 logicatoms are related with probability p. Select 1/ E Si+1 (/1). It io not 
related to a logic atom in 8 i (11) with probability 1 J! = q. It is not related to any logicatom 
in 8;(/1) with probability qD,(/l). It is related to at It'ast llogicatom in S;(/1) with probability 
1- qDi(jJ.). This is true for every logicatom in S,+1 (/1). Thus the probability for a given surface 
sequence {DdJi), DA/1) , ... , DL(H"" , (/1)} includes the factor [1 qO,(/l)]D,+dlt ) 
(b) V17 E l(/1).';;/1/ U~:~-I Sk(/1) : It is not the case that /1B/} 
This expresses the notion that each logicatom a distance i + 1 from I-l cannot be related to any 
logieatolll at a dhitanc(' 0, 1,2,:t ... , i-I from /1 at time to. to + 1 •.. .. to + i-I respectively. 
Select an logicatom TJ E S,+l (/1.). Thio is not related to a logicatom v E UZ:~-l Sd p) (at 
any time) with probability q. This is not related to any logicatom II E U~:~-l Sd/l.) with 
probability , D, (jJ.). This is true for every logic atom in (p). Thus the probability for a 
given surface sequence {DdIJ), D'2(p,)"", DLmo, (l1)} illchHks thp factor (qL;-="" D,\jJ.))J)i+I(li) 
(c) The logicatoms are all distinguishable and may be permuted between the sets of logicatoIIls 
at the same distances. This introduces a factor of in the probability for a given 
surface sequence {D 1(/1), D2 (/1), ... , D L, .n.", (/1)}. Here lV 1/£ "". (/1) is the total amount of 
logicatoms under consideration. 











therefore the product of these three terms: 
L--1 
P(E(Ji.) II (qL:7~~ D, )0.'+1 
k=l 
(4.1.12) 
One is interested in the most likely probability distribution. Towards this end, one needs to derive 
the distribution of the surface sequence that maximises 4.1.12 and satisfies the constraints 4.1.8, 
4.1.9 and 4.1.10. The calculation is made more tractable by taking the natural logarithm of 4.1.12 
and using the Lagrange multiplier method to implement the constraints. One obtains 
L 
F InP + >.(2:::: Di - N) 
11l(N I)! + Dllll(p) -- tll(Dd) 
L 
t· LDtlll(qL~;~~Dj _qr::-'D,) 
i=2 
I. L 
L la(D,!) + p(L Di 
,=2 1.=0 
One proceeds to take the partial derivatives !/,~, For k 1: 
For k E [2, L]: 
(, 
----:oc- -VJ(DI + 1) + lll(p) + In q L D, 
,=2 
1.·2 D ) Dk+1qD k lnq I LL 





This i;; obtained by splitting the term L Di 11l(qL~r" J - qL.ro !) 
[ 
L ,.-2 D '<:'" 'f) J into the sum over the ranges 
,=2 











is the digaullua function, defined as the logarithlllic derivative of the galllllla function f(z). 
The gamma function (6.1.1 in [2]) 
d f' (z) 
ljJ(z) = -f(z) = -
dz f(z) 
')C 





is the extension of the factorial to real and complex number arguments and satisfies the properties 
that 
f(n) = (n ~ I)! for n E [1.2,;{, ... ] ( 4.l.l9) 
Simplifying Equations 4.1.14, 4.1.15 and setting !}!;, = 0, results in 
D· ~q 
In(1~q '-I)~'Ij'(Dk+l)(N~Dk~Dk_dlnq~Dk-+-l D +p=O 
1 ~ q k 
(4.1.20) 
for all k E [1. L]. Solving for Dk in 4.1.20 and 4.1.8 would give one the most likely surface sequence 
for any theory network. 
One can solve this in the case of p « 1 and Dk » 1. The asymptotic expansion for the digamma 
function is given by 
1 00 B 2" 'IjJ( Z + 1) = In z + - ~ ~ -.-
2z L... 2nz2n 
(4.1.21) 
n=1 
where Bn are the Bernoulli numbers defined by the identity 
oc B 7l 
.r ~ L n·T · 
--~ --
eX ~ 1 ~ n! 
n=O 
( 4.1.22) 
One approximates the J/;(Dk + 1) term by 
'IjJ(Dk + 1) ~ InDk + 2~k + 0 (~~) ~ InDk ( 4.1.23) 
The lu(qD'-I) term is approximated using the Taylor expansion 
(-U.2-t) 











S· '1 I h D III q . '. d . Iml ar y. t e k+ 1 ~ term IS apprOXimate to 
lng 
- Dk+1 D:::::: 1 - q k 
(4.1.26) 
Ing In(l - p):::::: -1'+ (0) (p2). Substituting these approximations into 4.1.20 and grouping 
all the Dk terms, one obtains 
constant (4.1.27) 
The final approximation is that 1'Dk ~ O. Incorporating this allows one to arrive at the equation 
( 4.1.28) 
where the constant is rewritten as 1 - 1/. Consider the case where 17 S; O. One has Do 1 (This 
assumes that the logicatom is not self referential. The approximation will however still hold if the 
logicatom was self referential.) and Dl ::::: 1. Then In (~ + 1 11)::::: 1. One can thus deduce 
D2 ? D l . Using this inductive argument, one deduces that Dk is a monotonically increasing 
function. violating the constraint specified by Equation 4.1.9. If I] > 0, one has a function with a 
single maximum. Assume this maximum occurs at k m. Define 11 k m. Then Do is the 
maximum element in the sought after surface sequence. One now has 
(4.1.29) 
Fnrthf'r df'fining y 8n with 3 = VI![ and , , 2 
wry) = wU3n) = Dn (4.1.30) 
so that 
w(y ± (3) w«(3n ± ri) = 'll'((3(n ± 1)) = Dn±l (4.1.31) 
and substituting this into 4.1.28 results in 
w(y+ w(y) [In w(y) -lniw(y - ,3)) + 1 - 2(32] (4.1.32) 
In order to solve this equation, substitute the Taylor expansion for wry + {3) and Ju( w(y)) and 
thereafter retain all terms up to the first order of (-J, This gives one the differential equation: 
'll,II(y) + 2w(y) W'(y)3 ,-( + O(tP) = 0 











subject to the initial conditions 
w(O) = n~) 
11"(0) "'" 0 
To solve this differential equation, one considers a perturbation expansion around (3 i.e. 






Substitnting thi!'; expansion into 4.1.33 and again retaining all term!'; up to the first order of (1, one 
obtains the constant and first order coefficient in the expansion as 
+ 
o ( 4.1.37) 
This is obtained by first multiplying 4.1.33 by W(y)2 and then substituting the expansion 4.1.36. 
Now since this is true for all ,tJ, one has 
subject to the initial condition 
211'0 
o 
1110 Wn lIll(O) 0 
w~(O) 0 w~ (0) 0 
The unique solution of 4.1.38 is given by 
Wo = VVo (y) 




















for the 2 w;,'w\ term in Equation 4.1.39. 
tvu 
The unique solution is given by 
1 
3 Wo sin(2y) In(cosy) (4.1.44) 
resulting in 
w(y) W(j (cos2y + ~8Sill(2Y)ln(cOSY)) (4.1.45) 
One returns to the variable n by substituting y = lin and obtaining 
D [ 2(1) 3sin(2,3n)lll(cus3n) 
Dn max cos f n + 3 (4.1.46) 
One ret urns to the original variables by noting that if one sets n, + f, then for small positive 
o ( 4.1.47) 




Further, one notes that for /3 < exp ( ~ ~), the second zero occurs between k ~ and k = J ~ 1. 
so one can define L J, the furthest point (and thus the total amount of elements in the surface 
sequence), resulting in 
( 4.1.49) 
L L 
Finally note that L sin2 (1ff) = ~. Further L sin III (sill ( ))) O. This result is obtained 
~o k~ 
by noting that the kill term called;.; til<' (L ~ k)lh since 
sin In sin ( (L£k )1f )) = ~ sin (2~k In sin ( ). One thus obtains Dma.x = 2 t on satisfying 
the constraint 4.1.8, resulting in 
(4.1.50) 
:\ote that the first term dominates for 1: ~ 
The surface area of a sphere for a three dimensional manifold of constant positive curvature is given 
by 











In summary, what Nagels' showed using the above derivation was that inverted theory networks 
OYe'r PropCaln (n » 1) governed by the constrained uniform substitution function and the affirmed 
implication relation give one the impression of a 3-dimensional curved space when viewed on the 
large scale as a pregeometry. Together with the single time dimension, he has explained why we live 
in a 4-dimensional curved spacetime. 
4.2 Quantum theory 
'Surely you're johng Mr' Feynman!' - R.P. Feynman 
This section reviews work done by I:ieynman [24], [25J showing how the SchrOdinger and Dirac 
equations can be derived using path integrals. The reason I have included this section is to provide 
the non-physicist with the preliminaries required to understand the arguments put forward in Section 
4.2.2. 
The' heginning of the 20th century saw experimental physics lead the way in breaking down the notion 
that classical mechanics was an adequate theoretical framework for describing atomic structures. 
Various experiments showed the conflicts that arose using the classical interpretations of describing 
for example, electrons as particles and light using waves. The photo-electric effect showed light 
(viewed as waves modelled using Maxwell's Electromagnetic theory) of a particular frequency aimed 
plate would effectively knock off electrons from the plate's surface. On the other 
hand, electrons (viewed as classical particles and modelled using classical mechanics) displayed 
characteristic wave-hehaviour in the double slit experiment. The interference patterns obtained 
could be explained by a wave theory but not a particle theory [35J. Quantum Physics (born out of 
quantum mechanics) was developed to explain these and other phenomena. 
Quantum Mechanics changed our perception of physical processes. The theory showed that experi-
ments exist in which the observables can only be represented as a probability distribution of various 
outcomes. The fact that the exact outcome of the experiment was fundamentally unpredictable was 
not due to any unknowns in the experiment (as would be the case in statistical mechanics), but 
wa.'3 an actual property of the physics [25]. Furthermore, the mathematical laws governing these 
probabilities were different from those of the classical probability theory of Laplace. For example, 
in the double slit experiment performed with particles, the probability that one observes a particle 
at a point x on the wall with both slits open is not the sum of the probabilities of observing the 
particle at that same point x with only slit 1 open and only slit 2 open. A probability amplitude 
was associated with every observable. When there wa.'> more than one alternative in an experiment 











concepts also elevated the observer to a new position in physics. Unlike classical mechanics, the 
observer in the experiment affected the outcome of the experiment. This was elegantly stated by 
Heisenberg as the Uncertainty Principle. 'Any determination of the alternative taken by a process 
capable of following more than one alternative destroys the interference between alternatives' [25]. 
Thus closing slit 2 (and determining that the particles should all go through slit 1) results in no 
interference pattern. 
From the quantum mechanical perspective, all information regarding possible observations in an 
experiment resided in the wave function dJ that satisfied the Schrodinger equation: 
h fJip 
i fJt 
+ V)d) (4.2.1) 
Any observation resulted in localising the extent of the wave function in space. The consequence 
was that only a discrete set of wavelengths and correspondingly, only a discrete set of frequencies 
could occur - "Localisation leads to quantisation" [35]. The correspondence principle further showed 
that. classical mechanics was an approximation to quantum mechanics. The expectation values of 
the observables in quantum mechanics behaved in the same way as the observables themselves did 
in classical mechanics, as the size of the particles involved increased. 
4.2.1 Path Integrals 
Path integrals were introduced by Dirac in the 1930's, but their mathematical impreciseness initially 
discouraged their serious application to quantum theory. The integrals could not be rigorously 
defined using a measure on the space of aU paths. Ci:.tlllerou·s theorem stated that llO finite 
Lebesque measure existed for these path integrals. Feynman reintroduced path integrals [24] in a 
seminal paper showing how non-relativistic quantum mechanics could be reformulated using this 
approach. Despite the mathematical impreciseness, the manipulations suggested by the approach 
provided valuable insights and useful approximation schemes, such as the perturbative expansions 
represented by Feynman diagrams in quantum field theory. Anot.her great feature wa.s t.he simple 
explanation the formalism provided in describing how the classical limit arose from t.he quantum 
theory i.e. the correspondence principle. The formalism also portrayed a relatively simple process 
for quantising classical theories. The concept of summing over all possible alternatives, as opposed 
to promoting elements in the classical phase space to quantum operators on a Hilbert space, is 
conceptually easier to understand, although it may be argued that this is a matter of taste. 
The path-integral approach to quantum theory [25, 24] incorporates as its starting point the basic 
quantum mechanical amplitude for a complete history of the system under consideration. In the 











for the particle to travel on this particular path hi given by where S[x(t)] is the action 
functional describing the classical dynamics of the system [69]. from this basic amplitude and the 
principle that one sums over all unobserved histories of the system, one can compute the quantum 
mechanics of the system. 
Figure 4.5: Various poosible paths for a particle in one spatial dimension 
For example, if the particle was observed at Xa at time ta, the probability amplitude to observe the 
particle at Xb at a later time tb is obtained h~' slllllllling uver all possible paths startiug at (xa, ta) 
and ending at (Xb. tb): 
( 4.2.2) 
Here N io a normalioation factor (needed due to the fact that 110 well defined measure exi;;t;; for this 
integral) and C 1'ep1'('sc11ts the set of all paths joining tu) to (Xb, tb). 
The quantity K(.Tb, tb t a) called the propagator, snmmarises the entire quantum mechanics of 
the system. Given a wave function td specifying the state of a system at time tt, the wave 
function at a later time t2 will be given by 
( 4.2.3) 
Conccprually. this principln is easily extended to deal with systems with an infinite number of 
degrees of freedom, such as the electromagnetic field in Minkowski spacetime. The essence of the 
i(lea remains the same in that, the probability amplitude of observing an elect.romagnetic field 











B' (:r, y. Z) 011 a hypenmrface E', is given by a sum over all histories which are compatible with the 
initial and final field configurations on the respective surfaces. 
K(B", ElfIB" E') = N f. D[A 11 ]eT,S[A,,: ic 
(4.2.4) 
Here S is the cla.'5sical action for the electromagnetic field. I will now proceed to show how Feynman 
[25] calculated the propagator K(Xb, tblxa, tal for the free particle, showing the equivalence to the 
Schrodinger equation. 
The classical action functional for a free particle is given by 
tb 
S[x(t)] = J L(x,x,t)dt (4.2.5) 
I" 
where the integral is along the path 
given by 
from x(tn) to X(tb). L. the Lagrangian of a free particle is 
L(i:,x,t} ( 4.2.6) 
In order to SUIll o\'('r all paths joining (Xal t a ) to tb). divide the time into steps of length c. 
This gives OIll' tIl(' series of values (tal ta + C, ... , ta + (n -- l)c, tb). At each of these time points 
choose a value Xi and construct a path by linearly joining these points as shown in Figure 4.6. 
Integrating over all paths is now equivalent to integrating over all values of :ri for i E {I, ... ,n -. I} 
Figure 4.6: Constructing the sum over all paths 











( -+ O. A normalisation constant A is defined to allow tllt: limit to exist. FeYllluall "hows how the 
value of A can be calculated using Equation 4.2.3 and choosing t2 = tl + f with f « 1 
The path integral is then just 
with 
lin1 - . . . c' 1.0\(1, , 1 f j' j' 'In c· bl dXj 
,~O A... A 
A = 27rillt J /2 
m 
For L = 1 mi::!. the action S for the path P defined by the series 
(( .Ta. fa), (;1:I,t I), ... , (:l:n-l ,tn-d, Vb, tb)) where tk fa + kf. is given by 
tb 
S(P) J ~mx2dt 
tn 
resulting in 
Integrating the gaussians and taking the limit results in 
1 
Tf( ) [27rih(tb - tal] 2im(Xb-







Equivalence with the Schrodinger equation is established OIl noticing that this is just the Green's 
function for Equation 4.2.1. 
For the case of the Dirac equation, Feynman states [25] that the propagator for a relativistic particle 
starting at spac(>tiwe point (:ra, tal ami ending at (Xb, tb) is given by 
K(b, a) ~ N(R)(ie:)R (4.2.12) 
R 
where N (R) is the number of paths joining a and b with R corners / reversals and E; is the length of 
a single step. Figure 4.7 shows three of these possible paths. 
In order to calculate the propagator one specifies a move to the right (respectively left) in Figure 
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Figure 4.7: Possible paths in the path integral formulation of the Dirac Equation 
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moving in the positive direction, and end at b with a move in the positive direction will be denoted 
by P++. Similarly P+ _ denotes the paths starting with a move in the positive direction and ending 
with a move in the negative direction. In order to count the total amount of paths with R reversals 
between (xa,ta) a.nd (Xb,tb), one splits the paths into the 4 disjoint sets P++ ,P+_ ,P_+, and P __ . 














nT - nx 
2 
( 4.2.16) 
One clearly has nx s: nT, otherwise no paths between the points would exist . In the calculations, 
one assumes nx < nT i.e. there are no paths with 0 reversals. 
Now using combinatorial counting arguments, one has 
N++(2m) ( 0'-1 ) ( ~ ~11 ) #P++ = ( 4.2.17) m 
N __ (2m) ( 0'-1 ) ( 13-1 ) (4.2.18) #P_- = m-l m 
N_+ = N+_ (2m - 1) #P+- = ( 











with Tn E [1,2. :3, 
Splitting the propagator K(a, b) into (a, b).K~ '" b).K_+(a, b) and K_ (a, b) one obtains: 
,----:\, (.) 1) ('I',iC)'2m-l ~ lV+ __ 'IH ~ 
m=1 
f (a 1) (;j 1 ) (iE)2m~1 
m=l Tn 1 Tn 1 
Similarly 
and 
= ( 2,,", 0: -E ~ 
k=O k 
Expressing the combinatorial in terms of the gamma function ,1.1.18 
( j) r(j+1) k - r(k + l)r(j - k + 1) 
allows one to use the combinatorial relation 
to obtain 
K_+(a, b) K+ 
1 
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where 2Fl is the liypergeometric fUllctioll defined by (15.1.1 ill 
f(c) f f(a + n)f(b + n) zn 
f(a)f(b) f(c + n) 
n=O 
(4.2.26) 
Similarly one obtains 
( 4.2.27) 
and 
K_ (a, b) ( 4.2.28) 





one proceeds to take the limit as E O. Firstly, since the propagators K'f'f vanish at every other 
lattin' point. the.\' must he di\·ided by 2e in order to obtain their continuum form [51]. Further using 
the hypergeometric relation (15.3.3 in [2]) 
one obtains 
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in the K_.J,.. and propagators, one obtains 
(4.2.37) 
Finally, using the hypergeometric relation with the Jacobian (9.1.70 in [2]) 
(4.2.38) 
and the fact that 
(4.2.39) 
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2.Jo( X2) 
In the case of K ,one uses the hypergeometric relation (15.2.17 in 
to obtain 
J( 
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c~(J 40' 
lim ((T - X) -2E) 
£~O 4(T + X) 
one uses 4.2.38 t.o obtain 
T-X 
----
Finally, an identical argument gives 
8 
(T - X) 1 
2JT2 - X2 1.( 
(T+ X) 
-- 1[ ( 





Equations 4.2.40,4.2.45 and 4.2.46 give the continuum propagator for the Dirac equation in one 
dimension [51]. 
Ff'ynman failpd in his efforts to generalise to higher dimensions his successful 2 (1 + 1) dimensional 
derivation of the Dirac equation, Tony Smith [71] generalised Feynrnan's argument and arrived at 
the hyperdiarnond Feynman Checkerboard model based on the 4-dirn hyperdiarnond lattice. I use 
his work to hypothesise in the subsequent section, how quantum theory could arise within inverted 
theory networks governed by natural selection. 
4.2.2 Inverted theory networks and quantum theory 
The possible futures of inverted theory networks clearly lend themselves to the same interpretation 
as the sum over all possible paths methodology in the path integral approach to quantum theory. If 
one is to accept this, the following question needs to be answered: What is the probability amplitude 
associated with each of these possible futures. I will spend the remainder of this section detailing 
a !t~'pothesis that I will rail the (TEA)-l hypothesis ill Chapter 5. Towards this end, I define 
a projection (J : Form(<p n ) 1m mapping propositional formulae to quaternion numbers. Any 
quaternion H E 1H[ can be represented as 










where a, b, c, d E ~ are real numbers and I, J, K are the complex 2 x 2 matrices 
( ~ 0 ) 1= -I 
J= (~1 ~) 
K= (~ ~) 
Given cf; E Form(if>n)' define the following subsets of if>n: 
Further let 
Then 
nO (cf;) = {p E if>n I cf; does not require p} 
n+ (cf;) = {p E if>n I cf; requires only p} 
n-(cf;) = {p E if>n I cf; requires only ,p} 
n+~ (cf;) = {p E if>n I cf; requires p and 'p} 
7r1/J (cf;) = # IT V! (<p) 
7r+(d» = #IT+(<p) 
7r-(cf;) = #n-(0) 
7r+-(cf;) = #IT+-(6) 
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( 4.2.48) 
Now consider the inverted theory network T- 1 = (C Rj , T) o\"!~r PropCal" governed by the affirmed 
implication relation and the constrained uniform substitution transition function i.c. thc inverted 
theory network governed by natural selection. Let /l(t) be a logicatom at time t, (1 a possible future 
and /1(1 (t - 1) the corresponding logicatom 1 time step away along possible future C. Then the 
probability amplitude for logicatom /1(t) to evolve along possible future ( to logicatom /1(1 (t - 1) is 
given by 
One iteratively continues this argument to calculate the probability amplitude for the next possible 











The product of the!:ie probability amplitude!:i defines the alllplitude for a particular future path 
F'I.; = (Cl, C2,"" cd i.e. the probability amplitude for a logicatom p(t) at time t to evolve to 
logicatom /l( t - k) at time t - k along the future path :Fie = ((1. (2, .... (d is given by: 
Then the propagator for logicatom tl(t) to believe B(p(t - k)) at t - k is given by 
K(p(t),p(t - k)) = LK(p(t),p(t - k),F'k) ( 4.2.49) 
F, 
where the sum is over all possible future paths. Equation 4.2.49 will be used in Chapter 5 to detail the 
(TEA)-1 hypothesis. This basically states that Equation 4.2.49 i!:i actually the (3+1) dimensional 
Dirac equation. 
4.3 Modelling knowledge 
Inverted theory networks comprise logicatoms that are defined using description logic. Further, 
certain inverted theory networks are regulated by natural selection. In summary, I have a space 
comprising entitie!:i that are defined u!:iing the formalmathelllatical language for knowledge de!:icrip-
tion and are regulated by natural selection i.e. Dawkins' memes. Thus if one accepts Dawkins' 
hypothesis that knowledge is modelled using memes, then inverted theory networks are a possible 
platform in which to model the dynamics and evolution of knowledge. Further, using the argument 
that theory networks can simulate cellular automata, and noting that the cellular automata model 
specified by [66] can be viewed as a possible future in an inverted theory network shows that emer-
gent structures can arise that have the ability to self-replicate i.e. evangelical (self-propagating) 
beliefs can ari!:ie. 
The above arguments are merely qualitative, and do not provide a way forward to research whether 
inverted theory networks can actually model the way say knowledge evolves in our brains. Towards 
this end. consider the inwrted theory network O\'Cr PropC'aln governed by the affirmed implication 
relation and the constrained uniform substitution transition function i.e. the inverted theory network 
governed by natural selection. In Section 2.4.2, I showed that the evolution of theory networks of this 
type have an interesting interpretation in terms of rule based reasoning. In particular, I proved that 
the updated belief of any logicatom could be viewed as the consequence (using rule based reasoning) 
of it!:i prcviou!:i belief and monotonic rule!:i specified hy all logicatolll!:i it is related to. Now consider 
what is happening in the inverted theory networks of this category. A logicatom has a particular 











have. together with a set of monotonic rules (defined by the :;ubstitutioll map) that would lllake the 
belief at time t a consequent. In layman's terms, a possible future one a possible answer to the 
question: 'How did I get to believe what I believe?'. Now I will argue why I think this is the way we 
think!. Einstein conceptualised his theory of general relativity long before he learnt the mathematics 
of differential geomet.ry. that. provided him with a formallang\lag(~ in whirh to explain his tlwory to 
the rest of the world. I believe the process of t.hought involves having a belief/idea and considering 
all the possible monotonic rule sets and beliefs that would infer the current belief using rule-based 
reasoning. These possible sets of monotonic rules and corresponding beliefs are constrained by the 
current beliefs. This is exactly what the above class of inverted theory networks achieve. The reader 
can clearly question why I believe this? The only way I can motivate this argument is by analysing 
the way I think. Ten years ago, I barged into my then supervisor's office claiming that the universe 
is just one giant brain. He in response did what any reasonable person would do - he asked how I 
deduced this i.e. he asked for a current accepted belief (i.e. a physical theory) together with a set 
of monotonic rules that would lead one to affirm thb st,atemellt. My thought process over the last 
ten years encompassed acquiring these rules and beliefs, resulting in the current thesis. 
Even if one accepts the above argument, the question still remains - how does one conclude the one 
possible future that contains the correct belief and monotonic rules that affirm my current belief 
as a consequent. Since there are many possible futures, quantum theory tells us rather to assign a 
probability amplitude with each possible future. Summing over all possible futures provides one with 
a distribution that tells one the probability that we will be in one particular state (Le. a particular 
future). Statistics then dictates that the 'answer' is actually a probability distribution of possible 
'answers'. Our 'choice' in choosing the answer is then governed by these a.'isociated probabilities 
i.e. I am most likely to choose the possible future with the highest associated probability. I believe 
these probability amplitudes are specified by Equation 4.2.49 i.e. the mathematics used to show 










The (T EA)-l Hypothesis 
I belicllf' (TEAy-l Theory. 
This is /w('altHI' (TEAr l A-IE-Ill = 'i:ll.. 
That everything exists in some inverted theory network 
I would rpnll~' haw wanted to SHy that I have proved (TEA) -1 Theory, but in reality, I have not even 
touched the surface this, in my opinion is just a bit more detail regarding an "idea for an idea" [55]. 
I personally feel that I would need another 5 years of focused research to complete a comprehensive 
mathematical theory of inverted theory networks, in order to convince the sceptical scientist that 
this is a path worth researching. I will now detail what has (and has not) been achieved. 
I have come some way in formalising natural selection. This formalisation resulted in interesting 
results: Firstly, the requirement of non-deterministic replication that is always taken for granted 
comes to the fore when fonnaiising the theory. Secondly, there is a specific equation that holds 
in any system regulated by natural selection. Further, the power of using the equation of natural 
selection in biological arguments was evidenced in the argument as to why sex evolved. Thirdly, the 
mathematical arguments delivered is in effect a formal proof that we as humans are currently (to 
some degree) regulated by this principle. 
I have succeeded in constructing a space, known as an inverted theory network, that is built up 
using propositional calculus and is regulated by the principle of natural selection i.e. the inverted 
theory uetwork OWl' PropCaln governed by the affirmed implication relation and constrained uniform 
substitution function. This space can thus be seen as the formal analog to the space of Dawkins' 
memes. I have argued that this inverted theory network can be viewed as the pregeometry proposed 
by Wheeler, implying that his sought after regulating principle is in fact natural selection. This 
is evidenced in showing that this structure predicts the arrow of time (by construction) and the 












I have shown that projected inverted theory networks can model non-deterministic cellular automata. 
This is a consequence of the fact that projected theory networks can simulate cellular automata 
systems. Inverted theory networks thus inherit many characteristics of cellular automata, including 
self-replication, a requirement to modelling memes. Further, by construction, logicatoms in inverted 
theory networks over ill L( 0, <f>n), adhere to the philosophy of Russell's logical atomism - they can 
be composed wholly of constituents with which they are acquainted i.e. logicatoms. 
J han~ Hot "hOWl! what I ici{'ally would have liked to do i.e. the (TEA}-l hypothesis specified below: 
Proposition 5.0.1. The (TEA)-l hypothesis: 
Consider the projectedi~verted theory network T- 1 = (~, R f , T, 0') m'cr ProT/Caln where 
is the affirmed implication relation generating function. 
is the constrained uniform substitution transition map and 
O'(dI) (o)K) 
is the projection map defined in Section 4.2.2, mapping propositions to quatenrion number8. Then 
the propagator 
K(/l(t),J1(t - k)) LK(J1(tl,/,(t k).:F,J 
:h 
(5.0.1) 
generates the Green's junction of the (3 + 1) dimensional Dirac equation. Further, this propagator 
will model creativc thought as specified in Section 4. 3. 
I believe that proving the above hypothe;o;j;o; (or alternativply. fine-tuning thp (TEA) 1 hypothe;o;is 
so 3..'> to achieve the sought after objective in my synthesis) provides opportunities for good future 
research in this field. This is not to say that research in this field, from an applied mathematical 
perspective is not warranted. Section 2.4.1 shows how these structures provide powerful modelling 
platforms, and I believe further research is warranted in terms of the application of these structures 
to the applied sciences. From a purely mathematical perspective, the exact relationship between the 
regUlating principle of natural selection and pregeometric concepts also needs further analysis. 
I will end this journey by giving the reader one philosophical point to ponder: Assume I have a 
mathematical platform with which to model human thought. Now the environment together with 
some regulating process in my brain resulted in me having certain unalterable beliefs e.g. God exists. 
But I can argue that the same platform and regulating process will create unalterable laws of nature 













A substantial part of the research done involved the numerical simulation of the various models 
and structures that have been discussed in this thesis. These numerical simulations provided a 
powerful laboratory and steered me in the correct direction, allowing me to numerically confirm 
that various aspects of the thesis were (numerically) t.rue before attempting to formally prove them. 
This appendix details the mathematics and algorithms involved in these numerical simulations. 
Section A.l details the numerical simulations of the equation of natural selection. (These simulations 
were actually used to derive the equation.) I use the.'3e simulations to show the reader how the various 
definitions make sense from a numerical perspective. 
Section A.2 details the work done in numerically simulating theory networks. These simulations 
helped me identify which local relations would satisfy the requirements of natural selection, prior 
to attempting the formal proofs. Further, the simulations enabled me to confirm all the counting 












A.I Simulating the equation of natural selection 
In the derivation of the equation of natural selection, there are two definitions that the reader might 
query. The first was Equation 3.3.14 
, <fJE II 
[ 
L q(¢, w)z(¢)q'(¢, Ill)] 
Pi(W) [1 - ]}m(w)] + PmCw) = E L (,. ) ( ) 
q d>, w z ¢ 
<f>EH 
that stated that the expectation value of the ratio of summation terms shown on the right hand side 
is equal to the probability that a selecton was mutated or that the selecton was inherited and no 
mutation occurred. 
The second involved the definition of the probability of mutation. for the asexual case, this was 
sJJcrihcd in Equation ::UU3 as 
[ 
L [1 q(¢,w)] z(¢)ql(<}>lWl] 
E </JEH 
L [1 q(<}>, w)] ;;(¢) 
"'Ell 
For the case of 'polysexual' reproduction (Le. more than 1 parent), this was generalised to Equation 
3.:1.20, specified &"l 
Pm( w) + p,(w)(l [ 
a(z)JC~1 
Pm(w»)(l 1 Q(H, w) p(q, z)a(q) Z ". ) 
[ 
L [1 - q(¢, W).i z(<}»q'(¢, tvl] 
E "'Ell , __ 
L [1- q(rp,wl] z(<}» 
<pEH 
As specified, it has been assumed that ]}i(W) and Pm(u') are the means of normally distributed 
samples. The numerical simulations detailed below should convince the reader as to the validity of 
these equations. 
A.I.I Algorithms implemented 
I wrote a program using VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) in Excel. This particular platform was 
chosen to facilitate graphical representation of the results. The program numerically simulated the 
dynamics of one selecton in a population of replicators over one generation. Multiple simulations 











The following parameters were defined in the code. The notatioll u1;ed below i1; identical to that 
used in Section 3.3.2. 
Parameter Type Description 
I nPrcdccessors I Integer This parameter specifies the number of replicators in the prede-
cessor set H. 
nSucccssors Integer This parameter specifies the number of replicators in the successor 
set H'. 
Q(H) [0,1] 
....... . .. ~ 
This parameter specifies the frequency of the replicators in H that 
have the selection w. 
I-=-
' Clllax Integer This parameter specifies the maximum number of predecessors 
(parents) of each successor in H'. 
Parentconstant Boolean This parameter determines whether the successors all have the 
same number of predecessors (True) or can have between 1 and C 
i parents (False). 
Pm [0,1] This parameter specifics the probability that a successor has the 
selection w given that none of its parents have w. 
Pi [n, 1] This parameter specifies the probability that a successor has the 
selection w, given that at least one of its parents ha..'l w. 
pp(q,z) [ L l] This parameter is a measure of how correlated with fitness we want 
the selecton w to be. The exact. use is clarified in the algorithm 
i 
below. 
Table A.I: Parameters used in the numerical simulation of the equation of natural selection 
The algorithm implemented to simulate the selecton frequency from one generation to the next is 
described below. 
(1) Create all t.he data structures required. 
(1.1) Instantiate a boolean array of si;;;e l1Pred"cessors that represents the names of the predeces-
sors (defined as the index of the element) and whether they have the selecton w (Boolean 
Value = True) or not (Boolean Value = False). 
(1.2) Similarly, instantiate a boolean array of size Tlsucc"ssors for the successors. 
(1.;3) Illstautiate all integer array of si;;;c (nsucccssors x C). This data structure will demarcate 
the names of every parent for any given successor. 
(2) Distribute the selectonw among the predecessor population. For each predecessor in the array, 
generate a random number r E [0,1]. If r :::; Q(H) then give the predecessor the selecton i.e 
assign value of True in the respective boolean array. Otherwise assign a value of False. 











(3.1) If Parentconstant = True, then repeat the Step 3.2 C times. Otherwise generate a random 
number r E [0,1]. Assign C' = .\fill(l.HoullCl(r X C)) parents to the successor, and repeat 
3.2 C' times. Note that in this case, I have set pc(H) = in Equation 3.3.21 
i.e. Every replicator is equally likely to have anywhere between 1 and emit" predecessors. 
(3.2) Generate a random number r E [0,1]. 
(3.2.1) For the case 0 :S pp(q.z) 1: If r :S pp(q.z) then randomly select a unique parent 
(Le. it must not exist in the successors parent set already) that has the selecton w. 
Otherwise randomly select a unique parent from the whole set H. 
(3.2.1) For the case -1 :S pp(q,z) < 0: If r:S p{,(qz)1 then randomly select a unique parent 
that does not have the selecton 11'. Otherwise randomly select a unique parent from 
the whole set H. This process verifies how we use Pplq,z) to simulate various values 
of p(q, z) 
Distribute the selecton w among the successor population. For every successor in H' repeat 
the following: 
1) Generate a random number r [0, If r :S Pm then give the successor the selecton and 
goto Step 4 otherwise implement Step 4.2 
(4.2) Iterate through all the predecessors of the successor and confirm whether at least one 
predecessor has the selecton. If this is not the case, then don't assign the selecton to the 
successor and goto Step 4. Otherwise generate a random number r E [0,1:. If r :S Pi then 
give the successor the selecton, otherwise not. 
The process described above "P"P""""" all the data required to calculate the various terms in Equa-











A.1.2 Simulation Results 
I first show the results pertaining to the equation 
[ 
L q(¢, w)z(¢)q'(¢, W)] 
q,EH 
Pi(W) [1 - Pm(w)] + Prn(w) = £ L q(¢, w)z(¢) 
q,EH 
L q(q"w)z(q,)q'(q"w) 
I calculate the value of q,E H L: q(q"w)z(q,) in a single simulation, and compare it with the expected 
q,E H 
value of Pi(W) [1 - Pm(w)] + Pm(w) . I plot the relationships between the various variables for fixed 
nPredecessors = 1000, nSuccessors = 1000 and Q(H, w) = 0.6. The graph below shows the relationship 
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Figure A.l: The simulated value of q,E H t q( q"w)z(q,) compared to the expected value of 
<l>EH 











The projection below shows the relationship for 3 values of Pm (Pm. E {~, ~, ~}) and all values of Pi, 
with C = 2. 
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Figure A.2: The simulated value of 1>EH t q(c/J,w)z(c/J) compared to the expected value of 
1> El-! 
Pi(W) [1 - Pm.(w)] + P11,JW) for fixed Pm and C. 
Figures A.l and A.2 show that the theoretical equations fit the numerical simulations very well, 









I now show the results pertaining to the equation 
Pm(w) + Pi(w)(l [ 
( )]C-l 
Pm(w))(l - 1 - Q(H, w) - p(q, z)a(q) a : ) 
[ 
L [1 - q(¢>, w)] z(¢»q'(¢>, W)] 
£ q,EH 




Once again, the simulated values are plotted against the expected values. As before, the parameters 
take on the following values: npredecessors = 1000, nSuccessors = 1000, Q(H, w) = 0.6. 
Figure A.3 shows the results plotted over Pm for 3 values of Pi (Pi E a, ~, V) and C = 2. 
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Figure A.3: The simulated value of <l>E H t: [l -q(</> ,w)]z( q,) compared to the expected value of Pm(w)+ 
<l>EH 











Figure A.4 shows the results plotted over Pi for 3 values of Pm (Pm E {~, ~, t}) and C = 2 
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Figure A.4: The simulated value of <bE H t [l -q(¢,w) )z(q,) compared to the expected value of Pm( w)+ 
<bE " 











Figure A.5 shows the results plotted over Pm for 3 values of C (C E {I, 2, 5}) and Pi = 0.3 
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Figure A.5: The simulated value of ,pEN t [l-q(¢,w)]z(¢) compared to the expected value of Pm(w)+ 
"'E N 











Finally Figure A.6 shows the results plotted over Pi for 3 values of C (C E {I, 2, 5}) and Pm = 0.3 
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Figure A.6: The simulated value of .pE I-I t [l-q (¢, w )] z(¢) compared to the expected value of Pm( w)+ 
.peN 
pi(w)(l - P-m(w))(l - [1 - Q(H, w) - p(q, z)a(q)a ~z) r- 1) for fixed Pm and C 
Figures A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6 evidence the good fit between the theoretical and numerical simulations, 










A.2 Simulating theory networks 
In order to numerically simulate theory networks, I would be required to write algorithms to imple-
ment the classes of local relations defined in Definitions 3.5.1 and 3 .. 5.4. Further, I would need to 
be able to numerically implement the constrained uniform substitution transition function. Section 
A.2.1 shows the theorems used to implement these algorithms using the many world formalism of 
propositional calculus. 
A.2.1 Mathematics used for numerical simulations 
In the many world formalism of propositional calculus, the three logical connectives V (or), 1\ (and) 
and -, (not) are semantically equivalent to the set operations U (union), n (intersection) and 
(complement) respectively. 
[Ii' 1\ ¢] 
['Ii' V ¢] 
[-'1i'j 
[,~)] n [rp] 
[1/J] u [rp] 
[lb] 
(A.2.1) 
I will first prove the theorems that are used to simulate the local relations of the various theory 
Iletworks uIlder consideration. In Definition 2.4.5, I defined the concept of a proposition requiring a 
variable iff the proposition cannot be written without explicitly referring to the variable. One can 
calculate which variables are required to represent any proposition in Form ( CPn) using the following 
lemma: 
Lemma A.2.1. p is not required in ¢ ifff-- ¢ f-+ cp(-,p/p). 
Proof. Thc ll('cessar.v cas(' is trivial siu('(' if p is not required in cp. I can express rp without explicitly 
referring to p, resulting in the uniform substitution ¢(-,p/p) having no effect on ¢. 




Formula A.2.2 is derived by writing ¢ in full disjunctive normal form and grouping the disjuncts 











To prove the result, assume I- if; ~ 9 ('p/p). Then 
Csing A.2.2 and A.2.4 results in 
Since JI is a variable and 
A.2.3. 






The following lemma determines whether only p or "p is required in a proposition: 
Lemma A.2.2. Given a proposit'ion </J and a variable p. define 
fJ:=(pl\if;)V 1\ 
12 := ('p 1\ if;) V 1\ 
Then the following hold: 
(a): I- ~ 12) iff p is not requir'ed in 0 
12} and (a) does not holdifJ only 'p is required in 6. 
(c): I- b'2 It! and (a) does not hold iff only pis required in 6 
(d): (a). (b) and (c) do not hold iff p and -'p are required in ~) 




with ~)1, ?J!2. IP3 not requiring the variable p. (To achieve this, write 0 in full disjunctive normal form 
and group the conjuncts requiring p, -'p and not requiring p or -p respectively.) Now by definition 
of ~/J. oue has IJ (( V 1\ p) V (( WI V 1\ -,p) resulting in 
I- IJ <-+ V (A.2.lO) 
Similarly 
V (A.2.11) 
Expression A.2.9 can be written in the form 
V /I. ,p)] (A.2.12) 
resulting in 
(A.2.13) 











withli)j and not requiring p. Thus r/J does not require p. 
Conversely assume 6 does not require p. Then ::h'!3 such that 
Using A.2.10 and A.2.10 one has 
resulting in 'Yl ,.--. 12 as required. 
(b) Assume I- 'Yl -'1'2 and r 'Y2 'Yl. 
Thus 
for some '7 such that 
139 
..L and I- 1/;2 <-> in A.2.9 . 
(A.2.15) 
• rl/ f-> T: If '7 was a tautology! then ~f~ and 'Yl would both be tautologies, contradicting the 
assumption that they aren't equivalent. 
• y 11 <-> ..L: If 1/ was a contradiction, one would have I- 'Yl 
assumption. 
~f2' oll('e again contradicting thl' 
• 71 does not require p since by A.2.11 and A.2.lO, Atl and 'Y2 do not require p 
Suhstituting the equivaiPllt fOl'Ill1l1a hI V 7) for A('2 (as specified by A.2.17) into A.2.13 results in 
concluding that 6 can be expressed using only the affirmed variable p. 
Conversely assume r/J only p. Then ::J~l. with 
y +-+ ..L and I- tt'2 ..L in A.2.9. Using A.2.10 and A.2.1l one has 
I- 11 +--
1-1/'3 ~ (1/'2 \I 
I- (0/2 V 1;~':l) <-> ~('J. 
(A.2.16) 
proving I- An ---> Af2. )low if At'2 II then II .-, 1''2. which l)y (a) implies that r/J does not require p, 
com.radicting the assumption. Thus r h:2 --> ~ftl as l'('qllirprl. 
(c) The proof of (c) is completely symmetrical to that of (b); Assume I- /2 --t 1'1 and r Afl +-+ "'(2. 
Thus 
V 71) (A.2.17) 
for some TI such that 
• rl/ f-> T: If 'I] was a tautology, then ~/2 and 'Yl would both be tautologies, contradicting the 
assumption that they aren't equivalent. 
• r' '/ <-* ..L: If'IJ was a contradiction, one would have ~i2 <~ ~!l' OllCP Hgaill cOlltradicting thp 
assumption. 











Sllb:-;titlltillg th" eqlliYHlC'ut. forlllllla h2 V TI) for II (as specified by A.2.17) into A.2.l:3 results in 
v (p 1\ 71)) (A.2.18) 
concluding that ¢ can be expressed using only the negated variable -'p. 
Conversely assume ¢ only requires 'p. Then =] ~'1 \ '~'2 ,~)3 with 
¥l})2 ~ 1. and f- '~)J ~ .. L ill A.2.9. Using A.2.1O and A.2.11 ow, has 
f- 12 <-+ ¢3 
f-~'3 -+ ( V lb3) 
f- (-Ii'! V li':1) <---' ~'l 
proving f- 12 /1 . .\Jow if it ....... /2 then i1 ~ ~f2' which b~' (a) implii:>:; that ¢ does not require p, 
contradicting the assumption. Thus ¥ ....., ,2) as H'qllin'(L (d) Sim'p all t lil' ot 1wr options han, 
been eliminated, one can conclude (d). 0 
Finally, the following lemma shows whether a proposition implies an affirmed (respectively negated) 
variable. 
Lemma A.2.3. Given a proposition ¢ and a variable p, one has I- ([) 
Proof. Assume r dJ p. Then rj) can be expressed in the form ¢ 
not requiring p. The result follows. 
P iff I- Vp) +-+ T 
a 1\ P for some proposition a 
o 
The above three lemmas would allow me to semantically (and therefore numerically) calculate 
'whether a relation holds. However they do not suffice by themselves since I have not specified 
how uniform substitution (required in Lemmas A.2.1 and A.2.2) would be implemented using the 
semantic representation of propositional calculus. This is also required in order to simulate the con-
strained uniform substitution transition function. Towards this end, I need to derive the following 
algorithms: 
• Algorithm I: Consider any propositional variable p, E <l)n ill ProPC'Hln. Dt'terInillP [Pi], the 
set of worlds representing this atomic statement . 
• Algorithm II: If lj.! is a proposition, uniformly substitute E, : <Pn --> Form( <pn) to evaluate the 
proposition Tf. Denote l;(Pi) = ¢;. Then 
In order to proceed, I define an indexing methodology for any world in PropCaln . One can represent 
a worldu' ; Form ( ipn) ........ {O, I} as a binary series w (b j 1 b2 . ... , bn ) of size n by defining W(Pk) 
b" E {fl, I}. Oil tllP other hand, I ll11iqndy indpx all worlds ill PropCal" fmIll () tu 2TL 1 by 












II' Wi where i L hk-t-12k. (A.2.19) 
/;=0 
I am basically using the decimal representation of a binary number to calculate the index. Since every 
illtpgt'l' I)('HH"t'lI [O,2n 1] has a unique binary representation (using n digits), one has a method of 
moving between the 2 representations. I will refer to this as the binary indexing methodology. 
In order to create 'Algorithm 1', I generate the world representation for every atomic statement 
Pk E iPn by using the following lemma: 
Lemma A.2.4. Using tlu binary indering methodology fo/' lI'()rld.~ in PropCal", one has [Pk] 
{Wi liE [(2j 1)2k - l ,j2/';I],j E [1,2n - kJ faT' 1:::; k:::; /1. 
Proof. Let tV, E = {b1 ,b'2, ... ,bn }. By definition, we require b" 1. Consider the binary 
representation B J - I (Bj-d1), 1(2),.... l(n - k) of the integer j 1 E [0, 1]. The 
D)-Iii) flIP ddillf'd uniqllf'ly by the faet. that 
n-k 
j-l LB1- 1 (A.2.20) 
rn=1 
Let bk=1 D) _I (l). As one iterates over all possible values of j E [1, all the possible binary 
sequences for {bk+ I, bkt '2' .•. , bn } are obtained. Thus we only have to consider all the permutations 
uf t Itl' 1 lillaJ'Y s<'lies {b l , ... , b"-1 }. For a given j, the smallest possible decimal value of the binary 
series is where Vl < k ,bI O. This has the decimal representation of 
n n 
L bm 2rn - 1 = 2k - 1 r L bm 2m - 1 
m=1 m=k+l 
n-k n-k 
+ "" b .)1H+k-1 ~ rn+k'" + Zk L Bj_dmJzm~l 
m=l m=1 
(A.2.21) 
Similarly, the largest possible decimal value of the binary series is where Vl < k , bl = 1. This has 
the decimal representation of 
n 
L b",2m - 1 = (2k 1) + 
m=1 
n-k 




















Algorithm II requires encapsulating 'uniform substitution' using the many world formalism. I 
build up to the solution by initially considering simple examples. In particular, consider the following 
simple case of substitution where 
• the propositions '¢ and ¢ are semantically represented by 
{ Wi} for some 11], Wi V 
worlds 1.('. 
• If [lil] = {71'}, then 71'(1),) 1 i.c. only the affirmcd variable p is required in rp 
The following examples satisfy these criteria in PropCa13' 
Example A.2.1. Set. 
and evaluate 
IJ' PI 1\ 1'2 1\ "1'3 
"PI 1\ -'P2 1\ P3 
PI 1\ ~1'2 1\ -'])3 
'Ill/-! (rJil /1'2) 
'12 '1/; /fJ2) 
Using the binary indexing methodology, I define the following worlds in PropCah. 
I PI P2 P3 Valuation 
0 0 0 Wo 
1 0 0 lL'l 
0 1 0 W2 
1 1 0 W3 
0 0 1 W4 
1 0 1 W5 
0 1 1 W6 
1 1 1 1117 
[ tlms haw = {W:l}. 
1/1 PI 1\ 1\ "P2 1\ P3) 1\ 'P:l ~cc .1 
'12 PI 1\ (Pi /\ '1'2 1\ /\ ~Pl = 92 
{w} and 
Notice that when substituting, the 'value' of P2 in 'lj' i.e. 11]:1\1''2)' take'S Oil the 'yahw' of 'P2 in the 
proposition being substituted i.e. Wl(P2) and W] (P2) respectively. If the other variable values concur, 
then the result is always the proposition being substituted, else one obtains a contradiction. In other 
\\'onls for = {w} . {Wi} and W(Pk) = 1, I have 












Defille the fum:tioll f : H" x <1>n 2 IV by 
Define 9 : W x <P" x Hl --t rv by 
w' where 
if j cI k 
if j = k 
And finally, define ho : W x <1>n x W --t P(W) by 
{
WI 
ho(W,Pb Wi) = 0 






In summary, for the case where the propositions 9, 1/' are semantically represented by a single world, 
with substitution occurring in only one variable p E <1>n with the property that ¢ only requires the 
affirmed yariable P A.2.23 is equivalent to 
(A.2.27) 
Extending this argument to the case where the proposition ¢ being substituted has a semantic 
repn'sputatiotl [¢l {Wt, W2, .•. , WI} of more than one world, one observes that it is possible to 
express q; in its full disjunctive normal form ¢ ¢lY ¢2 V ... V ¢l where \:Ii E [1,1]. = {wJ } for 
somell'] E W. 
I 
The substitutionl/> (¢/Pk) is then just the disjunction of the propositions VI/! (dJdpd. 
Defille hI : IV x <P" x pnt') --t P(lV) by 















One now has the tools to handle the case when w(pkl = 0 for [lj)] {w}. Observe that substituting 
o for a variable Pk inl/.' with W(Pk) 0 is equivalent to substituting for the variable Pk in the 
proposition I}/ where Vi = lj' (-'Pk/Pk). Towards this cud, define (~: W X iI>n x P(W) --> PIT-V) by 
and h2 : W x iI>" x P(W) P(W) 
l'iow one has 
{ ~ if W(Pk) if w(J)d 





The final case where ,lb] = {lllJ' ill:.!" •• , wp } is argued in exaetly the same way as when one extends 
9 to multiple worlds. 
Defining h3 : POt') x iI>" x P(W) ---> P(ll') by 
h:I(U,Pk, U') = U h"2(W,Pk, U') (A.2.33) 
1L'EU 
one has the result with no restrictions. 
(A.2.34) 
In order to handle the case of uniform substitution over multiple variables, 
I return to the simple ease onee again: 
• All propositionsi.lJ and are semantically represented by single worlds 
Xow unless k r 1, j], the substitution will result in the contradiction l.. In the case 
where all !Pi are equal, an extension of the above argument gives one for 
{w} 
[dl] {w'} 















Thus one proceeds to generalise all the functions defined for the single substitution. I always assume 
that Pk, i: Pk, for i i= I (as implied by uniform substitution) in the definitions below. 
Defiue the functioll l' : W x P( <PH X 2) ---t lI' by 
(A.2.36) 
The rest of the functions get similarly extended. 
In particular g' : W x P(<pn x ~V) ---t W is opfinen by 
(A.2.37) 
h~ : ~r x P(<I>n x W) ...-; P(W) by 
if g'IW, {(Pk, , WkJ,· .. , (Pk j ,WkJ}j Wi 
and 11'ki u'h", Vi, mE [l,J] (A.2.38) 
otherwise 
Define h~ : IV x P(<I>" x P(W)) P(W) by 
h~ [u·. { (Pk I , U~ ) .... , (Pk, ' U; ) } ] u ... U h;.[W,{(Pk"vd,···,(PkjlVj)}] 
VI EU{ t'jEU-; 
(A.2.39) 
w'E u: 
Define h; : lV x P(<pn x P(W)) ... ~ P(W) by 
h~ {(Pk"Ut), .... (Pk" )}] 











Finally h~ : P(lV) x P(<1>n x P(W)) ----> P(W) by 
h~l(U'{(Pkl,U;), ... ,(PkJ'U;)}) = U h~[11',{(pkl,U;)"",(PkJ'U;)}] (A.2.41) 
wEU 
that provides us with the general expression required to calculate any uniform substitution using 
t hp IIlHlly world fortllalislIl ill PropCal n 
[1]] [0 (cfJdPk,:cfJ"2/Pk 2 ···d»/Pk,)] 
h~l ([0] , {(Pk" [d>d), ... , (Pk, ' [d>j])} ) (A.2.42) 
This completes the section on substitution using the semantic representation. One now has the tools 
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